Schelling Sentence Examples

To the former he owes his appreciation of exact investigation and a complete knowledge of the aims of science, to the latter an equal admiration for the great circle of ideas which had been diffused by the teaching of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.

The true method of science which he possessed forced him to condemn as useless the entire form which Schelling's and Hegel's expositions had adopted, especially the dialectic method of the latter, whilst his love of art and beauty, and his appreciation of moral purposes, revealed to him the existence of a transphenomenal world of values into which no exact science could penetrate.

When Lotze published these works, medical science was still much under the influence of Schelling's philosophy of nature.

The idealisms of Fichte and Schelling made contributions to Hegel's thought; Krause and the Roman Catholic Baader represent parallel if minor phases of idealism.

Robinet thus laid the foundation of that view of the world as wholly vital, and as a progressive unfolding of a spiritual formative principle, which was afterwards worked out by Schelling.

In the earlier writings of Schelling, containing the philosophy of identity, existence is represented as a becoming, or process of evolution.

The side of this process which Schelling worked out most completely is the negative side, that is, nature.

Schelling conceives of the gradual self-evolution of nature in a succession of higher and higher forms as brought about by a limitation of her infinite productivity, showing itself in a series of points of arrest.

Schelling's later theosophic speculations do not specially concern us here.

Of the followers of Schelling a word or two must be said.

All these processes are regarded as a series of manifestations of a vital principle in higher and higher forms. Oken, again, who carries Schelling's ideas into the region of biological science, seeks to reconstruct the gradual evolution of the material world out of original matter, which is the first immediate appearance of God, or the absolute.

Like Schelling, Hegel conceives the problem of existence as one of becoming.

Schelling's explicit appeal in the Identitdts-philosophie to an intellectual intuition of the Absolute, is of the essence of mysticism, both as an appeal to a suprarational faculty and as a claim not merely to know but to realize God.

The later philosophy of Schelling and the philosophy of Franz von Baader, both largely founded upon Boehme, belong rather to theosophy (q.v.) than to mysticism proper.

He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.

Von Hartmann thus combines "pantheism" with "panlogism" in a manner adumbrated by Schelling in his "positive philosophy."

Eschenmayer's views are largely identical with those of Schelling, but he differed from him in regard to the knowledge of the absolute.

After a successful course of study at the College Rollin, he proceeded to Munich, where he attended the lectures of Schelling, and took his degree in philosophy in 1836.

Schbnlein thus did something to introduce new and positive conceptions and exacter methods into Germany; but unfortunately his own mind retained the abstract habit of his country, and his abilities were dissipated in the mere speculations of Schelling.

Herder was much attracted by Schelling's early writings, but appears to have disliked Hegelianism because of the atheism it seemed to him to involve.

Atterbom and some fellow-students founded about 1810 a society for the deliverance of the country from French pedantry, which with this end carried on a periodical entitled Phosphoros (1810-1813), to propagate the opinions of Schlegel and Schelling.

In course of time, however, his ideas approximating to those of Schelling in his later years, he elaborated with I.

Schelling, however, called one of his works after him, Bruno.

The ground of the modification, further, has been sought and apparently found in quite external influences, principally that of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, to some extent that of Schleiermacher.

Dr Smith contributed articles on Calvin, Kant, Pantheism, Miracles, Reformed Churches, Schelling and Hegel to the American Cyclopaedia, and contributed to McClintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia; and was editor of the American Theological Review (1859 sqq.), both in its original form and after it became the American Presbyterian and Theological Review and, later, the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review.

He was twice married - in 1842 to a daughter of Schelling the philosopher, and in 1858 to a daughter of General von Hartmann.

In 1892 a bronze statue of Semper, by Johannes Schelling, was unveiled on the.

With characteristic zeal and impetuosity Schelling had no sooner grasped the leading ideas of Fichte's amended form of the critical philosophy than he put together his impressions of it in his Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt (1794).

After two years as tutor to two youths of noble family, Schelling was called as extraordinary professor of philosophy to Jena in midsummer 1798.

The philosophical renown of Jena reached its culminating point during the years (1798-1803) of Schelling's residence there.

In Schelling, essentially a self-conscious genius, eager and rash, yet with undeniable power, they hailed a personality of the true Romantic type.

