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sensations

sensations Sentence Examples

  • The strange sensations within him remained.

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  • His body was solid and strong, the sensations of his skin against hers and his scents intoxicating her.

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  • She closed her eyes, savoring the sensations, his scent and heated touch imprinted upon her mind.

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  • The buildings blocked the sun, and the barrage of sensations overwhelmed her.

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  • She held nothing back as he drove her to sensations and heights she'd never imagined.

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  • She closed her eyes to the gentle flow and strange sensations: Jule's warmth, her father's hot-cold rain, the ancient power of the ruins.

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  • Intrigued by the sensations, she found herself unwilling to look away from him this time.

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  • She was lost for a moment in the sensations of his warm hand clasping hers.

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  • His scent and heat, the warmth of his magic, the heady sensations of being so close to him … She concentrated on placing her feet and not on his body.

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  • She wanted to be angry at him but was too dazed, too surprised at the sensations running through her.

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  • She dropped her hand and prayed the sensations within her left.

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  • The sensations made her want to cry.

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  • Her recollections of the sensations of smell are very vivid.

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  • She savored the sensations of his hot, wet mouth and the buzz she got feeding from him.

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  • Lost in the heady sensations, Deidre wriggled and strained beneath him.

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  • She wasn't expecting the intensity of sensations in the human world.

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  • Unable to sleep, Deidre paced, trying hard to shake the sensations clouding her head.

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  • There were no sounds, no sights underground, no sensations aside from the scent of his own fear and the feeling of earth closing in around him.

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  • She accepted Jonny's hand rather than Xander's and closed her eyes to the cold sensations of Transporting.

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  • He kissed her long and light, enjoying the sensations of her body as she became aroused.

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  • Emotions, random sensations, memories, disjointed images.

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  • The sensations made him more restless.

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  • She was trying hard to ignore the sensations in her body.

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  • When he lifted his head, her thoughts were too addled for her to focus on anything more than the sensations of the body against hers.

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  • Muddling through the sensations, she sensed her father's magic.

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  • The initial sensations passed, and he breathed deeply, finally able to focus as his body adjusted to the feel of the energy flowing through him.

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  • In ethics empiricism begins by recognizing that man possesses sensations, and so is liable to pleasures and pains.

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  • In ethics empiricism begins by recognizing that man possesses sensations, and so is liable to pleasures and pains.

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  • The men around her were roused by the sensations.

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  • Yully closed her eyes, entranced by the sensations.

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  • The sensations were similar to her bond with Jule: sweet and warm.

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  • Deidre struggled against the sensations.

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  • Deidre ran her hands over the clothing in the wardrobe, gasping at the sensations.

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  • She ate, her attention soon captured by the sensations of the airy omelet and melted cheese in her mouth.

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  • Nothing made sense to her numbed mind, aside from the fragrant ocean, the fine sand that slid through her fingers like silk, and the warm-cool sensations caused by a combination of afternoon sun and sea breeze.

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  • The sensations stabilized and then dissipated.

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  • The sensations humbled him, and he thought again of Mansr's words, that he needed to be more than an exiled war planner.

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  • Rhyn squinted towards the sound of his brother's voice, struggling to balance the sensations within him.

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  • The colors and sensations of the immortal world were richer on the senses, but the mortal world seemed raw, untamed.

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  • He let the sensations outside of his mind distract him while he checked his watch a few times.

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  • She'd almost crossed the threshold where she was his; he felt her body start to arch under the sensations.

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  • The pinch came, followed by the strange sensations of energy flying within her.

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  • Jessi fought the sensations, not wanting to lose control, especially to him.

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  • Exploring the sensations of her body tentatively, she thought she heard the doorbell in the distance.

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  • Suddenly, the sensations stopped.

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  • He relished the sensations of her hot mouth and soft skin, the scent of her arousal and the way her body molded against his.

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  • She shivered at the sensations, desire blooming hot and fast within her.

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  • "What do you mean?" she whispered, enthralled by the sensations he stirred.

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  • Sense alone will never create orderly experience, as empiricism supposed; but a group of sensations reacted on by thought does so; it becomes, it is, a percept.

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  • Incomprehensibly, we are dependent upon sensation; and incomprehensibly, we place our sensations in time and space.

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  • " Things in themselves " - whether defined by Kant, illogically enough, as causes of sensations, or again defined by him as the ultimate realities towards which thought vaguely points - in either case, " things in themselves " are unattainable by any definite knowledge.

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  • Tremors of the muscles more or less violent accompany the cold sensations, beginning with the muscles of the lower jaw (chattering of the teeth), and extending to the extremities and trunk.

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  • Sensations, he argued, thus being representable by numbers, psychology may become an "exact" science, susceptible of mathematical treatment.

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  • By reducing the human mind to a series of unrelated atomic sensations, this teaching destroyed the possibility of knowledge, and further, by representing man as a "being who is simply the result of natural forces," it made conduct, or any theory of conduct, unmeaning; for life in any human, intelligible sense implies a personal self which (1) knows what to do, (2) has power to do it.

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  • Debussy has this in common with Strauss, that he too regards harmonies as pure physical sensations; but he differs from Strauss firstly in systematically refusing to regard them as anything else, and secondly in his extreme sensibility to harshness.

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  • We have seen (in the articles on Harmony and Music) how harmonic music originated in just this habit of regarding combinations of sound as mere sensations, and how for centuries the habit opposed itself to the intellectual principles of contrapuntal harmony.

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  • Much motor weakness and cutaneous sensations similar to those above described soon follow.

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  • 1843) and his disciples, it was proved that the cerebrum is occupied by many such centres or exchanges, which preside over the formulation of sensations into purposive groups of motions - kinaesthesis of H.

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  • As cause of our sensations and ground of our belief in externality, he substituted for an unintelligible material substance an equally unintelligible operation of divine power.

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  • The essence of his views is contained in the following passage, which he follows up with the conclusion "that one and the same kind of living filaments is and has been the cause of all organic life": "Would it be too bold to imagine that, in the great length of time since the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of the history of mankind, - would it be too bold to imagine that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, which the great First Cause endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions and associations, and thus possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of delivering down these improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end!"

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  • Equally impossible was it thenceforth to assert the mediate or immediate certainty of material substance as the cause either of events in nature or of sensations in ourselves.

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  • "not pulled aside," not distracted by synchronous sensations, but shown to be in harmony with them) when compared with others; probable, uncontradicted, and thoroughly investigated and confirmed.

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  • Helmholtz (Sensations of Tone, ch.

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  • If the sensations corresponding to these neighbouring elements are thus aroused, we have no such perception as a pure tone, and what we regard as a pure tone is the mean of a group of sensations.

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  • Smith, though recognizing the unpleasantness of beats, could not accept Sauveur's theory, and, indeed, it received no acceptance till it was rediscovered by Helmholtz, to whose investigations, recorded in his Sensations of Tone, we owe its satisfactory establishment.

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  • For a full discussion see his Sensations of Tone, ch.

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  • We may illustrate the first method by taking a case discussed by Helmholtz (Sensations of Tone, app. xvi.) where the two sources are reeds or pipes blown from the same wind-chest.

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  • But inasmuch as the successive orders are proportional to A X 2 A 3, or µµ 2 µ 3, and X and µ are small, they are of rapidly decreasing importance, and it is not certain that any beyond those in equation (35) correspond to our actual sensations.

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  • The second mode of production of combination tones, by the mechanism of the receiver, is discussed by Helmholtz (Sensations of Tone, App. xii.) and Rayleigh (Sound, i.

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  • Ellis, On the Sensations of Tone (1885).

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  • Aethers were invented for the planets to swim in, to constitute electric atmospheres and magnetic effluvia, to convey sensations from one part of our bodies to another, and so on, till all space had been filled three or four times over with aethers.

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  • Since (following Protagoras) knowledge is solely of momentary sensations, it is useless to try, as Socrates recommended, to make calculations as to future pleasures, and to balance present enjoyment with disagreeable consequences.

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  • Knowledge resides not in sense but in reason, which, on the suggestion of sensations of changing individuals, apprehends, or (to be precise) is reminded of, real universal forms, and, by first ascending from less to more general until it arrives at the form of good and then descending from this unconditional principle to the less general, becomes science and philosophy, using as its method the dialectic which gives and receives questions and answers between man and man.

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  • Berkeley is compelled to see that an immediate perception is not a thing, and that what we consider permanent or substantial is not a sensation but a group of qualities, which in ultimate analysis means sensations either immediately felt or such as our experience has taught us would be felt in conjunction with these.

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  • Our belief in the reality of a thing may therefore be said to mean assurance that this association in our minds between actual and possible sensations is somehow guaranteed.

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  • Further, Berkeley's own theory would never permit him to speak of possible sensations, meaning by that the ideas of sensations called up to our minds by present experience.

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  • Our belief in the permanence of something which corresponds to the association in our minds of actual and possible sensations means belief in the orderliness of nature; and that is merely assurance that the universe is pervaded and regulated by mind.

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  • He therefore concluded that all we know from the data of psychological idealism is impressions or sensations, ideas, and associations of ideas, making us believe without proof in substances and causes, together with " a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our preceptions."

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  • As to the origin of knowledge, Kant's position is that sense, outer and inner, affected by things in themselves, receives mere sensations or sensible ideas (Vorstellungen) as the matter which sense itself places in the a priori forms of space and time; that thereupon understanding, by means of the synthetic unity of apperception, " I think " - an act of spontaneity beyond sense, in all consciousness one and the same, and combining all my ideas as mine in one universal consciousness - and under a priori categories, or fundamental notions, such as substance and attribute, cause and effect, &c., unites groups of sensations or sensible ideas into objects and events, e.g.

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  • a house, one ball moving another; and that, accordingly, perception and experience, requiring both sense and understanding, are partly a posteriori and partly a priori, and constitute a knowledge of objects which, being sensations combined by synthetic unity under a priori forms, are more than mere sensations, but less than things in themselves.

