Locke Sentence Examples

Locke does not break with the compromise of Aquinas.

She read widely though unsystematically, studying philosophy in Aristotle, Leibnitz, Locke and Condillac, and feeding her imagination with Rene and Childe Harold.

Locke half playfully touches on certain monsters, with respect to which it is difficult to determine whether they ought to be called men.

In fundamental principles he follows almost entirely Locke and Pufendorf; but he works out with great skill the theory of moral obligation, referring it to the command or will of God.

Under the Reign of Terror he was arrested and imprisoned for nearly a year, during which he studied Condillac and Locke, and abandoned the natural sciences for philosophy.

Leibnitz has to supplement rather than correct Locke on this point.

The Sophists and the Sceptics, Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans took up the question, and from the time of Locke and Kant it has been prominent in modern philosophy.

Destutt de Tracy was the last eminent representative of the sensualistic school which Condillac founded in France upon a one-sided interpretation of Locke.

He was also one of the grantees of the province of Carolina and took a leading part in its management; it was at his request that Locke in 1669 drew up a constitution for the new colony.

Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill and Herbert Spencer are not systematic materialists, but show tendencies towards materialism.

Locke had spent some years in Holland, the country of Grotius, who, with help from other great lawyers, and under a misapprehension as to the meaning of the Roman jus gentium, shaped modern concepts of international law by an appeal to law of nature.

The Scottish philosophy of Thomas Reid and his successors believed that David Hume's scepticism was no more than the genuine outcome of Locke's sensationalist appeal to experience when ripened or forced on by the immaterialism of Bishop Berkeley - God and the soul alone; not God, world and soul.

On ethics, Locke says very little, although that little is hedonist and determinist.

Locke is thus a sensationalist and empiricist, but incompletely, and without perfect coherence.

Locke had treated ideas as testifying, to the existence of matter.

In Locke we find, with a retention of certain antievolutionist ideas, a marked tendency to this mode of viewing the world.

To Locke the universe is the result of a direct act of creation, even matter being limited in duration and created.

Lewes points out that Leibnitz is inconsistent in his account of the intelligence of man in relation to that of lower animals, since when answering Locke he no longer regards these as differing in degree only.

In the Beaux-Arts, Batteux developed a theory which is derived from Locke through Voltaire's sceptical sensualism.

But in its cool spirit it forecasts the coming age, whose master is John Locke.

Other engineers, however, such as Joseph Locke, cheapened the cost of construction by admitting long slopes of i in 80 or 70.

With the systematic study of the Latin, and to a slight extent also of the Greek classics, he conjoined that of logic in the prolix system of Crousaz; and he further invigorated his reasoning powers, as well as enlarged his knowledge of metaphysics and jurisprudence, by the perusal of Locke, Grotius and Montesquieu.

I also read and meditated Locke Upon the Understanding."

He was a son of the 18th century; he had studied with sympathy Locke and Montesquieu; no one appreciated more keenly than he did political liberty and the freedom of an Englishman.

To this end John Locke drafted for them in 1669 the famous Fundamental Constitutions providing for the division of the province into eight counties and each county into seigniories, baronies, precincts and colonies, and the division of the land among hereditary nobles who were to grant three-fifths of it to their freemen and govern through an elaborate system of feudal courts.

From its origin in Descartes and onwards through Locke and Berkeley, modern philosophy carried with it, Reid contends, the germ of scepticism.

His father, Joseph Austin, was a merchant of the city of Leeds; his mother, a sister of Joseph Locke, M.P. for Honiton.

During this period of his life he began the study of philosophy, being especially attracted by Locke.

The Logic, an eminently practical work, written from the point of view of Locke, is in five parts, dealing with (1) the nature of the human mind, its faculties and operations; (2) ideas and their kinds; (3) the true and the false, and the various degrees of knowledge; (4) reasoning and argumentation; (5) method and the ordering of our thoughts.

He may, in fact, be regarded as the final exponent of that empirical school of philosophy which owed its impulse to John Locke, and is generally spoken of as being typically English.

Locke and Hume held that the work of the mind was eo ipso unreal because it was "made by" man and not "given to" man.

The doctrine of analogy was intended as a reply to the deistical conclusions that had been drawn from Locke's theory of knowledge.

Among the more illustrious of his pupils may be mentioned South, Dryden, Locke, Prior and Bishop Atterbury.

His work is an attack on Toland's Letters to Serena (1704), which argued that motion is essential to matter, and on Locke and Berkeley.

One name should always be mentioned along with Sydenhamthat of his friend John Locke.

Their English contemporaries and successors, John Freind, William Cole, and Richard Mead, leaned also to mechanical explanations, but with a distrust of systematic theoretical completeness, which was perhaps partly a national characteristic, partly the result of the teaching of Sydenham and Locke.

According to a curious story, told by the third earl himself, the marriage between his father and mother was negotiated by John Locke, who was a trusted friend of the first earl.

Locke, who in his capacity of medical attendant to the Ashley household had already assisted in bringing the boy into the world, though not his instructor, was entrusted with the superintendence of his education.