With August Wilhelm Schlegel and his gifted wife Caroline, herself the embodiment of the Romantic spirit, Schelling's relations were of the most intimate kind, and a marriage between Schelling and Caroline's young daughter, Auguste Bohmer, was vaguely contemplated by both.

Auguste's death in 1800 (due partly to Schelling's rash confidence in his medical knowledge) drew Schelling and Caroline together, and Schlegel having removed to Berlin, a divorce was, apparently with his consent, arranged.

On the 2nd of June 1803 Schelling and Caroline were married, and with the marriage Schelling's life at Jena came to an end.

It was full time, for Schelling's undoubtedly overweening self-confidence had involved him in a series of disputes and quarrels at Jena, the details of which are important only as illustrations of the evil qualities in Schelling's nature which deface much of his philosophic work.

From September 1803 until April 1806 Schelling was professor at the new university of Würzburg.

In Würzburg Schelling had had many enemies.

In 1809 Caroline - died, and three years later Schelling married one of her closest friends, Pauline Gotter, in whom he found a faithful companion.

During the long stay at Munich (1806-1841) Schelling's literary activity seemed gradually to come to a standstill.

In Berlin particularly, the headquarters of the Hegelians, the desire found expression to obtain officially from Schelling a treatment of the new system which he was understood to have in reserve.

The realization of the desire did not come about till 1841, when the appointment of Schelling as Prussian privy councillor and member of the Berlin Academy, gave him the right, a right he was requested to exercise, to deliver lecturesin the university.

Whatever judgment one may form of the total worth of Schelling as a philosopher, his place in the history of that important movement called generally German philosophy is unmistakable and assured.

Hence it has come about that Schelling remains for the philosophic student but a moment of historical value in the development of thought, and that his wor for the most part ceased now to have more than historic interest.

It is not unfair to connect the apparent failings of Schelling's philosophizing with the very nature of the thinker and with the historical accidents of his career.

It is not possible to acquit Schelling of a certain disingenuousness in regard to the Hegelian philosophy; and if we claim for him perfect disinterestedness of view we must accuse him of deficient insight.

But Schelling did not merely borrow, he had genuine philosophic spirit and no small measure of philosophic insight, and under all the differences of exposition which seem to constitute so many differing systems, there is one and the same philosophic effort and spirit.

But what Schelling did want was power to work out his ideas methodically.

It is fair in dealing with Schelling's development to take into account the indications of his own opinion regarding its more significant momenta.

In his own view the turning points seem to have been - (1) the transition from Fichte's method to the more objective conception of nature - the advance, in other words, to Naturphilosophie; (2) the definite formulation of that which implicitly, as Schelling claims, was involved in the idea of Naturphilosophie, viz.

Only what falls under the first and second of the divisions so indicated can be said to have discharged a function in developing philosophy; only so much constitutes Schelling's philosophy proper.

From Fichte's position Schelling started.

Animated with this new conception Schelling made his hurried rush to Naturphilosophie, and with the aid of Kant and of fragmentary knowledge of contemporary scientific movements, threw off in quick succession the Ideen, the Weltseele, and the Erster Entwurf.

Schelling had neither the strength of thinking nor 4-he acquired knowledge necessary to hold the balance between the abstract treatment of cosmological notions and the concrete researches of special science.

Yet it would be unjust to ignore the many brilliant and sometimes valuable thoughts that are scattered throughout the writings on Naturphilosophie - thoughts to which Schelling himself is but too frequently untrue.

It was impossible for Schelling, the animating principle of whose thought was ever the reconciliation of differences, not to take and to take speedily the step towards the conception of the uniting basis of which nature and spirit are manifestations, forms, or consequences.

It lay in the very nature of this thought that Spinoza should now offer himself to Schelling as the thinker whose form of presentation came nearest to his new problem.

With all his efforts, Schelling does not succeed in bringing his conceptions of nature and spirit into any vital connexion with the primal identity, the absolute indifference of reason.

Along two distinct lines Schelling is to be found in all his later writings striving to amend the conception, to which he remained true, of absolute reason as the ultimate ground of reality.

And it is easy to see how from this position Schelling was led on to the further statements that not in the rational conception of God is an explanation of existence to be found, nay, that all rational conception extends but to the form, and touches not the real - that God is to be conceived as act, as will, as something over and above the rational conception of the divine.