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  • As to the known world, Kant's position was the logical deduction that from such phenomena of experience all we can know by logical reason is similar phenomena of actual or possible experience; and therefore that the known world, whether bodily or mental, is not a Cartesian world of bodies and souls, nor a Spinozistic world of one substance, nor a Leibnitzian world of monadic substances [[[Metaphysical Idealism]] created by God, but a world of sensations, such as Hume supposed, only combined, not by association, but by synthetic understanding into phenomenal objects of experience, which are phenomenal substances and causes - a world of phenomena not noumena.

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  • This second position is a new form of metaphysical idealism, containing the supposition, which lies at the foundation of later German philosophy, that since understanding shapes the objects out of sensations, and since nature, as we know it, consists of such objects, " understanding, though it does not make, shapes nature," as well as our knowledge.

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  • c. As to existence, Kant's position is the wholly illogical one that, though all known things are phenomena, there are things in themselves, or noumena; things which are said to cause sensations of outer sense and to receive sensations of inner sense, though they are beyond the category of causality which is defined as one of the notions uniting phenomena; and things which are assumed to exist and have these causal attributes, though declared unknowable by any logical use of reason, because logical reason is limited by the mental matter and form of experience to phenomena; and all this according to Kant himself.

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  • F His point was that there are no things in themselves different from minds or acting on them; that man is no product of things; nor does his thinking arise from passive sensations caused by things; nor is the end of his existence attainable in a world of things; but that he is the absolute free activity constructing his own world, which is only his own determination, his self-imposed limit, and means to his duty which allies him with God.

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  • In order to prove this novel conclusion he started afresh from the Cartesian " I think " in the Kantian form of the synthetic unity of apperception acting by a priori categories; but instead of allowing, with all previous metaphysicians, that the Ego passively receives sensations from something different, and not contenting himself with Kant's view that the Ego, by synthetically combining the matter of sensations with a priori forms, partially constructs objects, and therefore Nature as we know it, he boldly asserted that the Ego, in its synthetic unity, entirely constructs things; that its act of spontaneity is not mere synthesis of passive sensations, but construction of sensations into an object within itself; and that therefore understanding makes as well as shapes Nature.

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  • Kant's a priori synthesis of sensations into experience lies at the root of all German idealism.

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  • The noumenal idealists of Germany assumed, like all psychological idealists, the unproved hypothesis that there is no sense of body, but there is a sense of sensations; and they usually accepted Kant's point, that to get from such sensations to knowledge there is a synthesis contributing mental elements beyond the mental data of sense.

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  • He really accepted, like Kant, the hypothesis of a sense of sensations which led to the Kantian conclusion that the Nature we know in time and space is mere sensible appearances in us.

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  • From antiquity men had applied themselves to determine the relations between the physical stimuli and the socalled " quality " of sensations.

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  • But what was new was the application of this doctrine to the relations between the stimuli and the socalled " intensity " of sensations.

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  • There are then, at least within the limits of moderate sensations, concomitant variations between stimuli and sensations, not only in " quality," as in the intervals of sounds, which were understood long ago, but also in " intensity "; and the discovery of the latter is the importance of Weber's and Fechner's law.

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  • By the rules of induction from concomitant variations, we are logically bound to infer the realistic conclusion that outer physical stimuli cause inner sensations of sensible effects.

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  • Proceeding on this suggestion, and misled by the mathematical expression which he had given to Weber's law, Fechner held that a conscious sensation, like its stimulus, consists of units, or elements, by summation and increments of which conscious sensations and their differences are produced; so that consciousness, according to this unnecessary assumption, emerges from an integration of unconscious shocks or tremors.

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  • But he had also to endure countless objections to his mathematical statement of Weber's law, to his unnecessary assumption of units of sensation, and to his unjustifiable transfer of the law from physical to physiological stimuli of sensations, involving in his opinion his parallelistic view of body and mind.

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  • Hence he deduced that whatever we know from sensations arranged in such a priori forms are objects of our own experience and mental phenomena.

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  • Lange thus transmuted inconsistent Kantism into a consistent Neo-Kantism, consisting of these reformed positions: (1) we start with sensations in a priori forms; (2) all things known from these data are mental phenomena of experience; (3) everything beyond is idea, without any corresponding reality being knowable.

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  • He accepts the Kantian positions that unity of consciousness combines sensations by a priori synthesis, and that therefore all that natural science knows about matter moving in space is merely phenomena of outer sense; and he agrees with Kant that from these data we could not infer things in themselves by reason.

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  • " Sensory knowledge," he says, " is the knowledge of the relations of things through the relations of the sensations of things."

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  • He agrees with Fechner that physical process of nerve and psychical process of mind are really the same psychophysical process as appearing on the one hand to an observer and on the other hand to one's own consciousness; and that physical phenomena only produce physical phenomena, so that those materialists and realists are wrong who say that physical stimuli produce sensations.

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  • For what does it matter to metaphysics whether by association sensations suggest ideas, and so give rise to ideas of substance and causation a posteriori, or synthetic unity of consciousness combines sensations by a priori notions of substance and causation into objects which are merely mental phenomena of experience, when it is at once allowed by the followers of Hume and Kant alike that reason in any logical use has no power of inferring things beyond the experience of the reasoner?

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  • He tells us how from his youth he pursued physical and psychological studies, how at the age of fifteen he read Kant's Prolegomena, and later rejected the thing in itself, and came to the conclusion that the world with his ego is one mass of sensations.

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  • He holds, like Hume, that nothing is real except our sensations and complexes of sensory elements; that the ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity, but its continuity alone is important; and that we know no real causes at all, much less real causes of our sensations; or, as he expresses it, bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations form bodies.

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  • But he limits this power of mind beyond sensations to mere ideas, and like Hume, and also like Lange, holds at last that, though we may form ideas beyond sensations or phenomena, we cannot know things.

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  • 1908) as well as in his psychological work on the Analysis of Sensations (Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen, 1886), we find two main causes, both psychological and epistemological; namely, his views on sense and on inference.

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  • similar pressures of outside things), but are the actual elements out of which everything known is made; as if sensations were like chemical elements.

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  • Within the limits of these supposed sensory elements he accords more than many psychologists do to sense; because, following the nativists, Johannes Muller and Hering, he includes sensations of time and space, which, however, are not to be regarded as " pure intuitions " in the style of Kant.

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  • But here again he identifies time and space with the sensations of them (Zeitempfindungen and Raumempfindungen).

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  • On the assumption, then, that time and space are not objects, but systems, of sensations, he concludes that a body in time and space is " a relatively constant sum of touch-and-light-sensations, joined to the same time-and-space-sensations," that each man's own body is included in his sensations, and that to explain sensations by motions would only be to explain one set of sensations from another.

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  • In short, sensations are elements and bodies complexes of these elements.

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  • Secondly, his theory of inference contains the admission that we infer beyond sensations: he remarks that the space of the geometer is beyond space-sensations, and the time of the physicist does not coincide with time-sensations, because it uses measurements such as the rotation of the earth and the vibrations of the pendulum.

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  • Inference, according to him, is merely mental completion of sensations; and this mental completion has two characteristics: it only forms ideas, and it proceeds by an " economy of thought."

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  • According to him, whatever inferences we make, certain or uncertain, are mere economies of thought, adapting ideas to sensations, and filling out the gaps of experience by ideas; whatever we infer, whether bodies, or molecules, or atoms, or space of more than three dimensions, are all without distinction equally provisional conceptions, things of thought; and " bodies or things are compendious mental symbols for groups of sensations - symbols which do not exist outside thought."

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  • His philosophy, therefore, is that all known things are sensations and complexes of sensory elements, supplemented by an economy of thinking which cannot carry us beyond ideas to real things, or beyond relations of dependency to real causes.

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  • But the idealists are only too glad to get any excuse for denying bodily substances and causes; and, while Leibnitz supplied them with the fancied analysis of material into immaterial elements, and Hume with the reduction of bodies to assemblages of sensations, Mach adds the additional argument that bodily forces are not causes at all.

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  • Within this essential co-ordination he distinguished three values: R-values of the environment as stimulus; C-values of the central nervous system; and E-values of human statements - the latter being characterized by that which at the time of its existence for the individual admits of being named, and including what we call sensations, &c., which depend indirectly on the environment and directly on the central nervous system, but are not, as the materialist supposes, in any way reducible to possessions of the brain or any other part of that system.

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  • Now, beneath these confusing phrases the point to be regarded is that, in Wundt's opinion, though we can receive sensations, we cannot think at all beyond sense, without some will.

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  • Further, Wundt declares that the psychical compound of sensations, with which, according to him, we actually start, is not a complex sensation, but a compound idea; so that I am expected to believe that, when I hear the chord of D, I am not conscious of single sensations of D, F, A, and have only a compound idea of the chord - as if the hearing of music were merely a series of ideas!

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  • It follows that every psychical compound into which temporal and spatial ideas enter must itself be an idea; and, as time at any rate accompanies all our sensations, it follows that every psychical compound of sensations, containing as it does, always temporal, if not also spatial, ideas, must be a compound idea, and not, as nativists suppose, Schuppe for instance, a compound sensation.

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  • But he does not agree with Hume that mind is nothing but sensations, ideas, and associations, but with Kant, that there are higher combinations.

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  • As with Kant against Hume, so with Wundt against Mach and Avenarius, the world we know will contain something more than mere complexes of sensations, more than pure experience: with Wundt it will be a world of real causes and some substances, constituted partly by experience and partly by logical thinking, or active inner will.

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  • Hence, according to Wundt, the world we know is still unitary experience, distinguished, not separated, into subject and object, aggregates of ideas analysed by judgment and combined by inference, an object of idea elaborated into causes and substances by logical thinking, at most a world of our ideas composed out of our sensations, and arranged under our categories of our understanding by our inner wills, or a world of our ideating wills; but nothing else.

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  • The predominant influence, on the whole, has been the phenomenalism of Hume, with its slender store of sensations, ideas and associations, and its conclusion that all we know is sensations without any known thinkers or any other known things.