This was conducted according to the principles enunciated in Locke's Thoughts concerning Education, and the method of teaching Latin and Greek conversationally was pursued with such success by his instructress, Mrs Elizabeth Birch, that at the age of eleven, it is said, Ashley could read both languages with ease.

Lord Ashley now retired into Holland, where he became acquainted with Le Clerc, Bayle, Benjamin Furly, the English Quaker merchant, at whose house Locke had resided during his stay at Rotterdam, and probably Limborch and the rest of the literary circle of which Locke had been a cherished and honoured member nine or ten years before.

In August 1703 he again settled in Holland, in the air of which he seems, like Locke, to have had great faith.

Like Locke he had a peculiar pleasure in bringing forward young men.

Fcrster in 1830, and again in an enlarged form in 1847; three letters, written respectively to Stringer, Lord Oxford and Lord Godolphin, which appeared, for the first time, in the General Dictionary; and lastly a letter to Le Clerc, in his recollections of Locke, first published in Notes and Queries, Feb.

From these results we see that Shaftesbury, opposed to Hobbes and Locke, is in close agreement with Hutcheson, and that he is ultimately a deeply religious thinker, inasmuch as he discards the moral sanction of public opinion, the terrors of future punishment, the authority' of the civil authority, as the main incentives to goodness, and substitutes the voice of conscience and the love of God.

The Religion of Protestants is characterized by much fairness and acuteness of argument, and was commended by Locke as a discipline of "perspicuity and the way of right reasoning."

It is remarkable that Collier makes no reference to Locke, and shows no sign of having any knowledge of his works.

It was, however, Berkeley who first sought to utilize the conclusions that were implicit in Locke's starting-point to disprove " the systems of impious and profane persons which exclude all freeedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a selfexistent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings."

It is the kernel of the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Filmer and Locke.

Among the chief objects set before this board were the inquiry into trade obstacles and the employment of the poor; the state of the silver currency was also a subject on which John Locke, its secretary, lost no time in making representations to the government.

Locke's retirement in 1700 removed any chance of the board of ' trade advocating more enlightened opinions on commercial subjects than those generally held.

He was a friend of John Locke.

Locke, who had been educated at Winchester and had lectured on Greek at Oxford (1660), nevertheless almost completely eliminated Greek from the scheme which he unfolded in his Thoughts on Education (1693).

With Locke, the moral and practical qualities of virtue and prudence are of the first consideration.

To facilitate the reading of Latin texts, the favourite method was the use of interlinear translations, originally proposed by Locke, first popularized in France by Dumarsais (1722), and in constant vogue down to the time of the Revolution.

It was formerly wrongly supposed, and even Locke and Montesquieu did not escape this error, that the fall in the value of the precious metals consequent on the discovery of the American mines was the real cause of the general lowering of the rate of interest in Europe.

The most interesting episode of his life was his intimacy with Locke, who in his letters speaks of him with affection and admiration.

There is no sign of any intimate knowledge of ancient or scholastic thought; to the doctrines of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Norris, the attitude is one of indifference or lack of appreciation, but the influence of Descartes and specially of Locke is evident throughout.

In the philosophies of Descartes and Locke a large share of attention had been directed to the idea of matter, which was held to be the abstract, unperceived background of real experience, and was supposed to give rise to our ideas of external things through its action on the sentient mind.

That in knowing objects certain thoughts are implied which are not presentations or their copies is at times dimly seen by Berkeley himself; but he was content to propound a question with regard to those notions, and to look upon them as merely Locke's ideas of relation.

Such ideas of relation are in truth the stumbling-block in Locke's philosophy, and Berkeley's empiricism is equally far from accounting for them.

At first a sensualist, like Condillac and Locke, next an intellectualist, he finally shows himself a mystical theosophist.

Maine de Biran's first essays in philosophy were written avowedly from the point of view of Locke and Condillac, but even in them he was brought to signalize the essential fact on which his later speculation turns.

This third position isarelic of ancient metaphysical realism; although it must be remembered that Kant does not go to the length of Descartes and Locke, who supposed that from mere ideas we could know bodies and souls, but suggests that beneath the phenomena of outer and inner sense the thing in itself may not be heterogeneous (ungleichartig).

In a way they returned to the wider opinions of Aristotle, which had come down to Descartes and Locke, that reason in going beyond sense knows more things than phenomena; yet they would not hear of external bodies, or of bodies at all.

Locke mistook it to mean " substratum," or support of qualities, and naturally concluded that it is unknown.

Kant, taking it in the mistaken meaning of Locke, converted it into the a priori category of the permanent substrate beneath the changes of phenomena, and even went so far as to separate it from the thing in itself, as substantia phenomenon from noumenon.

He essayed to answer Locke by Kant, and Kant by Reid, Maine de Biran and Schelling.

It is spoilt by Locke's hypothesis that we do not perceive things but qualities implying things.

Passing to Amsterdam he was introduced to John Locke and to Philip v.