Hence the stress laid on will as the realizing factor, in opposition to thought, a view through which Schelling connects himself with Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, and on the ground of which he has been recognized by the latter as the reconciler of idealism and realism.

Schelling's works were collected and published by his sons, in 14 vols.

Schelling in ihren schwiibischen Jugendjahren (1877).

See further Schelling als Personlichkeit.

An entirely different class of ideas, also termed animistic, is the belief in the world soul, held by Plato, Schelling and others.

In the course of his intellectual development, he came successively under the influence of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, and on account of the different phases through which he passed he was called the Talleyrand of German thought.

Dogmatik (1810), and his Judas Ischarioth (2 vols., 1816, 2nd ed., 1818), were all written in the spirit of Schelling, the last of them reflecting a change in Schelling himself from theosophy to positive philosophy.

It remained, however, for Schelling to convert this parallelism into identity by identifying motion with the intelligence of God, and so to transform the pantheism of Spinoza into pantheistic idealism.

In this extension of metaphysical idealism he was influenced by his disciple, Schelling.

Nevertheless, he refused to go as far as Schelling, and could not bring himself to identify either man or nature with Absolute God.

The assertion of absolute substance by Spinoza incited Schelling and Hegel.

The Spinozistic parallelism of extension and thought, and the Leibnitzian parallelism of bodily motion and mental action, incited Schelling and Fechner.

By changing the meaning of "noumenon " from the thing apprehended (voouµevov) to the thought (vOnya), and in the hypothesis of a common consciousness, he started the view that a thing is not yours or my thought, but a common thought of all mankind, and led to the wider view of Schelling and Hegel that the world is an absolute thought of infinite mind.

In the doctrine - no object, no subject - no subject, no object - that is, in the utter identification of things with objects of subjects, he anticipated not only Schelling and Hegel, but also Schuppe and Wundt with their congeners.

Schelling and Hegel thought it was infinite reason; Schopenhauer, unconscious will; Hartmann, unconscious intelligence and will; Lotze, the activity or life of the divine spirit; Fechner, followed by Paulsen, a world of spiritual actualities comprised in the one spiritual actuality, God, in whom we live and move and have our being.

Of these noumenal idealisms the earliest in time and the nearest to Fichte's philosophy was the panlogism, begun by Schelling (1775-18J4), completed by his disciple Hegel (1770-1831), and then modified by the master himself.

Starting from Fichte's " Wissenschaftslehre," Schelling accepted the whole process of mental construction, and the deduction that noumena are knowable products of universal reason, the Absolute Ego.

According to Schelling it is known by intellectual intuition.

Schelling attributes to man an intellectual intuition of the Absolute God; and as there is, according to him, but one universal reason, the common intelligence of God and man, this intellectual intuition at once gives man an immediate knowledge of God, and identifies man with God himself.

On Schelling's idealistic pantheism, or the hypothesis that there is nothing but one absolute reason identifying the opposites of subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel based his panlogism.

He meant a new " speculative " method, dialectic, founded on an assumption which he had already learnt from Schelling, namely, that things which are different but similar can have the same attribute, and therefore be also the same.

With this powerful instrument of dialectic in hand, he attempted to show how absolute reason differentiates itself into subjective and objective, ideal and real, and yet is the identity of both - an identity of opposites, as Schelling had said.

By the same dialectic Hegel was able to justify the gradual transformation of transcendental into noumenal idealism by Fichte and Schelling.

Schelling himself, as soon as he saw his own formulae exposed in the logic or rather dialectic of his disciple, began to reconsider his philosophy of identity, and brought some powerful objections against both the conclusions and the method of Hegel.

Again, Schelling urged that besides the rational element there must be something else; that there is in nature, as natures naturans, a blind impulse, a will without intelligence, which belongs to the existent; and that even God Himself as the Absolute cannot be pure thought, because in order to think He must have an existence which cannot be merely His thought of it, and therefore pure being is the prior condition of thought and spirit.

Schelling was right; but he had too much affinity with Hegelian assumptions, e.g.

Hence he rejected the infinite intelligence supposed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel against whom he urged that blind will produces intelligence, and only becomes conscious in us by using intelligence as a means to ends.

In his tract entitled Schelling's positive Philosophie als Einheit von Hegel and Schopenhauer (1869) he further showed that, in his later philosophy, Schelling had already combined reason and will in the Absolute.