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  • But natural realism, as finally interpreted by Hamilton, was too dogmatic, too unsystematic, and too confused with elements derived from Kantian idealism to withstand the brilliant criticism of Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), a work which for a time almost persuaded us that Nature as we know it from sensations is nothing but permanent possibilities of sensation, and oneself only a series of states of consciousness.

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  • Taken for granted the Kantian hypothesis of a sense of sensations requiring synthesis by understanding, and the Kantian conclusion that Nature as known consists of phenomena united by categories as objects of experience, Green argued, in accordance with Kant's first position, that knowledge, in order to unite the manifold of sensations by relations into related phenomena, requires unifying intelligence, or what Kant called synthetic unity of apperception, which cannot itself be sensation, because it arranges sensations; and he argued, in accordance with Kant's second position, that therefore Nature itself as known requires unifying intelligence to constitute the relations of its phenomena, and to make it a connected world of experience.

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  • It is, according to him, something more than sensation, but less than perception; it is common to us with lower animals such as dogs; its operation consists in co-ordinating sensations into an aggregate which the subject throws back into space, and thereby has a consciousness of a total object outside itself, e.g.

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  • Kant, applying them only to sensations, concluded that we can know nothing beyond by their means.

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  • What Hume called repeated sequence Pearson calls " routine " of perceptions, and, like his master, holds that cause is an antecedent stage in a routine of perceptions; while he also acknowledges that his account of matter leads him very near to John Stuart Mill's definition of matter as " a permanent possibility of sensations."

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  • Two psychological errors, among many others, constantly meet us in the history of idealism - the arbitrary hypothesis of a sense of sensations, or of ideas, and the intolerable neglect of logical inference.

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  • After the metaphysical idealism, begun by Berkeley, had eventuated in Hume's reduction of the objects of knowledge to sensations, ideas and associations, the Scottish school, applying the Baconian method to the study of mind, began to inquire once more for the evidences of our knowledge, and produced the natural or intuitive realism of T.

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  • He vacillated a great deal about our mode of perceiving the external world; but his final view (edition of Reid's works, note D*) consisted in supposing that (1) sensation is an apprehension of secondary qualities purely as affections of the organism viewed as ego; (2) perception in general is an apprehension of primary qualities as relations of sensations in the organism viewed as non-ego; while (3) a special perception of a so-called " secundo-primary " quality consists in " the consciousness of a resisting something external to our organism."

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  • Secondly, there are so-called " subjective sensations," without any external object as stimulus, most commonly in vision, but also in touch, which is liable to formication, or the feeling of creeping in the skin, and to horripilation, or the feeling of bristling in the hair; yet, even in " subjective sensations," we perceive something sensible, which, however, must be within, and not outside, the organism.

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  • This illogical hypothesis, which consists of incautiously passing from the truth that the sensible object perceived is not external but within the organism to the non-sequitur that therefore it is within the mind, derived what little plausibility it ever possessed from three prejudices: the first, the scholastic dogma that the sensible object is a species sensibilis, or immaterial sensible form received from the external thing; the second, the Cartesian a priori argument that the soul as thinking thing can perceive nothing but its own ideas; the third, the common assumption of a sense of sensations.

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  • Like Kant, he supposes that experience is concerned with sensations, distinguishes matter and form in sense, identifies time and space, eternal time and infinite space, with the formal element, and substitutes 'synthesis of sensations of touch and sight for association and inference, as the origin of our knowing such a solid material object as a bell.

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  • Although he does not agree with Kant that either the formal element in sense or the synthesis of sensations is a priori, yet in very Kantian fashion, through not distinguishing between operation and object, he holds that, in synthetically combining sensations of touch and sight, we not only have a complex perception of a solid body, but also know this " object thought of " as itself the complex of these sensations objectified.

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  • Not so; like Kant himself, Hodgson supposes something beyond; not, however, an unknown thing in itself causing sensations, but a condition, or sine qua non, of their existence, without being a cause of their nature.

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  • It is realism - but inconsequent and inadequate realism, something like that of Spencer; according, indeed, more knowledge of the distinction between Nature as condition of sensations and God as condition of Nature; but very like in holding that all we know of natural forces is our perceptions.

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  • Yet Martineau adopted, as his view of the limits of human intelligence, that Kant was right in making space and time a priori forms of sense, but wrong in limiting them to sensations.

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  • He next assumes that we have no immediate experience of independent things - that sense perceives sensations, feelings, or ideas; while all else, e.g.

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  • On this quite new assumption of a sense of sensations he deduces that, from a perception of these mental facts, we could not infer material facts, e.g.

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  • He thirdly assumes an appendix to the second assumption: he assumes that sense perceives mental sensations with succession but without causality, because no kind of cause is open to observation.

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  • On this assumption of a sense of sensations, but not of causality, he deduces that we could not from such data infer any particular kind of cause, or a bodily cause, e.g.

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  • The machinery of expression having thus been indicated, the connexion of the physical actions and the psychical state was made the subject of speculation by Herbert Spencer (Psychology, 1855) These speculations were reduced to a system by Darwin (Expression of Emotions, 1872), who formulated and illustrated the following as fundamental physiognomical principles: (1) Certain complex acts are of direct or indirect service, under certain conditions of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations or desires; and whenever the same states of mind are induced the same sets of actions tend to be performed, even when they have ceased to be of use.

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  • Certain impressions, the sensations of sight and touch, have in themselves the element of space, for these impressions (Hume skilfully transfers his statement to the points) have a certain order or mode of arrangement.

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  • (2) Besides our sensations, we learn truth and reality by our preconceptions or ideas (irpoMpPaS).

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  • These are the fainter images produced by repeated sensations, the " ideas " resulting from previous " impressions "- sensations at second-hand as it were, which are stored up in memory, and which a general name serves to recall.

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  • These bear witness to reality, not because we feel anything now, but because we felt it once; they are sensations registered in language, and again, if need be, translatable into immediate sensations or groups of sensation.

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  • Reasoning can come in only to put sensations together, and to point out how they severally contribute to human welfare; it does not make them, and cannot alter them.

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  • We must indeed accept our feelings; but we must also believe much which is not directly testified by sensation, if only it serves to explain phenomena and does not contravene our sensations.

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  • He carried out the principle of association into the analysis of the complex emotional states, as the affections, the aesthetic emotions and the moral sentiment, all which he endeavoured to resolve into pleasurable and painful sensations.

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  • Patients in whom, for purposes of diagnosis, it has been electrically excited, describe, as the initial effect of the stimulation, tingling and obscure but locally-limited sensations, referred to the part whose muscles a moment later are thrown into co-ordinate activity.

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  • But all forms by which thought holds sensations in unity (the formative or synthetic elements of language) had their place assigned in a system where one leads up to and passes over into another.

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  • This empirical groundwork of Aristotle's logic was accepted by the Epicureans, who enunciated most distinctly the fundamental doctrine that all sensations are true of their immediate objects, and falsity begins with subsequent opinions, or what the moderns call " interpretation."

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  • that the existing hot is burning or becoming more or less hot, &c. Thus there is a combination of sensations causing the judgment; but the judgment is still a division of the sensible thing into itself and its being, and a belief that it is so determined.

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  • it is not a combination of sensations any more than of ideas.

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  • Moreover, as we have shown, our primary judgments of sense are beliefs founded on sensations without requiring ideas, and are beliefs, not merely that something is determined, but that it is determined as existing; and, accordingly, our primary inferences from these sensory judgments of existence are inferences that other things beyond sense are similarly determined as existing.

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  • When Berkeley has eliminated the literal materialism of Locke's metaphors of sense-perception, Hume finds no difficulty in accepting the sensations as present virtually in their own right, any nonsensible ground being altogether unknown.

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  • Normally he thinks of what he calls phenomena no longer as psychological groupings of sensations, as " states of mind," but as things and events in a physical world howsoever constituted and apprehended.

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  • On the other hand is a hypothetical dualism, according to which it is held that mind cannot bridge over the chasm so far as to know matter in itself, though it is compelled by its own laws of cause and effect to postulate matter as the origin, if not the motive cause, of its sensations.

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  • state in which sensations are more potent than ideas (so that the future is sacrificed to the present) to a state in which ideas are more potent than sensations (so that a greater but distant pleasure is preferred to a less but present pleasure); sociologically, as evolving from approval of war and warlike sentiments.

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  • His work on Sensations of Tone (1862) may well be termed the principle of physiological acoustics.

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  • It is thus that Fechner in his "day-view" of things sees in plants and planets the same fundamental "soul" as in us - that is, "one simple being which appears to none but itself, in us as elsewhere wherever it occurs self-luminous, dark for every other eye, at the least connecting sensations in itself, upon which, as the grade of soul mounts higher and higher, there is constructed the consciousness of higher and still higher relations."

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  • From the unity of soul it follows that all psychical processes - sensation, assent, impulse - proceed from reason, the ruling part; that is to say, there is no strife or division: the one rational soul alone has sensations, assents to judgments, is impelled towards objects of desire just as much as it thinks or reasons.

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  • Our ideas are copied from storedup sensations.

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  • So, too, in the order of knowledge there is nothing but sense and the force of reason maintaining its tension and connecting sensations and ideas in their proper sequence.

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  • - Sensations are the changes produced in the soul by external impressions, and are the result of contact, since every action of one body (and all representations are corporeal phenomena) upon another is of the nature of a shock.

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  • Such facts as that dogs " hunt in dreams," make it likely that their minds are not only sensible to actual events, present and past, but can, like our minds, combine revived sensations into ideal scenes in which they are actors, - that is to say, they have the faculty of imagination.

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  • The idea, inasmuch as it is a law of universal mind, which in particular minds produces aggregates of sensations called things, is a "determinant" (iripas ixov), and as such is styled "quantity" and perhaps "number" but the ideal numbers are distinct from arithmetical numbers.

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  • He warned his hearers against the fires of concupiscence, anger, ignorance, birth, death, decay and anxiety; and taking each of the senses in order he compared all human sensations to a burning flame which seems to be something it is not, which produces pleasure and pain, but passes rapidly away, and ends only in destruction.3 Accompanied by his new disciples, the Buddha walked on to Rajagaha, the capital of King Bimbisara, who, not unmindful of their former interview, came out to welcome him.