The park was presented in 1862 by the widow of Joseph Locke, M.P. The manufacture of iron and steel, and the weaving of linen and other cloth, are the two principal industries; but there are also bleachfields, printfields, dyeworks, sawmills, cornmills and malt-houses; and the manufacture of glass, needles and wire is carried on.

His chief philosophical works were an edition of the The'odicee of Leibnitz (1874), a monograph on Locke (1878), Devoirs et droits de l'homme (1880), Glissonius utrum Leibnitio de natura substantiae cogitanti quidquam tribuerit (1880)-, De La solidarite morale (4th ed., 1893).

At this time the intensity of his intellectual activity in the area opened up to him by Locke and Berkeley reduced him to a state of physical exhaustion.

Hume had the greatest respect for the author of the Analogy, ranks him with Locke and Berkeley as an originator of the experimental method in moral science, and in his specially theological essays, such as that on Particular Providence and a Future State, has Butler's views specifically in mind.

In the Treatise of Human Nature, which is in every respect the most complete exposition of Hume's philosophical conception, we have the first thorough-going attempt to apply the fundamental principles of Locke's empirical psychology to the construction of a theory of knowledge, and, as a natural consequence, the first systematic criticism of the chief metaphysical notions from this point of view.

To some extent Berkeley removed this radical inconsistency, but in his philosophical work it may be said with safety there are two distinct aspects, and while it holds of Locke on the one hand, it stretches forward to Kantianism on the other.

Without entering into details, which it is the less necessary to do because the subject has been recently discussed with great fulness in works readily accessible, it may be said that for Locke as for Hume the problem of psychology was the exact description of the contents of the individual mind, and the determination of the conditions of the origin and development of conscious experience in the individual mind.

And the answer to the problem which was furnished by Locke is in effect that with which Hume started.

This solution presupposes a peculiar conception of the general relation between the mind and things which in itself requires justification, and which, so far at least as the empirical theory was developed by Locke and his successors, could not be obtained from psychological analysis.

With Locke, Hume professes to regard this problem as virtually covered or answered by the fundamental psychological theorem; but the superior clearness of his reply enables us to mark with perfect precision the nature of the difficulty inherent in the attempt to regard the two as identical.

The difficulty of reconciling the two views is that which gives rise to much of the obscurity in Locke's treatment of the theory of knowledge; in Hume the effort to identify them, and to explain the synthesis which is essential to cognition as merely the accidental result of external relations among the elements of conscious experience, appears with the utmost clearness, and gives the keynote of all his philosophical work.

Moreover, if we remain faithful to the fundamental conception that the contents of the mind are merely matters of experience, it is evident in the first place that as impressions are strictly individual, ideas also must be strictly particular, and in the second place that the faculties of combining, discriminating, abstracting and judging, which Locke had admitted, are merely expressions for particular modes of having mental experience, i.e.

Such, in substance, is Hume's restatement of Locke's empirical view.

It remains to be seen how knowledge can be explained on such a basis; but, before proceeding to sketch Hume's answer to this question, it is necessary to draw attention, first, to the peculiar device invariably resorted to by him when any exception to his general principle that ideas are secondary copies of impressions presents itself, and, secondly, to the nature of the substitute offered by him for that perception of relations or synthesis which even in Locke's confused statements had appeared as the essence of cognition.

Hobbes and Locke were wrong in saying that the mind must find in the relation the idea of Power.

The work of the critical philosophy is the introduction of this new mode of regarding experience, a mode which, in the technical language of philosophers, has received the title of transcendental as opposed to the psychological method followed by Locke and Hume.

The second is the typical deist of Locke's school, improved as regards his philosophy, and holding that the only possible proof of God's existence was a posteriori, from design, and that such proof was, on the whole, sufficient.

Inconsistencies, no doubt, are to be detected in his system, but they arise from the limitations of the view itself, and not, as in the case of Locke and Berkeley, from imperfect grasp of the principle, and endeavour to unite with it others radically incompatible.

Berkeley had already, in the Querist, attacked the mercan t i le theory of the nature of national wealth and the functions of money, and Locke had, in a partial manner, shown that political economy could with advantage be viewed in relation to the modern system of critical philosophy.

We have said that Berkeley and Locke had already begun the general work for which Hume is most important; in details also Hume had been anticipated to some extent.

While in this phase he wrote his novels Yeast and Alton Locke, in which, though he pointed out unsparingly the folly of extremes, he certainly sympathized not only with the poor, but with much that was done and said by the leaders in the Chartist movement.

As already suggested, it cannot be allowed that Hobbes falls into any regular succession from Bacon; neither can it be said that he handed on the torch to Locke.

He was the one English thinker of the first rank in the long period of two generations separating Locke from Bacon, but, save in the chronological sense, there is no true relation of succession among the three.

Finally, the psychology of Hobbes, though too undeveloped to guide the thoughts or even perhaps arrest the attention of Locke, when essaying the scientific analysis of knowledge, came in course of time (chiefly through James Mill) to be connected with the theory of associationism developed from within the school of Locke, in different ways, by Hartley and Hume; nor is it surprising that the later associationists, finding their principle more distinctly formulated in the earlier thinker, should sometimes have been betrayed into affiliating themselves to Hobbes rather than to Locke.

