How to use Self-love in a sentence
The identification is slightly qualified in Hutcheson's posthumously published System of Moral Philosophy (1755), in which the general view of Shaftesbury is more fully developed, with several new psychological distinctions, including Butler's, separation of " calm " benevolence - as well as, after Butler, " calm self-love " - from the " turbulent " passions, selfish or social.
The threefold division into passions and affections, self-love and benevolence, and conscience, is Butler's celebrated analysis of human nature as found in his first sermon.
But by regarding benevolence less as a definite desire for the general good as such than as kind affection for particular individuals, he practically eliminates it as a regulative principle and reduces the authorities in the polity of the soul to two - conscience and self-love.
Man's function is not fulfilled by obeying the passions, or even cool self-love, but by obeying conscience.
It would be impossible to pass this judgment if self-love were not regarded as superior in kind to the passions, and this superiority results from the fact that it is the peculiar province of self-love to take a view of the several passions and decide as to their relative importance.Advertisement
But there is in man a faculty which takes into consideration all the springs of action, including self-love, and passes judgment upon them, approving some and condemning others.
He will not admit that there is any evidence of true virtue in the approbation of virtue and hatred of vice, in the workings of conscience or in the exercises of the natural affections; he thinks that these may all spring from self-love and the association of ideas, from " instinct " or from a " moral sense of a secondary kind " entirely different from " a sense or relish of the essential beauty of true virtue."
It also offended the self-love of most of the nobles and the clergy who were loath that a few of their number should be erected into a House of Lords.
Christian love is conceived (after Augustine) as primarily love to God (beyond the natural yearning of the creature after its ultimate good), which expands into love towards all God's creatures as created by him, and so ultimately includes even self-love.
Until this is done, the utmost demonstration of the abstract reasonableness of social duty only leaves us with an irreconcilable antagonism between the view of abstract reason and the self-love which is allowed to be the root of man's appetitive nature.Advertisement
The latter are " necessarily presupposed " as distinct impulses in " the very idea of an interested pursuit "; since, if there were no such pre-existing desires, there would be no pleasure for self-love to aim at.
Thus the object of hunger is not the pleasure of eating but food; hunger is therefore, strictly speaking, no more " interested " than benevolence; granting that the pleasures of the table are an important element in the happiness at which self-love aims, the same at least may be said for the pleasures of love and sympathy.
Further, so far from bodily appetites (or other particular desires) being forms of self-love, there is no one of them which under certain circumstances may not come into conflict with it.
Indeed, we may say that an egoist must be doubly self-regulative, since rational self-love ought to restrain not only other impulses, but itself also; for as happiness is made up of feelings that result from the satisfaction of impulses other than self-love, any over-development of the latter, enfeebling these other impulses, must proportionally diminish the happiness at which self-love aims. If, then, it be admitted that human impulses are naturally under government, the natural claim of conscience or the moral faculty to be the supreme governor will hardly be denied.
But has not self-love also, by Butler's own account, a similar authority, which may come into conflict with that of conscience?Advertisement
This dualism of governing principles, conscience and self-love, in Butler's system, and perhaps, too, his revival of the Platonic conception of human nature as an ordered and governed community of impulses, is perhaps most nearly antici pated in Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated (1722).
Wollaston's theory of moral evil as consisting in the practical contradiction of a true proposition, closely resembles the most paradoxical part of Clarke's doctrine, and was not likely to approve itself to the strong common sense of Butler; but his statement of happiness or pleasure as a " justly desirable " end at which every rational being " ought " to aim corresponds exactly to Butler's conception of self-love as a naturally governing impulse; while' the " moral arithmetic " with which he compares pleasures and pains, and endeavours to make the notion of happiness quantitatively precise, is an anticipation of Benthamism.
Only in a secondary sense is approval due to certain " abilities and dispositions immediately connected with virtuous affections," as candour, veracity, fortitude, sense of honour; while in a lower grade still are placed sciences and arts, along with even bodily skills and gifts; indeed, the approbation we give to these is not strictly moral, but is referred to the " sense of decency or dignity," which (as well as the sense of honour) is to be distinguished from 1 In a remarkable passage near the close of his eleventh sermon Butler seems even to allow that conscience would have to give way to self-love, if it were possible (which it is not) that the two should come into ultimate and irreconcilable conflict.
Calm self-love Hutcheson regards as morally indifferent; though he enters into a careful analysis of the elements of happiness,' in order to show that a true regard for private interest always coincides with the moral sense and with benevolence.
The old theory that referred this approval entirely to self-love, is, he holds, easy to disprove by " crucial experiments " on the play of our moral sentiments; rejecting this, he finds the required explanation in the sympathetic pleasure that attends our perception of the conduciveness of virtue to the interests of human beings other than ourselves.Advertisement
Not that he repudiates the obligation either of rational benevolence or self-love; on the contrary, he takes more pains than Butler to demonstrate the reasonableness of either principle.