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  • Sensations, or the facts of the sensibility, are necessary; we do not impute them to ourselves.

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  • I thus reach an objective impersonal world of forces which corresponds to the variety of my sensations.

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  • The same criticism is even more emphatically applicable to the influence of a not-self, or world of forces, corresponding to our sensations, and the cause of them.

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  • Causality might tell us that a cause there is of sensation somewhere and of some sort; but that this cause is a force or sum of forces, existing in space, independently of us, and corresponding to our sensations, it could never tell us, for the simple reason that such a notion is not supposed to exist in our consciousness.

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  • It was by suppressing, through such self-torture, the influence on his soul of all sensations that the Jain could obtain salvation.

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  • And the sense data are, he finds, partly (a) revelations of external things themselves in their mathematical relations, and partly (b) sensations, boundless in variety, which are somehow awakened in us through contact and collision with things relatively to their mathematical relations.

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  • quantity, and also in terms of our own sensations.

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  • (Locke might have added that when one only ` sees a man ' it is merely his visible qualities that are perceived; his other qualities are as little ` actual present sensations ' as if he were out of the range of sense.) But when the man leaves me alone, I cannot be certain that he still exists."

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  • He shows elaborately how the pleasures and pains of " imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, and the moral sense " are developed out of the elementary pleasures and pains of sensation; by the coalescence into really complex but apparently single ideas of the " miniatures " or faint feelings which the repetition of sensations contemporaneously or in immediate succession tends to produce in cohering groups.

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  • His theory assumes the correspondence of mind and body, and is applied pari passu to the formation of ideas from sensations, and of " compound vibratiuncules in the medullary substance " from the original vibrations that arise in the organ of sense.2 The same general view was afterwards developed with much vigour and clearness on the psychical side alone by James Mill in his Analysis of the Human Mind.

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  • And yet that these forms are "given" to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other.

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  • If we were without sensations, i.e.

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  • But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know what actually happens when it is in connexion with other's reals, for its self-preservations then are what we call sensations.

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  • And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely.

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  • In phenomena we distinguish matter, which is given by sense, and form, which is the law of the order of sensations.

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  • Sensations formed by space and time compose the world of appearance, and this when treated by the understanding, according to logical rules, is experience.

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  • She blinked rapidly, startled by the sensations going through her.

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  • The men around her were roused by the sensations.

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  • He kissed her long and light, enjoying the sensations of her body as she became aroused.

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  • The sensations-- and the moment of peace he'd been denied for thousands of years-- made him uncomfortable.

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  • His skin and senses crawled with the sensations of being surrounded by vamps.

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  • Intrigued by the sensations, she found herself unwilling to look away from him this time.

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  • Yully closed her eyes, entranced by the sensations.

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  • The sensations whipped through him, reminding him how human he really was.

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  • Muddling through the sensations, she sensed her father's magic.

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  • She accepted Jonny's hand rather than Xander's and closed her eyes to the cold sensations of Transporting.

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  • She closed her eyes to the gentle flow and strange sensations: Jule's warmth, her father's hot-cold rain, the ancient power of the ruins.

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  • The sensations were similar to her bond with Jule: sweet and warm.

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  • The strange sensations within him remained.

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  • She savored the sensations of his hot, wet mouth and the buzz she got feeding from him.

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  • Deidre struggled against the sensations.

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  • She dropped her hand and prayed the sensations within her left.

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  • Mesmerized by the sensations, her confusion and his direct gaze, she had to concentrate hard to register what he said.

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  • His body was solid and strong, the sensations of his skin against hers and his scents intoxicating her.

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  • Lost in the heady sensations, Deidre wriggled and strained beneath him.

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  • The sensations within her churned and burned in a way that demanded she do something.

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  • Deidre didn't understand how to balance the two sensations, the physical need that made her want to drink more of him and beg him to make love to her again, and the inability to believe her fate was at the side of the Dark One.

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  • She groaned at the sensations he caused, soon drowning in the scent of blood and need to feel him inside her.

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  • She wasn't expecting the intensity of sensations in the human world.

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  • Deidre ran her hands over the clothing in the wardrobe, gasping at the sensations.

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  • She ate, her attention soon captured by the sensations of the airy omelet and melted cheese in her mouth.

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  • The buildings blocked the sun, and the barrage of sensations overwhelmed her.

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  • Unable to sleep, Deidre paced, trying hard to shake the sensations clouding her head.

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  • She was lost for a moment in the sensations of his warm hand clasping hers.

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  • His scent and heat, the warmth of his magic, the heady sensations of being so close to him … She concentrated on placing her feet and not on his body.

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  • She hadn't been able to wake up, and the sensations felt too real.

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  • The strange energy hummed through her again, and she became aware of new sensations she'd never noticed with anyone else.

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  • She shuddered, enthralled by the sensations running through her.

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  • She held nothing back as he drove her to sensations and heights she'd never imagined.

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  • The sensations of freefalling made her stomach turn.

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  • She'd felt the weird sensations before … Shadow world.

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  • His examination didn't last long, and the sensations faded.

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  • Nothing made sense to her numbed mind, aside from the fragrant ocean, the fine sand that slid through her fingers like silk, and the warm-cool sensations caused by a combination of afternoon sun and sea breeze.

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  • Emotions, random sensations, memories, disjointed images.

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  • The sensations assured her the surreal situation was really happening.

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  • The sensations stabilized and then dissipated.

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  • The sensations surprised her.

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  • She wanted to be angry at him but was too dazed, too surprised at the sensations running through her.

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  • The sensations made her want to cry.

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  • Unable to understand or control the strange sensations, she tried to help right herself as the hands gripping her ribcage steadied her.

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  • The initial sensations passed, and he breathed deeply, finally able to focus as his body adjusted to the feel of the energy flowing through him.

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  • The sensations humbled him, and he thought again of Mansr's words, that he needed to be more than an exiled war planner.

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  • Rhyn squinted towards the sound of his brother's voice, struggling to balance the sensations within him.

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  • The colors and sensations of the immortal world were richer on the senses, but the mortal world seemed raw, untamed.

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  • The warm-cool sensations swept past her.

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  • There were no sounds, no sights underground, no sensations aside from the scent of his own fear and the feeling of earth closing in around him.

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  • He loved war, the all consuming sensations of battle from the metallic scent of weapons and blood to the burn of his muscles as he fought beyond his normal capabilities.

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  • The sensations made him more restless.

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  • The sensations unsettled him, but he forced himself to turn away.

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  • She closed her eyes, savoring the sensations, his scent and heated touch imprinted upon her mind.

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  • He let the sensations outside of his mind distract him while he checked his watch a few times.

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  • She was trying hard to ignore the sensations in her body.

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  • She'd almost crossed the threshold where she was his; he felt her body start to arch under the sensations.

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  • The pinch came, followed by the strange sensations of energy flying within her.

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  • Jessi fought the sensations, not wanting to lose control, especially to him.

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  • Exploring the sensations of her body tentatively, she thought she heard the doorbell in the distance.

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  • Suddenly, the sensations stopped.

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  • He relished the sensations of her hot mouth and soft skin, the scent of her arousal and the way her body molded against his.

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  • She shivered at the sensations, desire blooming hot and fast within her.

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  • "What do you mean?" she whispered, enthralled by the sensations he stirred.

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  • When he lifted his head, her thoughts were too addled for her to focus on anything more than the sensations of the body against hers.

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  • bodily sensations were no longer agreeable.

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  • centerfold sensations Kelly Havel, Pamela Petrokova, and Isabella Camille.

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  • He writes about it sensitively, with due modesty and a sensible regard for the precise chronology, the details, the sensations.

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  • The phrase seemed to me to capture the intense and direct physical sensations which are such a key part of playing the clavichord.

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  • Visual sensations must not be confused with visual ' perceptions ', in which interpretation plays an overwhelmingly dominant rôle.

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  • It also boasts real driving sensations with a driving position featuring the latest technologies, and a specially designed high-performance diesel hybrid drivetrain.

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  • An infant's actions are purely impulsive reactions to the sensations and emotions he is experiencing.

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  • intransitive bodily sensations.

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  • likely to suffer the sensations of pain or discomfort.

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  • Gradually the surrounds atmosphere seemed to fill with sensations, and grew luminous.

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  • The sensations of cold metal adds to the intense orgasm brought on by quickly pulling these beads out at the point of orgasm.

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  • out-of-body sensations, floating, flying and other pleasurable experiences.

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  • Then suddenly you smile as a wine tickles the palate with its joyous sensations.

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  • peculiar sensations.

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  • Once the mental shock of moving unsupported through the air was over, his sensations ceased to be unpleasant, became very speedily pleasurable.

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  • Maybe, behind the fleeting world of sensations, there is an ultimate reality.

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  • I did my best to ignore the fact that my bodily sensations were no longer agreeable.

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  • It involves human assessment of tactile sensations, with the object hidden from the assessor's view.

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  • Around 10 per cent of patients will experience some unpleasant sensations of the face which may affect the quality of life.

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  • We like to source food from around the world bringing a host of taste sensations to your palate.

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  • Singing sensations... Probably the most famous soprano around at the moment, Katherine Jenkins is a former choir member.

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  • The large power sunroof opens two ways to maximize open-air sensations.

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  • tactile sensations.

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  • taste sensations to your palate.

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  • This powerful heart-shaped clitoral stimulator has textured tickling nubs on one side for extra sensations.

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  • tickles the palate with its joyous sensations.

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  • This will give sensations which commonly will be a slight tingle, or a sense of fullness or pressure, or a dull ache.

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  • tingle, sensations of tingling, heat, heaviness, pressure or tightness.

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  • uncomfortable sensations.

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  • unpleasant sensations of the face which may affect the quality of life.

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  • verbalize any feelings or sensations which they might experience during the test.

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  • Perception is sensation caused by a present affection of the external extremities of the nerves; memory is sensation caused, in the absence of present excitation, by dispositions of the nerves which are the result of past experiences; judgment is the perception of relations between sensations, and is itself a species of sensation, because if we are aware of the sensations we must be aware also of the relations between them; will he identifies with the feeling of desire, and therefore includes it as a variety of sensation.