Following, however, in the footsteps of Schelling, he idealizes the one extended and thinking substance into one mental being; but he thinks that its essence consists in unconscious intelligence and will, of which all individual intelligent wills are only activities.

Thus his pantheistic is also a teleological idealism, which in its emphasis on free activity and moral order recalls Leibnitz and Fichte, but in its emphasis on the infinity of God has more affinity to Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel.

Hence Fechner describes himself as a twig fallen from Schelling's stem.

Schelling's adherent Oken by his Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie conveyed to his mind the life-long impression that God is the universe and Nature God's appearance.

At the same time, while accepting the Schellingian parallelistic identity of all things in God, Fechner was restrained by his accurate knowledge of physics from the extravagant construction of Nature, which had failed in the hands of Schelling and Hegel.

Both, however, used this influence freely; and, whereas Lotze used the Leibnitzian argument from indivisibility to deduce indivisible elements and souls, Fechner used the Leibnitzian hypotheses of universal perception and parallelism of motions and perceptions, in the light of the .Schellingian identification of physical and psychical, to evolve a world-view (Weltansicht) containing something which was neither Leibnitz nor Schelling.

Here, again, he went much further than Leibnitz, but along with Schelling, in identifying the physical and the psychical as outer and inner sides of the same process, in which the inner is the real and the outer the apparent.

The panlogism of Schelling and Hegel survives in its influence.

Coleridge (1772-1834) not only called attention to Kant's distinction between understanding and reason, but also introduced his countrymen to the noumenal idealism of Schelling.

In the Biographia Literaria (1817) he says that in Schelling's Naturphilosophie and System des transcendentalen Idealismus he first found a general coincidence with much that he had toiled out for himself, and he repeated some of the main tenets of Schelling.

He quotes with approval Schelling's phrase, " Nature is visible Intelligence and Intelligence visible Nature."

He essayed to answer Locke by Kant, and Kant by Reid, Maine de Biran and Schelling.

From Reid he adopted the belief in an external world beyond sensation, from Biran the explanation of personality by will, from Schelling the identification of all reason in what he called " impersonal reason," which he supposed to be identical in God and man, to be subjective and objective, psychological and ontological.

In 1796 he lectured at Kiel, and a year later went to Jena to study the natural philosophy of Schelling.

Steffens was one of the so-called Philosophers of Nature, a friend and adherent of Schelling and Schleiermacher.

More than either of these two thinkers he was acquainted with the discoveries of modern science, and was thus enabled to correct or modify the highly imaginative speculations of Schelling.

Not only did Schelling and Schleiermacher modify their theories in deference to his scientific deductions, but the intellectual life of his contemporaries was considerably affected.

Schelling (in his Identity-philosophy) and Hegel both carried on the pantheistic tradition, which after Hegel broke up into two lines of thought, the one pantheistic the other atheistic.

His system has had little influence in Germany; Reinhold (q.v.) alone expounded it against the attacks of Fichte and Schelling.

Yet in some respects his ideas opened the way for the later speculations of Schelling and Hegel.

In 1802 he happened to meet the young Norwegian Henrik Steffens (1773-1845), who had just returned from a scientific tour in Germany, full of the doctrines of Schelling.

Prominent scholars were summoned to it, mostly belonging to the Romantic School, such as Goerres, Schubert and Schelling, though others were not discouraged.

He does not free himself from the current theology either by rational moralizing like Kant, or by bold speculative synthesis like Fichte and Schelling.

During these years Hegel kept up a slack correspondence with Schelling and Holderlin.

Schelling, already on the way to fame, kept Hegel abreast with German speculation.

Schelling was the main philosophical lion of the time; and in some quarters Hegel was spoken of as a new champion summoned to help him in his struggle with the more prosaic continuators of Kant.

Still more striking was the agreement shown in the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which Schelling and Hegel wrote conjointly during the years 1802-1803.

Even at a later period foreign critics like Cousin saw much that was alike in the two doctrines, and did not hesitate to regard Hegel as a disciple of Schelling.

The dissertation by which Hegel qualified for the position of Privatdozent (De orbitis planetarum) was probably chosen under the influence of Schelling's philosophy of nature.

Meanwhile, after the departure of Schelling from Jena in the middle of 1803, Hegel was left to work out his own views.