Reid considers " regard for one's good on the whole " (Butler's self-love) and " sense of duty " (Butler's conscience) as two essentially distinct and co-ordinate rational principles, though naturally often comprehended under the one term, Reason.
He does not with Price object to its being called the " moral sense," provided we understand by 1 It is to be observed that whereas Price and Stewart (after Butler) identify the object of self-love with happiness or pleasure, Reid conceives this " good " more vaguely as including perfection and happiness; though he sometimes uses " good " and happiness as convertible terms, and seems practically to have the latter in view in all that he says of self-love.
The first of these is merely the principle of rational self-love, " that we ought to prefer a greater to a lesser good, though more distinct, and a less evil to a greater," - the mention of which seems rather inconsistent with Reid's distinct separation of the " moral faculty " from " self-love."
The moral sentiments, on this view, are not phases of self-love as Hobbes held; nor can they be directly identified with sympathy, either in Hume's way or in Adani Smith's; in fact, though apparently simple they are really derived in a complex manner from self-love and sympathy combined with more primitive impulses.Advertisement
Some years earlier, Gay,' admitting Hutcheson's proof of the actual disinterestedness of moral and benevolent impulses, had maintained that these (like the desires of knowledge or fame, the delight of reading, hunting and planting, &c.) were derived from self-love by " the power of association."
Cold-hearted and formal by nature, he had not even self-love, detested his wife Anne of Austriatoo good a Spaniardand only attached himself fitfully to his favorites, male or female, who were naturally jealously suspected by the cardinal.
The self-love theory of Hobbes, with its subtle perversions of the motives of ordinary humanity, led to a reaction which culminated in the utilitarianism of Bentham and the two Mills; but their theory, though superior to the extravagant egoism of Hobbes, had this main defect, according to Herbert Spencer, that it conceived the world as an aggregate of units, and was so far individualistic. Sir Leslie Stephen in his Science of Ethics insisted that the unit is the social organism, and therefore that the aim of moralists is not the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," but rather the "health of the organism."
May it bring self-love and healing into your life.
Rose Quartz brings powerful healing energies to remove negativity and bring back a strong sense of self-worth and gentle self-love.Advertisement
There are (a) given instinctive " propensions "; (b) a part of higher principles, " benevolence " and " rational self-love," equally valid with each other, though at times they may seem to conflict; (c) there is the master principle of conscience, which judges between motives, but does not itself constitute a motive to action.
Mental operations are identified with physical movements, the three conditions of physical movement, inertia, attraction and repulsion, being in the moral world self-love, love and hate.
The aim, both in public and private life, is to secure to the utmost possible extent the victory of the social feeling over self-love, or Altruism over Egoism.'
It is a state in which every one has a right to everything that may conduce to his preservation; but it is therefore also a state of war - a state so wretched that it is the first dictate of rational self-love to emerge from it into social peace and order.
Justice, veracity, fidelity to compacts and to governments, are all co 1 It is worth noticing that Hutcheson's express definition of the object of self-love includes " perfection " as well as " happiness "; but in the working out of his system he considers private good exclusively as happiness or pleasure.Advertisement
It was from Helvetius that he learnt that, men being universally and solely governed by self-love, the so-called moral judgments are really the common judgments of any society as to its common interests; that it is therefore futile on the one hand to propose any standard of virtue, except that of conduciveness to general happiness, and on the other hand useless merely to lecture men on duty and scold them for vice; that the moralist's proper function is rather to exhibit the coincidence of virtue with private happiness; that, accordingly, though nature has bound men's interests together in many ways, and education by developing sympathy and the habit of mutual help may much extend the connexion, still the most effective moralist is the legislator, who by acting on self-love through legal sanctions may mould human conduct as he chooses.
The highest chords he strikes are those of reason and self-love.
Love grows with the knowledge of its object, he proceeds, and at the highest stage self-love is so merged in love to God that we love ourselves only for God's sake or because God has loved us.
The ethics of these principles were worked out in Discours sur le bonheur, La Volupte, and L' Art de jouir, in which the end of life is found in the pleasures of the senses, and virtue is reduced to self-love.
Teresa turned to the mystical writers, and learnt from them how to root out the last relics of self-love from the mind by a long discipline of mystical trance and " contemplation."Advertisement
For while self-love plays a most important part in the human economy, there is no less evidently a natural principle of benevolence.
We have, in fact, to distinguish self-love, the " general desire that every man hath of his own happiness " or pleasure, from the particular affections, passions, and appetites directed towards objects other than pleasure, in the satisfaction of which pleasure consists.