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  • Sense alone will never create orderly experience, as empiricism supposed; but a group of sensations reacted on by thought does so; it becomes, it is, a percept.

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  • Incomprehensibly, we are dependent upon sensation; and incomprehensibly, we place our sensations in time and space.

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  • Fourthly: if we try to think of objects not built up out of sensations and not in time and space, we are Austin's Jurisprudence explicitly assumes that the dilemma of " intuitive " and " utilitarian " is exhaustive.

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  • " Things in themselves " - whether defined by Kant, illogically enough, as causes of sensations, or again defined by him as the ultimate realities towards which thought vaguely points - in either case, " things in themselves " are unattainable by any definite knowledge.

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  • Tremors of the muscles more or less violent accompany the cold sensations, beginning with the muscles of the lower jaw (chattering of the teeth), and extending to the extremities and trunk.

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  • Sensations, he argued, thus being representable by numbers, psychology may become an "exact" science, susceptible of mathematical treatment.

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  • Though stimuli are composite, sensations are not.

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  • By reducing the human mind to a series of unrelated atomic sensations, this teaching destroyed the possibility of knowledge, and further, by representing man as a "being who is simply the result of natural forces," it made conduct, or any theory of conduct, unmeaning; for life in any human, intelligible sense implies a personal self which (1) knows what to do, (2) has power to do it.

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  • That which we perceive is from the outset an apprehended fact - that is to say, it cannot be analysed into isolated elements (socalled sensations) which, as such, are not constituents of consciousness at all, but exists from the first as a synthesis of relations in a consciousness which keeps distinct the "self" and the various elements of the "object," though holding all together in the unity of the act of perception.

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  • Debussy has this in common with Strauss, that he too regards harmonies as pure physical sensations; but he differs from Strauss firstly in systematically refusing to regard them as anything else, and secondly in his extreme sensibility to harshness.

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  • We have seen (in the articles on Harmony and Music) how harmonic music originated in just this habit of regarding combinations of sound as mere sensations, and how for centuries the habit opposed itself to the intellectual principles of contrapuntal harmony.

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  • Much motor weakness and cutaneous sensations similar to those above described soon follow.

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  • Lewes and others the doctrine of "cerebral reflex" was suggested, whereby actions, at first achieved only by incessant attention, became organized as conscious or subconscious habits; as for instance in the playing on musical or other instruments, when acts even of a very elaborate kind may directly follow the impulses of sensations, conscious adaptation and the deliberate choice of means being thus economized.

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  • 1843) and his disciples, it was proved that the cerebrum is occupied by many such centres or exchanges, which preside over the formulation of sensations into purposive groups of motions - kinaesthesis of H.

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  • As cause of our sensations and ground of our belief in externality, he substituted for an unintelligible material substance an equally unintelligible operation of divine power.

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  • The essence of his views is contained in the following passage, which he follows up with the conclusion "that one and the same kind of living filaments is and has been the cause of all organic life": "Would it be too bold to imagine that, in the great length of time since the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of the history of mankind, - would it be too bold to imagine that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, which the great First Cause endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions and associations, and thus possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of delivering down these improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end!"

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  • Equally impossible was it thenceforth to assert the mediate or immediate certainty of material substance as the cause either of events in nature or of sensations in ourselves.

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  • All our sensations are relative, and acquaint us, not with things as they are, but only with the impressions that things produce upon us.

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  • "not pulled aside," not distracted by synchronous sensations, but shown to be in harmony with them) when compared with others; probable, uncontradicted, and thoroughly investigated and confirmed.

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  • Helmholtz (Sensations of Tone, ch.

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  • If the sensations corresponding to these neighbouring elements are thus aroused, we have no such perception as a pure tone, and what we regard as a pure tone is the mean of a group of sensations.

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  • Smith, though recognizing the unpleasantness of beats, could not accept Sauveur's theory, and, indeed, it received no acceptance till it was rediscovered by Helmholtz, to whose investigations, recorded in his Sensations of Tone, we owe its satisfactory establishment.

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  • For a full discussion see his Sensations of Tone, ch.

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  • - Helmholtz has given a theory which certainly accounts for the production of a tone of the frequency of the beats and for other tones all grouped under the name of " combination tones "; and in his Sensations of Tone (ch.

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  • We may illustrate the first method by taking a case discussed by Helmholtz (Sensations of Tone, app. xvi.) where the two sources are reeds or pipes blown from the same wind-chest.

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  • But inasmuch as the successive orders are proportional to A X 2 A 3, or µµ 2 µ 3, and X and µ are small, they are of rapidly decreasing importance, and it is not certain that any beyond those in equation (35) correspond to our actual sensations.

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  • The second mode of production of combination tones, by the mechanism of the receiver, is discussed by Helmholtz (Sensations of Tone, App. xii.) and Rayleigh (Sound, i.

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  • Ellis, On the Sensations of Tone (1885).

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  • Aethers were invented for the planets to swim in, to constitute electric atmospheres and magnetic effluvia, to convey sensations from one part of our bodies to another, and so on, till all space had been filled three or four times over with aethers.

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  • These sensations are motions (, v)creis) which (1) are purely subjective, and (2) are painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as they are violent, tranquil or gentle.

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  • Since (following Protagoras) knowledge is solely of momentary sensations, it is useless to try, as Socrates recommended, to make calculations as to future pleasures, and to balance present enjoyment with disagreeable consequences.

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  • Knowledge resides not in sense but in reason, which, on the suggestion of sensations of changing individuals, apprehends, or (to be precise) is reminded of, real universal forms, and, by first ascending from less to more general until it arrives at the form of good and then descending from this unconditional principle to the less general, becomes science and philosophy, using as its method the dialectic which gives and receives questions and answers between man and man.

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  • Berkeley is compelled to see that an immediate perception is not a thing, and that what we consider permanent or substantial is not a sensation but a group of qualities, which in ultimate analysis means sensations either immediately felt or such as our experience has taught us would be felt in conjunction with these.

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  • Our belief in the reality of a thing may therefore be said to mean assurance that this association in our minds between actual and possible sensations is somehow guaranteed.

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  • Further, Berkeley's own theory would never permit him to speak of possible sensations, meaning by that the ideas of sensations called up to our minds by present experience.

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  • Our belief in the permanence of something which corresponds to the association in our minds of actual and possible sensations means belief in the orderliness of nature; and that is merely assurance that the universe is pervaded and regulated by mind.

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  • He therefore concluded that all we know from the data of psychological idealism is impressions or sensations, ideas, and associations of ideas, making us believe without proof in substances and causes, together with " a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our preceptions."

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  • As to the origin of knowledge, Kant's position is that sense, outer and inner, affected by things in themselves, receives mere sensations or sensible ideas (Vorstellungen) as the matter which sense itself places in the a priori forms of space and time; that thereupon understanding, by means of the synthetic unity of apperception, " I think " - an act of spontaneity beyond sense, in all consciousness one and the same, and combining all my ideas as mine in one universal consciousness - and under a priori categories, or fundamental notions, such as substance and attribute, cause and effect, &c., unites groups of sensations or sensible ideas into objects and events, e.g.

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  • a house, one ball moving another; and that, accordingly, perception and experience, requiring both sense and understanding, are partly a posteriori and partly a priori, and constitute a knowledge of objects which, being sensations combined by synthetic unity under a priori forms, are more than mere sensations, but less than things in themselves.

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  • This first position is psychological idealism in a new form and supported by new reasons; for, if experience derives its matter from mental sensations and its form from mental synthesis of sensations, it can apprehend nothing but mental objects of sense, which, according to Kant, are sensible ideas having no existence outside our thought, not things in themselves; or phenomena, not noumena.

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  • As to the known world, Kant's position was the logical deduction that from such phenomena of experience all we can know by logical reason is similar phenomena of actual or possible experience; and therefore that the known world, whether bodily or mental, is not a Cartesian world of bodies and souls, nor a Spinozistic world of one substance, nor a Leibnitzian world of monadic substances [[[Metaphysical Idealism]] created by God, but a world of sensations, such as Hume supposed, only combined, not by association, but by synthetic understanding into phenomenal objects of experience, which are phenomenal substances and causes - a world of phenomena not noumena.

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  • This second position is a new form of metaphysical idealism, containing the supposition, which lies at the foundation of later German philosophy, that since understanding shapes the objects out of sensations, and since nature, as we know it, consists of such objects, " understanding, though it does not make, shapes nature," as well as our knowledge.

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  • c. As to existence, Kant's position is the wholly illogical one that, though all known things are phenomena, there are things in themselves, or noumena; things which are said to cause sensations of outer sense and to receive sensations of inner sense, though they are beyond the category of causality which is defined as one of the notions uniting phenomena; and things which are assumed to exist and have these causal attributes, though declared unknowable by any logical use of reason, because logical reason is limited by the mental matter and form of experience to phenomena; and all this according to Kant himself.

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  • F His point was that there are no things in themselves different from minds or acting on them; that man is no product of things; nor does his thinking arise from passive sensations caused by things; nor is the end of his existence attainable in a world of things; but that he is the absolute free activity constructing his own world, which is only his own determination, his self-imposed limit, and means to his duty which allies him with God.

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  • In order to prove this novel conclusion he started afresh from the Cartesian " I think " in the Kantian form of the synthetic unity of apperception acting by a priori categories; but instead of allowing, with all previous metaphysicians, that the Ego passively receives sensations from something different, and not contenting himself with Kant's view that the Ego, by synthetically combining the matter of sensations with a priori forms, partially constructs objects, and therefore Nature as we know it, he boldly asserted that the Ego, in its synthetic unity, entirely constructs things; that its act of spontaneity is not mere synthesis of passive sensations, but construction of sensations into an object within itself; and that therefore understanding makes as well as shapes Nature.

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  • The conclusion of his epistemology is that we start with ourselves positing subjective sensations - e.g.

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  • The metaphysics resulting from this epistemology is that the socalled thing in itself is not a cause of our sensations, but a product of one's own thinking, a determination of the Ego, a thing known to the Ego which constructs it.