He contributed the article on John Locke to the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Dr Warton, in his observations upon Pope's line, "Unthought-of frailties cheat us in the wise," says, "Who could imagine that Locke was fond of romances; that Newton once studied astrology; that Dr Clarke valued himself on his agility, and frequently amused himself in a private room of his house in leaping over the tables and chairs ?"

The materialism of Hobbes, the pantheism of Spinoza, the empiricism of Locke, the determinism of Leibnitz, Collins' necessitarianism, Dodwell's denial of the natural immortality of the soul, rationalistic attacks on Christianity, and the morality of the sensationalists - all these he opposed with a thorough conviction of the truth of the principles which he advocated.

Locke, when Cartesianism had raised the problem of the contents of consciousness, and the spirit of Baconian positivism could not accept of anything that bore the ill-omened name of innate ideas, elaborated a theory of knowledge which is psychological in the sense that its problem is how the simple data with which the individual is in contact in sensation are worked up into a system.

Locke is of more importance, if not for his logical doctrine, at least for the theory of knowledge from which it flows.

With Locke the mind is comparable to white paper on which the world of things records itself in ideas of sensation.

It is Locke's initial attribution of the primary role in mental process to the simple ideas of sensation that precludes him from the development of the conception of another sort of ideas, or mental contents that he notes, which are produced by reflection on " the operations of our own mind within us."

It is in the latter group that we have the explanation of all that marks Locke as a forerunner of the critical philosophy.

Locke, however, fails to " deduce " his categories.

When Berkeley has eliminated the literal materialism of Locke's metaphors of sense-perception, Hume finds no difficulty in accepting the sensations as present virtually in their own right, any nonsensible ground being altogether unknown.

Drawing upon Gassendi for his psychological atomism and upon Hobbes for a thoroughgoing nominalism, he reproduces, as the logical conclusion from Locke's premises, the position of Antisthenes.

So long as the relation of the nominal to the real essence has no other background than Locke's doctrine of perception, the conclusion that what Kant afterwards calls analytical judgments a priori and synthetic judgments a posteriori exhaust the field follows inevitably, with its corollary, which Locke himself has the courage to draw, that the natural sciences are in strictness impossible.

Mathematical knowledge is not involved in the same condemnation, solely because of the " archetypal " character, which, not without indebtedness to Cumberland, Locke attributes to its ideas.

The view of reasoning which Locke enunciates coheres with these views.

As to syllogism specifically, Locke in a passage, 8 which has an obviously Cartesian ring, lays down four stages or degrees of reasoning, and points o ut that syllogism serves us in but one of these, and that not the all-important one of finding the intermediate ideas.

The distance from Locke to Stuart Mill along this line of thought is obviously but small.

A fundamental contrast to the school of Bacon and of Locke is afforded by the great systems of reason, owning Cartesian inspira tion, which are identified with the names of Spinoza and Leibnitz.

The clue to the discovery of transcendental conditions Kant finds in the existence of judgments, most manifest in mathematics and in the pure science of nature, which are certain, yet not trifling, necessary and yet not reducible to identities, synthetic therefore and a priori, and so accounted for neither by Locke nor by Leibnitz.

Mansel, too, was learned, specially in matters of Aristotelian exegesis, and much that is of value lies buried in his commentation of the dry bones of the Artis Logicae Rudimenta of Locke's contemporary Aldrich.

In his closing years he had some controversy with John Locke, whom he considered to have impugned the doctrine of the Trinity.

He lectured on Clarke, Butler and Locke, and also delivered a systematic course on moral philosophy, which subsequently formed the basis of his well-known treatise.

His New Theory of the Earth (1696), although destitute of sound scientific foundation, obtained the praise of both Newton and Locke, the latter of whom justly classed the author among those who, if not adding much to our knowledge, "at least bring some new things to our thoughts."

His only surviving child, Damaris, a devout and talented woman, became the second wife of Sir Francis Masham, and was distinguished as the friend of John Locke.

To this higher manifestation of Pneuma can be traced back the " esprits animaux " of Descartes and Leibnitz, which continue to play so great a part even in Locke.

Locke's philosophy, as well as his theology, served as a school for the deists.

But as Locke's philosophy became in France sensationalism, and as Locke's pregnant question, reiterated by Collins, how we know that the divine power might not confer thought on matter, led the way to dogmatic materialism, so deism soon gave way to forms of thought more directly and completely subversive of the traditional theology.

Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is here anticipated.

Roscher names him as having, along with Locke and Dudley North, raised the English school to the highest point it attained before the time of Hume.

But fire was not the simple thing that the many imagined, and Simon distinguished between its hidden and its manifest qualities, maintaining, like Locke, that the former were the cause of the latter.

It seems certain that these conclusions were independent of Berkeley and Malebranche, and were not drawn from Arthur Collier's Clavis universalis (1713), with which they have much in common, but were suggested, in part at least, by Locke's doctrine of ideas, Newton's theory of colours, and Cudworth's Platonism, with all of which Edwards was early familiar.