The preface to the Phenomenology signalled the separation from Schelling - the adieu to romantic. It declared that a genuine philosophy has no kindred with the mere aspirations of artistic minds, but must earn its bread by the sweat of its brow.

Compared with Fichte and Schelling, Hegel has a sober, hard, realistic character.

At a later date, with the call of Schelling to Berlin in 1841, it became fashionable to speak of Hegelianism as a negative philosophy requiring to be complemented by a " positive " philosophy which would give reality and not mere ideas.

Nor was it, as in Schelling's earlier system, to be a collateral progeny with mind from the same womb of indifference and identity.

Kant he by no means ignored, and under Schiller's guidance he learned much from him; but of the younger thinkers, only Schelling, whose mystic nature-philosophy was a development of Spinoza's ideas, touched a sympathetic chord in his nature.

But at the same time the philosophers Immanuel Fichte and Friedrich Schelling were creating a wide and deep impression.

When, a few years after his appointment at Blaubeuren, he published his first important work, Symbolik and Mythologie oder die Naturreligion des Alterturns (1824-1825), it became evident that he had made a deeper study of philosophy, and had come under the influence of Schelling and more particularly of Friedrich Schleiermacher.

Thus Schleiermacher's posthumously published Dialektik (1839) may be characterized as an appeal from the absolutist element in Schelling's philosophy to the conception of that correlation or parallelism which Schelling had exhibited as flowing from and subsisting within his absolute, and therein as a return upon Kant's doctrine of limits.

Beneke's philosophy is a striking instance of this, with application to Fries and affinity to Herbart conjoined with obligations to Schelling both directly and through Schleiermacher.

Schelling, too, called for a single principle and claimed to have found it in his Absolute, " the night " said Hegel, "in which all cows are black," but his historical influence lay, as we have seen, in the direction of a parallelism within the unity, and he also developed no logic. It is altogether otherwise with Hegel.

Schelling's Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom (1809) is almost entirely a reproduction of Boehme's ideas, and forms, along with Baader's writings, the best' modern example of theosophical speculation.

In his philosophy of identity Schelling (q.v.) had already defined the Absolute as pure indifference, or the identity of subject and object, but without advancing further into theogony.

In Boehme's spirit, Schelling defended his idea of God as the only way of vindicating for God the consciousness which naturalism denies, and which ordinary theism emptily asserts.

This theosophical transformation of Schelling's doctrine was largely due to the influence of his contemporary Baader (q.v.).

Joseph von Gdrres read the medieval mystics in the light of the newer mysticism of Schelling.

The gathered illhumour of many years, aggravated by the confident assurance of the Hegelians, found vent at length in the introduction to his next book, where Hegel's works are described as three-quarters utter absurdity and one-quarter mere paradox - a specimen of the language in which during his subsequent career he used to advert to his three predecessors Fichte, Schelling, but above all Hegel.

Lessing, Goethe, Herder, Novalis and Schleiermacher, not to mention philosophers like Schelling and Hegel, united in recognizing the unique strength and sincerity of Spinoza's thought, and in setting him in his rightful place among the speculative leaders of mankind.

This was the Gothic Society, which was Lorenzo Hammarskold1 8 182 who in (75-7) 1803 introduced the views of Tieck and Schelling by founding the society in Upsala called " Vitterhetens Va,nner," and by numerous critical essays.

It was most numerously attended about the middle of the 18th century; but the most brilliant professoriate was under the duke Charles Augustus, Goethe's patron (1787-1806), when Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schlegel and Schiller were on its teaching staff.

The explanation seems to be that while on Christian grounds he repeatedly denounced pantheism as being in all its forms equivalent to atheism, he was latterly much swayed by the thought of Schelling in the pantheistic direction which was natural to him.

It would seem that, in the extreme spiritual vicissitudes of his life, conscious alternately of personal weakness and of the largest speculative grasp, he at times threw himself entirely on the consolations of evangelical faith, and at others reconstructed the cosmos for himself in terms of Neo-Platonism and the philosophy of Schelling.

From Schelling, whom he praised as having developed Kant where Fichte failed to do so, he borrowed much and often, not only in the metaphysical sections of the Biographia but in his aesthetic lectures, and further in the cosmic speculations of the posthumous Theory of Life.

On the first score he makes but an equivocal acknowledgment, claiming to have thought on Schelling's lines before reading him; but it has been shown by Hamilton and Ferrier that besides transcribing much from Schelling without avowal he silently appropriated the learning of Maass on philosophical history.