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  • Kant's a priori synthesis of sensations into experience lies at the root of all German idealism.

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  • The noumenal idealists of Germany assumed, like all psychological idealists, the unproved hypothesis that there is no sense of body, but there is a sense of sensations; and they usually accepted Kant's point, that to get from such sensations to knowledge there is a synthesis contributing mental elements beyond the mental data of sense.

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  • He really accepted, like Kant, the hypothesis of a sense of sensations which led to the Kantian conclusion that the Nature we know in time and space is mere sensible appearances in us.

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  • From antiquity men had applied themselves to determine the relations between the physical stimuli and the socalled " quality " of sensations.

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  • But what was new was the application of this doctrine to the relations between the stimuli and the socalled " intensity " of sensations.

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  • There are then, at least within the limits of moderate sensations, concomitant variations between stimuli and sensations, not only in " quality," as in the intervals of sounds, which were understood long ago, but also in " intensity "; and the discovery of the latter is the importance of Weber's and Fechner's law.

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  • By the rules of induction from concomitant variations, we are logically bound to infer the realistic conclusion that outer physical stimuli cause inner sensations of sensible effects.

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  • Proceeding on this suggestion, and misled by the mathematical expression which he had given to Weber's law, Fechner held that a conscious sensation, like its stimulus, consists of units, or elements, by summation and increments of which conscious sensations and their differences are produced; so that consciousness, according to this unnecessary assumption, emerges from an integration of unconscious shocks or tremors.

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  • But he had also to endure countless objections to his mathematical statement of Weber's law, to his unnecessary assumption of units of sensation, and to his unjustifiable transfer of the law from physical to physiological stimuli of sensations, involving in his opinion his parallelistic view of body and mind.

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  • Hence he deduced that whatever we know from sensations arranged in such a priori forms are objects of our own experience and mental phenomena.

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  • Lange thus transmuted inconsistent Kantism into a consistent Neo-Kantism, consisting of these reformed positions: (1) we start with sensations in a priori forms; (2) all things known from these data are mental phenomena of experience; (3) everything beyond is idea, without any corresponding reality being knowable.

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  • He accepts the Kantian positions that unity of consciousness combines sensations by a priori synthesis, and that therefore all that natural science knows about matter moving in space is merely phenomena of outer sense; and he agrees with Kant that from these data we could not infer things in themselves by reason.

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  • " Sensory knowledge," he says, " is the knowledge of the relations of things through the relations of the sensations of things."

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  • He agrees with Fechner that physical process of nerve and psychical process of mind are really the same psychophysical process as appearing on the one hand to an observer and on the other hand to one's own consciousness; and that physical phenomena only produce physical phenomena, so that those materialists and realists are wrong who say that physical stimuli produce sensations.

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  • But whereas Fechner and Paulsen hold that all physical processes are universally accompanied by psychical processes which are the real causes of psychical sensations, Riehl rejects this paradox of universal parallelism in order to fall into the equally paradoxical hypothesis that something or other, which is neither physical not psychical, causes both the physical phenomena of matter moving in space and the psychical phenomena of mind to arise in us as its common effects.

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  • For what does it matter to metaphysics whether by association sensations suggest ideas, and so give rise to ideas of substance and causation a posteriori, or synthetic unity of consciousness combines sensations by a priori notions of substance and causation into objects which are merely mental phenomena of experience, when it is at once allowed by the followers of Hume and Kant alike that reason in any logical use has no power of inferring things beyond the experience of the reasoner?

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  • He tells us how from his youth he pursued physical and psychological studies, how at the age of fifteen he read Kant's Prolegomena, and later rejected the thing in itself, and came to the conclusion that the world with his ego is one mass of sensations.

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  • He holds, like Hume, that nothing is real except our sensations and complexes of sensory elements; that the ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity, but its continuity alone is important; and that we know no real causes at all, much less real causes of our sensations; or, as he expresses it, bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations form bodies.

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  • But he limits this power of mind beyond sensations to mere ideas, and like Hume, and also like Lange, holds at last that, though we may form ideas beyond sensations or phenomena, we cannot know things.

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  • 1908) as well as in his psychological work on the Analysis of Sensations (Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen, 1886), we find two main causes, both psychological and epistemological; namely, his views on sense and on inference.

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  • In the first place, he displays in its most naked form the common but unproved idealistic paradox of a sense of sensations, according to which touch apprehends not pressure but a sensation of pressure, sight apprehends not colour but a sensation of colour, and there is no difference between the sensory operation and the sensible object apprehended by any sense, even within the sentient organism.

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  • Hence, according to him, sensations are not apprehensions of sensible objects (e.g.

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  • similar pressures of outside things), but are the actual elements out of which everything known is made; as if sensations were like chemical elements.

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  • Within the limits of these supposed sensory elements he accords more than many psychologists do to sense; because, following the nativists, Johannes Muller and Hering, he includes sensations of time and space, which, however, are not to be regarded as " pure intuitions " in the style of Kant.

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  • But here again he identifies time and space with the sensations of them (Zeitempfindungen and Raumempfindungen).

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  • On the assumption, then, that time and space are not objects, but systems, of sensations, he concludes that a body in time and space is " a relatively constant sum of touch-and-light-sensations, joined to the same time-and-space-sensations," that each man's own body is included in his sensations, and that to explain sensations by motions would only be to explain one set of sensations from another.

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  • In short, sensations are elements and bodies complexes of these elements.

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  • Secondly, his theory of inference contains the admission that we infer beyond sensations: he remarks that the space of the geometer is beyond space-sensations, and the time of the physicist does not coincide with time-sensations, because it uses measurements such as the rotation of the earth and the vibrations of the pendulum.

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  • Inference, according to him, is merely mental completion of sensations; and this mental completion has two characteristics: it only forms ideas, and it proceeds by an " economy of thought."

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  • According to him, whatever inferences we make, certain or uncertain, are mere economies of thought, adapting ideas to sensations, and filling out the gaps of experience by ideas; whatever we infer, whether bodies, or molecules, or atoms, or space of more than three dimensions, are all without distinction equally provisional conceptions, things of thought; and " bodies or things are compendious mental symbols for groups of sensations - symbols which do not exist outside thought."

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  • His philosophy, therefore, is that all known things are sensations and complexes of sensory elements, supplemented by an economy of thinking which cannot carry us beyond ideas to real things, or beyond relations of dependency to real causes.

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  • But the idealists are only too glad to get any excuse for denying bodily substances and causes; and, while Leibnitz supplied them with the fancied analysis of material into immaterial elements, and Hume with the reduction of bodies to assemblages of sensations, Mach adds the additional argument that bodily forces are not causes at all.

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  • Within this essential co-ordination he distinguished three values: R-values of the environment as stimulus; C-values of the central nervous system; and E-values of human statements - the latter being characterized by that which at the time of its existence for the individual admits of being named, and including what we call sensations, &c., which depend indirectly on the environment and directly on the central nervous system, but are not, as the materialist supposes, in any way reducible to possessions of the brain or any other part of that system.

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  • Now, beneath these confusing phrases the point to be regarded is that, in Wundt's opinion, though we can receive sensations, we cannot think at all beyond sense, without some will.

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  • He begins with psychical elements, sensations and feelings, but he asserts that these always exist in a psychical compound, from which they can be discovered only by analysis and abstraction; and his paradox that a pure sensation is an abstraction is repeated by W.

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  • Further, Wundt declares that the psychical compound of sensations, with which, according to him, we actually start, is not a complex sensation, but a compound idea; so that I am expected to believe that, when I hear the chord of D, I am not conscious of single sensations of D, F, A, and have only a compound idea of the chord - as if the hearing of music were merely a series of ideas!

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  • He supposes that we have no sensations of space and time, as the nativists suppose, but that, while local signs give us spatial ideas, feelings of expectation are temporal signs giving us temporal ideas, and that these ideas enter into the psychical compound, which is our actual starting-point.

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  • It follows that every psychical compound into which temporal and spatial ideas enter must itself be an idea; and, as time at any rate accompanies all our sensations, it follows that every psychical compound of sensations, containing as it does, always temporal, if not also spatial, ideas, must be a compound idea, and not, as nativists suppose, Schuppe for instance, a compound sensation.

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  • He prefixes to the ordinary associations, which descend from Hume, an association which he calls fusion (Verschmelzung), and supposes that it is a fundamental process of fusing sensations with spatial and temporal ideas into a compound idea.

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  • But he does not agree with Hume that mind is nothing but sensations, ideas, and associations, but with Kant, that there are higher combinations.

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  • As with Kant against Hume, so with Wundt against Mach and Avenarius, the world we know will contain something more than mere complexes of sensations, more than pure experience: with Wundt it will be a world of real causes and some substances, constituted partly by experience and partly by logical thinking, or active inner will.

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  • Hence, according to Wundt, the world we know is still unitary experience, distinguished, not separated, into subject and object, aggregates of ideas analysed by judgment and combined by inference, an object of idea elaborated into causes and substances by logical thinking, at most a world of our ideas composed out of our sensations, and arranged under our categories of our understanding by our inner wills, or a world of our ideating wills; but nothing else.

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  • The predominant influence, on the whole, has been the phenomenalism of Hume, with its slender store of sensations, ideas and associations, and its conclusion that all we know is sensations without any known thinkers or any other known things.

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  • But natural realism, as finally interpreted by Hamilton, was too dogmatic, too unsystematic, and too confused with elements derived from Kantian idealism to withstand the brilliant criticism of Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), a work which for a time almost persuaded us that Nature as we know it from sensations is nothing but permanent possibilities of sensation, and oneself only a series of states of consciousness.

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  • Taken for granted the Kantian hypothesis of a sense of sensations requiring synthesis by understanding, and the Kantian conclusion that Nature as known consists of phenomena united by categories as objects of experience, Green argued, in accordance with Kant's first position, that knowledge, in order to unite the manifold of sensations by relations into related phenomena, requires unifying intelligence, or what Kant called synthetic unity of apperception, which cannot itself be sensation, because it arranges sensations; and he argued, in accordance with Kant's second position, that therefore Nature itself as known requires unifying intelligence to constitute the relations of its phenomena, and to make it a connected world of experience.