Kant's problem is not, in its wording, very different from that which Locke set before him when he resolved to "inquire into the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent."

But, because time had not yet made the matter clear, Locke suffered himself to digress in his second book into the psychological question of the origin of our ideas; and his theory of knowledge is ruined by the failure to distinguish between the epistemological sense of "idea" as significant content and the psychological sense in which it is applied to a fact or process in the individual mind.

Stillingfleet's complaint against Locke was that he was "one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning that have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world."

The resemblance, both in title and in principles, of his book to Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, led to a prompt disavowal on Locke's part of the supposed identity of opinions, and subsequently to the famous controversy between Stillingfleet and the philosopher.

For the time, however, he tranquilly pursued his studies, writing those notes on Vieta which establish his proficiency in mathematics, and a metaphysical treatise now lost, which, if Foscarini's account of it may be relied upon, anticipated the sensationalism of Locke.

During his residence in London Newton had made the acquaintance of John Locke.

Locke had taken a very great interest in the new theories of the Principia.

In one of his letters to Locke at the beginning of 1692, when Montague, Lord Monmouth and Locke were exerting themselves to obtain some appointment for him, Newton wrote that he was " fully convinced that Mr Montague, upon an old grudge which he thought had been worn out, was false to him."

This friend was Locke, who received the letter in November 1690.

Sir Isaac seems to have been then anxious for its publication; but, as the effect of his argument was to deprive the Trinitarians of two passages in favour of the Trinity, he became alarmed at the probable consequences of such a step. He therefore requested Locke, who was then going to Holland, to get it translated into French, and published on the continent.

Being prevented from going to Holland, Locke copied the manuscript, and sent it, without Newton's name, to Le Clerc, who received it before the 11th of April 1691.

On the 20th of January 1692 Le Clerc announced to Locke his intention to publish the pamphlet in Latin; and, upon the intimation of this to Sir Isaac, he entreated him " to stop the translation and impression as soon as he could, for he designed to suppress them."

Laromiguiere taught the philosophy of Locke and Condillac, happily modified on some points, with a clearness and grace which in appearance at least removed difficulties, and with a charm of spiritual bonhomie which penetrated and subdued."

The lectures on Locke were first sketched in 1819, and fully developed in the course of 1829.

This observational method Cousin regards as that of the 18th century, - the method which Descartes began and abandoned, and which Locke and Condillac applied, though imperfectly, and which Reid and Kant used with more success, yet not completely.

But he left very interesting psychological analyses, and several new, just, and true expositions of philosophical systems, especially that of Locke and the philosophers of Scotland.

The literary spokesman of the new system was Locke.

Locke, alone escaped.

The elder Locke, a strict but genial Puritan, by whom the son was carefully educated at home, was engaged in the military service of the parliamentary party.

Christ Church was Locke's occasional home for thirty years.

But Locke's hereditary sympathy with the Puritans was gradually lessened by the intolerance of the Presbyterians and the fanaticism of the Independents.

Under Owen scholastic studies were maintained with a formality and dogmatism unsuited to Locke's free inquisitive temper.

At Oxford Locke was nevertheless within reach of liberal intellectual influence tending to promote self-education and strong individuality.

It does not seem that Locke read extensively, but he was attracted by Descartes.

The Royal Society was then founded, and we find Locke experimenting in chemistry in 1663, also in meteorology, in which he was particularly interested all his life.

The restraints of a professional career were not suited to Locke.

Nevertheless, although known among his friends as " Doctor Locke," he never graduated in medicine.

Locke early showed an inclination to politics, as well as to theology and medicine.

Locke was introduced to him by his physician, Dr Thomas.

In 1667 Locke moved from Christ Church to Exeter House, Lord Ashley's London residence, to become his confidential secretary.

Locke's commonplace books throw welcome light on the history of his mind in early life.

The Shaftesbury connexion must have helped to save Locke from those idols of the " Den " to which professional life and narrow experience is exposed.

Locke proposed some criticism of the necessary " limits of human understanding " as likely to open a way out of their difficulties.

The fall of Shaftesbury in 1675 enabled Locke to escape from English politics.

Locke returned to London in 1679.

Locke resumed his old confidential relations, now at Thanet House in Aldersgate.

In these two years Locke was much at Oxford and in Somerset, for the later movements of Shaftesbury did not commend themselves to him.

Unpublished correspondence with his Somerset friend, Edward Clarke of Chipley, describes Locke's life in those troubled years.

In his fifty-second year, in the gloomy autumn of 1683, Locke retired to Holland, then the asylum of eminent persons who were elsewhere denied liberty of thought.

Locke spent more than five years there; but his (unpublished) letters show that exile sat heavily upon him.

Locke contributed several articles.

Locke was then at Rotterdam, where he lived for a year in the house of a Quaker friend, Benjamin Furley, or Furly, a wealthy merchant and lover of books.

William landed in England in November 1688; Locke followed in February 1689, in the ship which carried the princess Mary.