Inasmuch as he finally followed in philosophy the mainly poetical or theosophic movement of Schelling, which satisfied neither the logical needs appealed to by Hegel nor the new demand for naturalistic induction, Coleridge, after arousing a great amount of philosophic interest in his own country in the second quarter of the century, has ceased to "make a school."

In i 8 i r appeared his last philosophic work, directed against Schelling specially (Von den gottlichen Dingen and ihrer Offenbarung), the first part of which, a review of the Wandsbecker Bote, had been written in 1798.

A bitter reply from Schelling was left without answer by Jacobi, but gave rise to an animated controversy in which Fries and Baader took prominent part.

He then took up the study of German, worked at Kant and Jacobi, and sought to master the Philosophy of Nature of Schelling, by which he was at first greatly attracted.

The influence of Schelling may be observed very markedly in the earlier form of his philosophy.

The following year Cousin went to Munich, where he met Schelling for the first time, and spent a month with him and Jacobi, obtaining a deeper insight into the Philosophy of Nature.

Tested by the power and effect of his teaching influence, Cousin occupies a foremost place in the rank of professors of philosophy, who like Jacobi, Schelling and Dugald Stewart have united the gifts of speculative, expository and imaginative power.

The historical position of the system lies in its relations to Kant, Schelling and Hegel.

Cousin Relations was opposed to Kant in asserting that the uncondi- to Kant, tioned in the form of infinite or absolute cause is but Schelling a mere unrealizable tentative or effort on the part of and Hegel.

With Schelling again Cousin agrees in regarding this supreme ground of all as positively apprehended, and as a source of development, but he utterly repudiates Schelling's method.

If it does, it comes within the sphere of psychology; and the objections to it as thus a relative, made by Schelling himself, are to be dealt with.

Schelling's intellectual intuition is the mere negation of knowledge.

The intellectual intuition of Schelling, as above consciousness, the pure being of Hegel, as an empty abstraction, unvindicated, illegitimately assumed, and arbitrarily developed, are equally useless as bases of metaphysics.

Hamilton in the Edinburgh Review of 1829, and it was animadverted upon about the same time by Schelling.

Here Schelling and Hamilton argue that Cousin's absolute is a mere relative.

Before the ethics of Kant had begun to be seriously studied in England, the rapid and remarkable development of metaphysical view and method of which the three chief stages are represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel respectively had already taken place; and the system of the latter was occupying the most prominent position in the philosophical thought of Germany.

In the systems of Schelling and Hegel ethics falls again into a subordinate place; indeed, the ethical view of the former is rather suggested than completely developed.

Neither Fichte nor Schelling has exercised more than the faintest and most indirect influence on ethical philosophy in England; it therefore seems best to leave the ethical doctrines of each to be explained in connexion with the rest of his system.

Meantime he studied Spinoza and Plato, and was profoundly influenced by both, though he was never a Spinozist; he made Kant more and more his master, though he departed on fundamental points from him, and finally remodelled his philosophy; with some of Jacobi's positions he was in sympathy, and from Fichte and Schelling he accepted ideas, which in their place in his system, however, received another value and import.

It is obvious that Plato, Spinoza and Kant had contributed characteristic elements of their thought to this system, and directly or indirectly it was largely indebted to Schelling for fundamental conceptions.

Jacobi, with whom he was for years on terms of friendship. He now learned something of Schelling, and the works he published during this period were manifestly influenced by that philosopher.

Yet Baader is no disciple of Schelling, and probably gave out more than he received.

The young Lessing produced his first play in the Leipzig theatre, and the university counts Goethe, Klopstock, Jean Paul Richter, Fichte and Schelling among its alumni.

Schelling regarded the devil as, not a person, but a real principle, a spirit let loose by the freedom of man.

These doctrines of Lotze - though pronounced with the distinct and reiterated reserve that they did not contain a solution of the philosophical question regarding the nature, origin, or deeper meaning of this all-pervading mechanism, neither an explanation how the action of external things on each other takes place nor yet of the relation of mind and body, that they were merely a preliminary formula of practical scientific value, itself requiring a deeper interpretation - these doctrines were nevertheless by many considered to be the last word of the philosopher who, denouncing the reveries of Schelling or the idealistic theories of Hegel, established the science of life and mind on the same basis as that of material things.