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  • It is, according to him, something more than sensation, but less than perception; it is common to us with lower animals such as dogs; its operation consists in co-ordinating sensations into an aggregate which the subject throws back into space, and thereby has a consciousness of a total object outside itself, e.g.

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  • Kant, applying them only to sensations, concluded that we can know nothing beyond by their means.

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  • What Hume called repeated sequence Pearson calls " routine " of perceptions, and, like his master, holds that cause is an antecedent stage in a routine of perceptions; while he also acknowledges that his account of matter leads him very near to John Stuart Mill's definition of matter as " a permanent possibility of sensations."

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  • Two psychological errors, among many others, constantly meet us in the history of idealism - the arbitrary hypothesis of a sense of sensations, or of ideas, and the intolerable neglect of logical inference.

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  • After the metaphysical idealism, begun by Berkeley, had eventuated in Hume's reduction of the objects of knowledge to sensations, ideas and associations, the Scottish school, applying the Baconian method to the study of mind, began to inquire once more for the evidences of our knowledge, and produced the natural or intuitive realism of T.

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  • He vacillated a great deal about our mode of perceiving the external world; but his final view (edition of Reid's works, note D*) consisted in supposing that (1) sensation is an apprehension of secondary qualities purely as affections of the organism viewed as ego; (2) perception in general is an apprehension of primary qualities as relations of sensations in the organism viewed as non-ego; while (3) a special perception of a so-called " secundo-primary " quality consists in " the consciousness of a resisting something external to our organism."

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  • Secondly, there are so-called " subjective sensations," without any external object as stimulus, most commonly in vision, but also in touch, which is liable to formication, or the feeling of creeping in the skin, and to horripilation, or the feeling of bristling in the hair; yet, even in " subjective sensations," we perceive something sensible, which, however, must be within, and not outside, the organism.

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  • This illogical hypothesis, which consists of incautiously passing from the truth that the sensible object perceived is not external but within the organism to the non-sequitur that therefore it is within the mind, derived what little plausibility it ever possessed from three prejudices: the first, the scholastic dogma that the sensible object is a species sensibilis, or immaterial sensible form received from the external thing; the second, the Cartesian a priori argument that the soul as thinking thing can perceive nothing but its own ideas; the third, the common assumption of a sense of sensations.

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  • Like Kant, he supposes that experience is concerned with sensations, distinguishes matter and form in sense, identifies time and space, eternal time and infinite space, with the formal element, and substitutes 'synthesis of sensations of touch and sight for association and inference, as the origin of our knowing such a solid material object as a bell.

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  • Although he does not agree with Kant that either the formal element in sense or the synthesis of sensations is a priori, yet in very Kantian fashion, through not distinguishing between operation and object, he holds that, in synthetically combining sensations of touch and sight, we not only have a complex perception of a solid body, but also know this " object thought of " as itself the complex of these sensations objectified.

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  • Not so; like Kant himself, Hodgson supposes something beyond; not, however, an unknown thing in itself causing sensations, but a condition, or sine qua non, of their existence, without being a cause of their nature.

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  • It is realism - but inconsequent and inadequate realism, something like that of Spencer; according, indeed, more knowledge of the distinction between Nature as condition of sensations and God as condition of Nature; but very like in holding that all we know of natural forces is our perceptions.

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  • Yet Martineau adopted, as his view of the limits of human intelligence, that Kant was right in making space and time a priori forms of sense, but wrong in limiting them to sensations.

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  • He next assumes that we have no immediate experience of independent things - that sense perceives sensations, feelings, or ideas; while all else, e.g.

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  • On this quite new assumption of a sense of sensations he deduces that, from a perception of these mental facts, we could not infer material facts, e.g.

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  • He thirdly assumes an appendix to the second assumption: he assumes that sense perceives mental sensations with succession but without causality, because no kind of cause is open to observation.

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  • On this assumption of a sense of sensations, but not of causality, he deduces that we could not from such data infer any particular kind of cause, or a bodily cause, e.g.

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  • The machinery of expression having thus been indicated, the connexion of the physical actions and the psychical state was made the subject of speculation by Herbert Spencer (Psychology, 1855) These speculations were reduced to a system by Darwin (Expression of Emotions, 1872), who formulated and illustrated the following as fundamental physiognomical principles: (1) Certain complex acts are of direct or indirect service, under certain conditions of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations or desires; and whenever the same states of mind are induced the same sets of actions tend to be performed, even when they have ceased to be of use.

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  • Certain impressions, the sensations of sight and touch, have in themselves the element of space, for these impressions (Hume skilfully transfers his statement to the points) have a certain order or mode of arrangement.

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  • (2) Besides our sensations, we learn truth and reality by our preconceptions or ideas (irpoMpPaS).

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  • These are the fainter images produced by repeated sensations, the " ideas " resulting from previous " impressions "- sensations at second-hand as it were, which are stored up in memory, and which a general name serves to recall.

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  • These bear witness to reality, not because we feel anything now, but because we felt it once; they are sensations registered in language, and again, if need be, translatable into immediate sensations or groups of sensation.

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  • Reasoning can come in only to put sensations together, and to point out how they severally contribute to human welfare; it does not make them, and cannot alter them.

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  • We must indeed accept our feelings; but we must also believe much which is not directly testified by sensation, if only it serves to explain phenomena and does not contravene our sensations.

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  • He carried out the principle of association into the analysis of the complex emotional states, as the affections, the aesthetic emotions and the moral sentiment, all which he endeavoured to resolve into pleasurable and painful sensations.

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  • Patients in whom, for purposes of diagnosis, it has been electrically excited, describe, as the initial effect of the stimulation, tingling and obscure but locally-limited sensations, referred to the part whose muscles a moment later are thrown into co-ordinate activity.

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  • But all forms by which thought holds sensations in unity (the formative or synthetic elements of language) had their place assigned in a system where one leads up to and passes over into another.

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  • He examined and analysed the fact of human knowledge, and obtained the following results: (r) that the notion or idea of being or existence in general enters into, and is presupposed by, all our acquired cognitions, so that, without it, they would be impossible; (2) that this idea is essentially objective, inasmuch as what is seen in it is as distinct from and opposed to the mind that sees it as the light is from the eye that looks at it; (3) that it is essentially true, because "being" and "truth" are convertible terms, and because in the vision of it the mind cannot err, since error could only be committed by a judgment, and here there is no judgment, but a pure intuition affirming nothing and denying nothing; (4) that by the application of this essentially objective and true idea the human being intellectually perceives, first, the animal body individually conjoined with him, and then, on occasion of the sensations produced in him not by himself, the causes of those sensations, that is, from the action felt he perceives and affirms an agent, a being, and therefore a true thing, that acts on him, and he thus gets at the external world, - these are the true primitive judgments, containing (a) the subsistence of the particular being (subject), and (b) its essence or species as determined by the quality of the action felt from it (predicate); (5) that reflection, by separating the essence or species from the subsistence, obtains the full specific idea (universalization), and then from this, by leaving aside some of its elements, the abstract specific idea (abstraction); (6) that the mind, having reached this stage of development, can proceed to further and further abstracts, including the first principles of reasoning, the principles of the several sciences, complex ideas, groups of ideas, and so on without end; (7) finally, that the same most universal idea of being, this generator and formal element of all acquired cognitions, cannot itself be acquired, but must be innate in us, implanted by God in our nature.

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  • This empirical groundwork of Aristotle's logic was accepted by the Epicureans, who enunciated most distinctly the fundamental doctrine that all sensations are true of their immediate objects, and falsity begins with subsequent opinions, or what the moderns call " interpretation."

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  • that the existing hot is burning or becoming more or less hot, &c. Thus there is a combination of sensations causing the judgment; but the judgment is still a division of the sensible thing into itself and its being, and a belief that it is so determined.

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  • it is not a combination of sensations any more than of ideas.

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  • Moreover, as we have shown, our primary judgments of sense are beliefs founded on sensations without requiring ideas, and are beliefs, not merely that something is determined, but that it is determined as existing; and, accordingly, our primary inferences from these sensory judgments of existence are inferences that other things beyond sense are similarly determined as existing.

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  • When Berkeley has eliminated the literal materialism of Locke's metaphors of sense-perception, Hume finds no difficulty in accepting the sensations as present virtually in their own right, any nonsensible ground being altogether unknown.

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  • Normally he thinks of what he calls phenomena no longer as psychological groupings of sensations, as " states of mind," but as things and events in a physical world howsoever constituted and apprehended.

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  • On the other hand is a hypothetical dualism, according to which it is held that mind cannot bridge over the chasm so far as to know matter in itself, though it is compelled by its own laws of cause and effect to postulate matter as the origin, if not the motive cause, of its sensations.

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  • state in which sensations are more potent than ideas (so that the future is sacrificed to the present) to a state in which ideas are more potent than sensations (so that a greater but distant pleasure is preferred to a less but present pleasure); sociologically, as evolving from approval of war and warlike sentiments.

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  • His work on Sensations of Tone (1862) may well be termed the principle of physiological acoustics.

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  • It is thus that Fechner in his "day-view" of things sees in plants and planets the same fundamental "soul" as in us - that is, "one simple being which appears to none but itself, in us as elsewhere wherever it occurs self-luminous, dark for every other eye, at the least connecting sensations in itself, upon which, as the grade of soul mounts higher and higher, there is constructed the consciousness of higher and still higher relations."

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  • From the unity of soul it follows that all psychical processes - sensation, assent, impulse - proceed from reason, the ruling part; that is to say, there is no strife or division: the one rational soul alone has sensations, assents to judgments, is impelled towards objects of desire just as much as it thinks or reasons.

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  • Our ideas are copied from storedup sensations.

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  • So, too, in the order of knowledge there is nothing but sense and the force of reason maintaining its tension and connecting sensations and ideas in their proper sequence.