After his return to England in 1689 Locke emerged through authorship into European fame.

Locke's asthma was aggravated by the air of London; and the course of public affairs disappointed him, for the settlement at the Revolution fell short of his ideal.

She told Le Clerc that after Locke's return from exile, " by some considerably long visits, he had made trial of the air of Otes, which is some zo m.

A rejoinder in 1691 was followed by Locke's elaborate Third Letter on Toleration in the summer of the following year.

In the Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures (anonymous, 1695), Locke sought to separate the divine essence of Christ's religion from later accretions of dogma, and from reasonings due to oversight of the necessary limits of human thought.

Locke's Vindication, followed by a Second Vindication in 1697, added fuel to this fire.

In 1695 a revival of controversy about the currency diverted Locke's attention.

In 1696 Locke was induced to accept a commissionership on the Board of Trade.

In the autumn of 1696, Stillingfleet, an argumentative ecclesiastic more than a religious philosopher, in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, charged Locke with disallowing mystery in human knowledge, especially in his account of the metaphysical idea of " substance.

Stillingfleet's rejoinder appeared in May, followed by a Second Letter from Locke in August, to which the bishop replied in the following year.

On the other hand Locke was defended with vigour by Samuel Bolde, a Dorsetshire clergyman.

The fourth edition (the last while Locke was alive) appeared in 1700, with important additional chapters on " Association of Ideas " and " Enthusiasm."

It appeared among Locke's posthumous writings.

In 1700 Locke resigned his commission at the Board of Trade,.

Locke in consequence began a Fourth Letter on Toleration.

Locke's writings have made his intellectual and moral features familiar.

The delight he took in exercising reason in regard to everything he did was what his friend Pierre Coste remarked in Locke's daily life at Otes.

Large, " round-about " common sense, intellectual strength directed by a virtuous purpose, not subtle or daring speculation sustained by an idealizing faculty, in which he was deficient, is what we find in Locke.

Locke is apt to be forgotten now, because in his own generation he so well discharged the intellectual mission of initiating criticism of human knowledge, and of diffusing the spirit of free inquiry and universal toleration which has since profoundly affected the civilized world.

In the inscription on his tomb, prepared by himself, Locke refers to his books as a true representation of what he was.

There are also miscellaneous writings of Locke first published in the biographies of Lord King (1830) and of Mr Fox Bourne (1876).

Letters from Locke to Thoynard, Limborch, Le Clerc, Guenellon, Molyneux, Collins, Sir Isaac Newton, the first and the third Lord Shaftesbury, Lords Peterborough and Pembroke, Clarke of Chipley and others are preserved, many of them unpublished, most of them in the keeping of Lord Lovelace at Horseley Towers, and of Mr Sanford at Nynehead in Somerset, or in the British Museum.

The attack on Sir Robert Filmer in Locke's First Treatise on Government was an anachronism.

Indeed Locke seems to allow that the consent was at first tacit, and by anterior law of nature conditional on the beneficial purpose of the trust being realized.

Locke's philosophical defence of religious liberty in the four Letters of Toleration is the most far-reaching of his contributions to social polity.

The change is due more to Locke himself than to anyone else.

Locke went far to unite in a higher principle elements in the broad Anglican and the Puritan theories, while he recognized the individual liberty of thought which distinguishes the national church of England.

To the atheist alone Locke refuses full toleration, on the ground that social obligation can have no hold over him, for " the taking away of God dissolves all."

The unfitness of persecution as a means of propagating truth is copiously insisted on by Locke.

The principles that governed Locke's social polity largely determined his attitude to Christianity.

But Locke accepted Holy Scripture as infallible with the reverence of a Puritan.

And faith in its infallibility was combined in Locke with deep distrust in " enthusiasm."

Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity was an attempt to recall religion from the crude speculations of theological sects, destructive of peace among Christians, to its original simplicity; but this is apt to conceal its transcendent mystery.

Those who practically acknowledge the supremacy of Jesus as Messiah accept all that is essential to the Christianity of Locke.

Locke has his place among classic writers on the theory and art of Education.

Knowledge of what other men have thought is perhaps of too little account with Locke.

It has been suggested that Locke may have begun with this book.

For Locke saw that the ultimate questions about our knowledge and its extent presuppose questions about ideas.

For this Locke himself is partly to blame.

Locke was perhaps too little read in the literature of philosophy to do full justice to those more subtle thinkers who, from Plato downwards, have recognized the need for categories of the understanding and presuppositions of reason in the constitution of knowledge.

This Locke himself sometimes seems to allow.

What Locke really objects to is, that any of our supposed knowledge should claim immunity from free criticism.

The truth is that neither Locke, on the one hand, nor the intellectualists of the 17th century, on the other, expressed their meaning with enough of precision; if they had, Locke's argument would probably have taken a form less open to the charge of mere empiricism.

But the suggestion that " sense " might designate both the springs of experience is misleading, when we find in the sequel how much Locke tacitly credits " reflection " with.