In this endeavour he forms with Herbart an opposition to the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, which aimed at objective and absolute knowledge, and also to the criticism of Kant, which aimed at determining the validity of all human knowledge.

Schelling's theory is a bold attempt to revitalize nature in the light of growing physical and physiological science, and by so doing to comprehend the unity of the world under the idea of one principle of organic development.

This writer, by his conception of the world as will which objectifies itself in a series of gradations from the lowest manifestations of matter up to conscious man, gives a slightly new shape to the evolutional view of Schelling, though he deprives this view of its optimistic character by denying any co-operation of intelligence in the world-process.

Eberhard, Ernst Platner, and to some extent Schelling, whom, however, it would be incorrect to describe as merely an eclectic. In the first place, his speculations were largely original; and in the second place, it is not so much that his views of any time were borrowed from a number of philosophers, as that his thinking was influenced first by one philosopher, then by another.

Cousin, whose views varied considerably at different periods of his life, 'not only adopted freely what pleased him in the doctrines of Pierre Laromiguiere, RoyerCollard and Maine de Biran, of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, and of the ancient philosophies, but expressly maintained that the eclectic is the only method now open to the philosopher, whose function thus resolves itself into critical selection and nothing more.

With characteristic zeal and impetuosity Schelling had no sooner grasped the leading ideas of Fichte's amended form of the critical philosophy than he put together his impressions of it in his Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt (1794).

From September 1803 until April 1806 Schelling was professor at the new university of Würzburg.

In Würzburg Schelling had had many enemies.

Paulus, sharpened by Schelling's apparent success, led to the surreptitious publication of a verbatim report of the lectures on the philosophy of revelation, and, as Schelling did not succeed in obtaining legal condemnation and suppression of this piracy, he in 1845 ceased the delivery of any public courses.

Schelling was prematurely thrust into the position of a foremost productive thinker; and when the lengthened period of quiet meditation was at last forced upon him there unfortunately lay before him a system which achieved what had dimly been involved in his ardent and impetuous desires.

In expanding Kant's act of synthesis till it absorbed the inner sense and the innermost soul, he started the modern paradox that soul is not substance, but subject or activity, a paradox which has been gradually handed down from Schelling and Hegel to Fechner, and from Fechner to Paulsen and Wundt.

Hence Schelling objected to the Hegelian dialectic on the ground that, although reason by itself can apprehend notions or essences, and even that of God, it cannot deduce a priori the existence either of God or of Nature, for the apprehension of which experience is required.

Besides, he was deeply impressed by the fact of man's personality and by the problem of his personal immortality, which brought him back through Schelling to Leibnitz, whose Monadologie throughout maintains the plurality of monadic souls and the omnipresence of perception, sketches in a few sections (§§ 23, 78-81) a panpsychic parallelism, though without identity, between bodily motions and psychic perceptions, and, what is most remarkable, already uses the conservation of energy to argue that physical energy pursues its course in bodies without interacting with souls ., and that motions produce motions, perceptions produce perceptions.

Whereas Leibnitz confined a large area of the world to wholly unconscious perceptions, and therefore preferred to call the souls of inorganic beings " Entelechies," Fechner extended consciousness to the whole world; and accordingly, whereas Leibnitz believed in a supramundane Creator, " au dessus du Monde " and " dans le Monde," Fechner, in the spirit of Schelling, identified God with the soul of the world.

Though no noumenalist, in many details he is with noumenalists; with Fechner in psychophysics, in psychophysical parallelism, in the independence of the physical and the psychical chains of causality, in reducing physical and psychical to a difference of aspects, in substituting impulse for accident in organic evolution, and in wishing to recognize a gradation of individual spiritual beings; with Schopenhauer and Hartmann in voluntarism; and even with Schelling and Hegel in their endeavour, albeit on an artificial method, to bring experience under notions, and to unite subject and object in one concrete reality.

Both Schelling and Hegel stand in a relation to art, but while the aesthetic model of Schelling was found in the contemporary world, where art was a special sphere and the artist a separate profession in no intimate connexion with the age and nation, the model of Hegel was found rather in those works of national xui.

In his works on aesthetics he combined the views of Schelling with those of Winckelmann, Lessing, Kant,, Herder, Schiller and others.