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  • - Sensations are the changes produced in the soul by external impressions, and are the result of contact, since every action of one body (and all representations are corporeal phenomena) upon another is of the nature of a shock.

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  • Such facts as that dogs " hunt in dreams," make it likely that their minds are not only sensible to actual events, present and past, but can, like our minds, combine revived sensations into ideal scenes in which they are actors, - that is to say, they have the faculty of imagination.

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  • The idea, inasmuch as it is a law of universal mind, which in particular minds produces aggregates of sensations called things, is a "determinant" (iripas ixov), and as such is styled "quantity" and perhaps "number" but the ideal numbers are distinct from arithmetical numbers.

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  • He warned his hearers against the fires of concupiscence, anger, ignorance, birth, death, decay and anxiety; and taking each of the senses in order he compared all human sensations to a burning flame which seems to be something it is not, which produces pleasure and pain, but passes rapidly away, and ends only in destruction.3 Accompanied by his new disciples, the Buddha walked on to Rajagaha, the capital of King Bimbisara, who, not unmindful of their former interview, came out to welcome him.

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  • Sensations, or the facts of the sensibility, are necessary; we do not impute them to ourselves.

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  • I thus reach an objective impersonal world of forces which corresponds to the variety of my sensations.

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  • The same criticism is even more emphatically applicable to the influence of a not-self, or world of forces, corresponding to our sensations, and the cause of them.

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  • Causality might tell us that a cause there is of sensation somewhere and of some sort; but that this cause is a force or sum of forces, existing in space, independently of us, and corresponding to our sensations, it could never tell us, for the simple reason that such a notion is not supposed to exist in our consciousness.

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  • It was by suppressing, through such self-torture, the influence on his soul of all sensations that the Jain could obtain salvation.

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  • And the sense data are, he finds, partly (a) revelations of external things themselves in their mathematical relations, and partly (b) sensations, boundless in variety, which are somehow awakened in us through contact and collision with things relatively to their mathematical relations.

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  • quantity, and also in terms of our own sensations.

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  • (Locke might have added that when one only ` sees a man ' it is merely his visible qualities that are perceived; his other qualities are as little ` actual present sensations ' as if he were out of the range of sense.) But when the man leaves me alone, I cannot be certain that he still exists."

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  • He shows elaborately how the pleasures and pains of " imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, and the moral sense " are developed out of the elementary pleasures and pains of sensation; by the coalescence into really complex but apparently single ideas of the " miniatures " or faint feelings which the repetition of sensations contemporaneously or in immediate succession tends to produce in cohering groups.

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  • His theory assumes the correspondence of mind and body, and is applied pari passu to the formation of ideas from sensations, and of " compound vibratiuncules in the medullary substance " from the original vibrations that arise in the organ of sense.2 The same general view was afterwards developed with much vigour and clearness on the psychical side alone by James Mill in his Analysis of the Human Mind.

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  • And yet that these forms are "given" to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other.

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  • If we were without sensations, i.e.

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  • But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know what actually happens when it is in connexion with other's reals, for its self-preservations then are what we call sensations.

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  • And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely.

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  • In phenomena we distinguish matter, which is given by sense, and form, which is the law of the order of sensations.

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  • Sensations formed by space and time compose the world of appearance, and this when treated by the understanding, according to logical rules, is experience.

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  • No one knows, however, just what her sensations are.

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  • If you had called these sensations respectively BLACK and WHITE, he would have adopted them as readily; but he would mean by BLACK and WHITE the same things that he means by SWEET and SOUR.

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  • It is true, on the other hand, that in her descriptions, she is best from the point of view of art when she is faithful to her own sensations; and this is precisely true of all artists.

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  • At the head of the table, where the honored guests sat, everyone seemed to be in high spirits and under the influence of a variety of exciting sensations.

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  • Not at all expecting so loud a report, Pierre shuddered at the sound and then, smiling at his own sensations, stood still.

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  • The one thing he now desired with his whole soul was to get away quickly from the terrible sensations amid which he had lived that day and return to ordinary conditions of life and sleep quietly in a room in his own bed.

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  • Maybe, behind the fleeting world of sensations, there is an ultimate reality.

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  • It involves human assessment of tactile sensations, with the object hidden from the assessor 's view.

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  • Around 10 per cent of patients will experience some unpleasant sensations of the face which may affect the quality of life.

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  • It consists of 3 rings which encircle your cock and balls and keeps them in a nice grip of pleasurable sensations.

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  • We like to source food from around the world bringing a host of taste sensations to your palate.

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  • Singing sensations... Probably the most famous soprano around at the moment, Katherine Jenkins is a former choir member.

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  • The large power sunroof opens two ways to maximize open-air sensations.

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  • There are ideas for building a fire on a damp blustery day or how to bring nature into your home to increase tactile sensations.

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  • This powerful heart-shaped clitoral stimulator has textured tickling nubs on one side for extra sensations.

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  • Pain, sensations of tingling, heat, heaviness, pressure or tightness.

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  • This will give sensations which commonly will be a slight tingle, or a sense of fullness or pressure, or a dull ache.

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  • Symptoms, she argued, were not just objective reports of deficits of function or uncomfortable sensations.

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  • The volunteer is asked to verbalize any feelings or sensations which they might experience during the test.

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  • Asian Sensations offers microwaveable Egg Rolls, Crab Rangoon, and Wontons.

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  • Slippery elm tea may be suggested as a way to coat the esophagus and reduce the burning sensations.

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  • Many people end up in the emergency room quite sure they're having a heart attack because the bodily sensations associated with panic and anxiety disorder mimic a heart attack.

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  • Basically, these modular sensations are arm chairs featuring cup holders, adjustable armrests, footrests, touch screens, and more.

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  • Artistic Sensations - has a great selection of animals and dinosaurs.

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  • Using all taste sensations is what makes this cuisine so unique and flavorful.

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  • Middle Eastern Themes: Thanks to the second Sex and the City movie, the colors and sensations of the Middle East are in.

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  • While some of the symptoms like the pleasurable sensations might feel good at first, methamphetamine is a dangerous drug that can be difficult to quit and can impair brain function for a time long after use.

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  • These things produce pleasurable feelings and calming sensations for users.

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  • Another unique dining option that offers guests unusual choices for their taste sensations.

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  • The overall sensations are light and dusty.

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  • Electric shock sensations, which may feel like a rubber band snapping in the layers of tissue between the skin and muscles.

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  • This neurological disorder is known for the uncomfortable and sometimes painful sensations in the legs that cause a burning, tugging or crawling sensation.

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  • These medications work to decrease the sensations of crawling that many with RLS feel.

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  • Fortunately, these sensations disappear with continued treatment.

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  • Since there are numerous reasons why you could be experiencing these painful sensations, a doctor is often the best resource in determining what is behind the pain you are feeling.

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  • The system sends signals from the brain and spinal cord to the different parts of the body-and amazingly, as people sleep, the central nervous system plays a big part in the many sensations that are expereinced in dreams.

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  • In the same respect, it is possible to experience the sensations of smell, taste, and sound during dreams.

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  • These sensations are more difficult to remember than what people see visually, but that doesn't mean they aren't occurring.

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  • These sensations are all completely normal and are not necessarily a cause for any alarm.

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  • Busch Gardens theme park Tampa offers a wide range of dining options, from gourmet meals to quick snacks and from barbeque and fajita wraps to filet mignon and seafood sensations.

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  • Thrill seekers marveled at the open air ride experience, new riding sensations, and unique thrills the inverted coaster could offer.

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  • Popular sensations come and go, and it's often difficult to know how long certain hits will remain at the top.

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  • The patient may feel aching or pain in parts of the body affected by inadequate blood supply, such as aching in the legs while walking or cramping sensations in the abdomen after meals.

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  • The child has tingling or other unusual sensations followed by numbness in certain parts of the body.

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  • When a narcotic medication stimulates these receptor proteins, the person typically experiences intense sensations of euphoria or well-being.

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  • Some people become convinced that their itch is caused by a parasite; this conviction is often linked to burning sensations in the tongue and may be caused by a major psychiatric disorder.

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  • Numbness and tingling are decreased or abnormal sensations caused by altered sensory nerve function.

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  • Sensations such as these, which occur without any associated stimulus, are called paresthesias.

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  • Restless legs syndrome (RLS)-A disorder in which the patient experiences crawling, aching, or other disagreeable sensations in the calves that can be relieved by movement.

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  • Normally, sensations of pain and fatigue signal that it is time to rest.

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  • Restless legs syndrome (RLS)-A disorder in which the patient experiences crawling, aching, or other disagreeable sensations in the calves that can be relieved by movement.

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  • Nerves are examined for sensory (feeling sensations) and motor (movement) function.

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  • The term refers to repeated unwanted or uncomfortable sensations, usually in the child's throat, eyes, or shoulders.

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  • Injected contrast can cause sensations of heat or cold through the body.

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  • The taste sensations for the front two-thirds of the tongue are sent to the brain via the seventh cranial nerve.

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  • The various swellings and enlargements throughout the body may press on nerves, causing sensations of local tingling or burning and sometimes result in muscle weakness.

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  • Some report various physical sensations, including tightness in the chest, tingling sensations, tremor, hearing echoes, or a feeling of pressure inside the head.

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  • Pain management covers a number of methods to prevent, reduce, or stop pain sensations.

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  • DDAVP has relatively few side effects although some people may experience facial flushing, tingling sensations, and headaches after treatment with this medication.

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  • Phantom sensations may begin immediately after the amputation, or they may develop months or years later.

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  • Other women find relief through visualization, concentrating on the pain as a particular color, and gaining control of the sensations.

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  • Side effects are usually mild, but may include headaches, nosebleeds, and unpleasant taste sensations.

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  • Akathisia-restlessness and a desire to move to relieve uncomfortable sensations.

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  • Sensations may include a feeling of crawling, itching, stretching, or creeping, usually in the legs.

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  • Restless legs syndrome (RLS)-A disorder in which the patient experiences crawling, aching, or other disagreeable sensations in the calves that can be relieved by movement.

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  • Side effects may include headaches, nosebleeds, and unpleasant taste sensations.

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