Although the second book is a sort of inventory of our ideas, as distinguished from the certainty and boundaries of our knowledge, Locke even here makes the assumption that the " simple ideas " of the five senses are practically qualities of things which exist without us, and that the mental " operations " discovered by " reflection " are those of a person continuously existing.

Such, according to Locke, are the only simple ideas which can appear even in the sublimest human speculations.

For proof of this Locke would have any one try to fancy a taste which had never affected his palate, or to frame the idea of a scent he had never felt, or an operation of mind, divine or human, foreign to all human consciousness.

Locke here treats simple ideas of the five senses as qualities of outward things.

Locke calls the former sort " primary, original or essential qualities of matter," and the others " secondary or derived qualities."

Thus far the outcome of what Locke teaches about matter is, that it is Something capable of being expressed in terms of mathematical.

This Locke proposes in a hesitating way.

Such are modes of quantity in space, and time and number, under which Locke reports that we find ourselves mentally impelled towards immensity, eternity and the innumerable - in a word, towards Infinity which seems to transcend quantity; then there is the complex thought of Substance, to which we find ourselves mysteriously impelled, when the simple phenomena of the senses come to be regarded as qualities of " something "; again there is the obscure idea of the identity of persons, notwithstanding their constant changes of state; and there is, above all, the inevitable tendency we somehow have to refund a change into what we call its " Cause," with the associated idea of active power.

Locke begins with our complex ideas of Space, Succession or Time, and Number.

Thus Locke seems by implication to acknowledge something added by the mind to the original " simple ideas " of extension and succession; though he finds that what is added is not positively conceivable.

Locke is too faithful to facts to overlook the ultimate mysteries in human experience.

Locke had some apprehension of this transcendent intellectual obligation.

Why man must remain in this mental predicament, Locke did not inquire.

Locke's thoughts about Causality and Active Power are especially noteworthy, for he rests our knowledge of God and of the external universe on those ultimate ideas.

Locke seems hardly to realize all that is implied in scientific prevision or expectation of change.

Locke here unconsciously approaches the spiritual view of active power in the physical universe afterwards taken by Berkeley, forming the constructive principle of his philosophy.

Locke's book about Ideas leads naturally to his Third Book which is concerned with Words, or the sensible signs of ideas.

Hume had not yet shown the sceptical objections against conclusions which Locke accepted without criticism.

Locke's report about human knowledge and its narrow extent forms the first thirteen chapters of the fourth book.

Locke found important differences in the way in which knowledge of any sort is reached.

Locke next inquired to what extent knowledge - in the way either of intuitive certainty, demonstrative certainty, or sense perception - is possible, in regard to each of the four (already mentioned) sorts of knowable relation.

Morality, Locke thinks, as well as mathematical quantity, is capable of being demonstrated.

Turning from abstract mathematical and moral relations to concrete relations of coexistence and succession among phenomena - the third sort of knowable relation - Locke finds the light of pure reason disappear; although these relations form " the greatest and most important part of what we desire to know."

But this moral venture Locke accepts as " sufficient for our purposes."

Our knowledge under Locke's fourth category of relations - real existence - includes (a) intuitive perceptions of our own existence; Real exist- (b) demonstrable certainty of the existence of God; and.

Faith in the existence of God is virtually with Locke an expression of faith in the principle of active causality in its ultimate universality.

But the immanence of God in the things and persons that compose the universal order, with what this implies, is a con ception foreign to Locke, whose habitual conception was of an extra-mundane deity, the dominant conception in the 18th century.

Turning from our knowledge of Spirit to our knowledge of Matter, nearly all that one can affirm or deny about " things external is," according to Locke, not knowledge but venture n or pre- Knowledge sumptive trust.

Accordingly, purely rational science of external Nature is, according to Locke, impossible.

Such is Locke's " plain, matter-offact " account of the knowledge of the Real that is open to man.

We learn little from Locke as to the rationale of the probabilities on which man thus depends when he deals with the past, Te the distant or the future.

Investigation of the foundation of inductive inference was resumed by Hume where Locke left it.

With a still humbler view of human reason than Locke's, Hume proposed as " a subject Locke and worthy of curiosity," to inquire into " the nature of t h at Hume.

Kant's critical analysis of pure reason is more foreign to Locke than the attempts of 18thand 19th-century associationists and evolutionists to explain experience and science.

Kant's aim was to Locke and show the necessary rational constitution of experience.

Locke's design was less profound.

Locke's mission was to initiate modern criticism of the foundation and limits of our knowledge.

Hume negatively, and the German and Scottish schools constructively, continued what it was Locke's glory to have begun.

The first collected edition of Locke's Works was in 1714, in three folio volumes.

The E loge of Jean le Clerc (Bibliotheque choisie, 1705) has been the basis of the memoirs of Locke prefixed to the successive editions of his Works, or contained in biographical dictionaries.

This adds a good deal to what was previously known, as Lord King was able to draw from the mass of correspondence, journals and commonplace books of Locke in his possession.

In the same year Dr Thomas Foster published some interesting letters from Locke to Benjamin Furly.

Pollock and Fraser at the bicentenary commemoration by the British Academy of Locke's death, published in the Proceedings of the Academy (1904).

Locke's treatment of the problem is in some respects more interesting than the theories of other English philosophers of his school.

Freedom, according to Locke, belongs to the man, not to the will.

Yet Locke's ethical opinions have been widely misunderstood; since from a confusion between " innate ideas " and " intuitions," 'which has been common in recent ethical discussion, it has been supposed that the founder of English empiricism must necessarily have been hostile to " intuitional " ethics.

The truth is that, while Locke agrees entirely with Hobbes as to the egoistic basis of rational conduct, and the interpretation of " good " and " evil" as " pleasure " and " pain," or that which is productive of pleasure and pain, he yet agrees entirely with Hobbes's opponents in holding ethical rules to be actually obligatory independently of political society, and capable of being scientifically constructed on principles intuitively known, - though he does not regard these principles as implanted in the mind at birth.

As Locke cannot consistently mean by God's " goodness " anything but the disposition to give pleasure, it might be inferred that the ultimate standard of right rules of action ought to be the common happiness of the beings affected by the action; but Locke does not explicitly adopt this standard.

We might give, as a fair illustration of Locke's general conception of ethics, a system which is frequently represented as diametrically opposed to Lockism; namely, that expounded in Clarke's Boyle lectures on the Being 'Clarke.

It is true that Locke is not particularly concerned with the ethico-theological proposition which Clarke is most anxious to maintain, - that the fundamental rules of morality are independent of arbitrary will, whether divine or human.

But in his general view of ethical principles as being, like mathematical principles,' essentially truths of relation, Clarke is quite in accordance with Locke; while of the four fundamental rules that he expounds, Piety towards God, Equity, Benevolence and Sobriety (which includes self-preservation), the first is obtained, just as Locke suggests, by " comparing the idea " of man with the idea of an infinitely good and wise being on whom he depends; and the second and third are axioms self-evident on the consideration of the equality or similarity of human individuals as such.

The quotation may remind us that the analogy between ethics and mathematics ought to be traced further back than Locke; in fact, it results from the influence exercised by Cartesianism over English thought generally, in the latter half of the 17th century.

This Paley and Bentham (after Locke) interpreted as merely the effect on the will of the pleasures or pains attached to the observance or violation of moral rules, combining with this the doctrine of Hutcheson that " general good " or " happiness " is the final end and standard of these rules; while they eliminated all vagueness from the notion of general happiness by defining it to consist in " excess of pleasure over pain " - pleasures and pains being regarded as " differing in nothing but continuance or intensity."

Neither the doctrine of Hobbes, that deliberation is a mere alternation of competing desires, voluntary action immediately following the " last appetite," nor the hardly less decided Determinism of Locke, who held that the will is always moved by the greatest present uneasiness, appeared to either author to require any reconciliation with the belief in human responsibility.

The physics and psychology of Descartes were much studied in England, and his metaphysical system was certainly the most important antecedent of Locke's; but Descartes hardly touched ethics proper.

Locke includes it among the books necessary to the complete education of a gentleman.

The parts of logic which he treated with most minuteness are modal propositions and modal syllogisms. In commenting on Aristotle's Ethics he dealt in a very independent manner with the question of free will, his conclusions being remarkably similar to those of John Locke.

Locke (Treatise on Government) differed from Hobbes in so far as he described the pre-social state as one of freedom, and held that private property must have been recognized, though there was no security.

The restrictions on Irish commerce provoked Locke's friend William Molyneux (1656-1698) to write his famous plea for legislative independence (1698).

As a metaphysician he starts from what he terms "the higher scepticism" of the Hume-Kantian sphere of thought, the beginnings of which he discerns in Locke's perplexity about the idea of substance.

He was well versed in English literature, chiefly of the age of Queen Anne, and had read English philosophy from Locke to Hume, and the Scottish school.

Of the two preceding stages of modern philosophy, only the second, that of Locke and Leibnitz, seems to have influenced practically the course of Kant's speculation.

The fundamental question for philosophic reflection presented itself to him in the form which it had assumed in the hands of Locke and his successors in England, of Leibnitz and the Leibnitzian school in Germany.

The tendency towards what may be technically called subjectivism, a tendency which differentiates the modern from the ancient method of speculation, is expressed in Locke and Leibnitz in a definite and peculiar fashion.

Regarded from the individualist point of view, this line of inquiry becomes purely psychological, and the answer may be presented, as it was presented by Locke, in the fashion of a natural history of the growth of conscious experience in the mind of the subject.

Consider, first, the application of the method on its psychological side, as it appears in Locke.

Starting with the assumption of conscious experience as the content or filling-in of the individual mind, Locke proceeds to explain its genesis and nature by reference co the real universe of things and its mechanical operation upon the mind.

He is not asking, with Locke, whence the details of experience arise; he is not attempting a natural history of the growth of experience in the individual mind; but he is endeavouring to state exhaustively what conditions are necessarily involved in any fact of knowledge, i.e.

Meanwhile, Sawyer is an amused but highly interested bystander when tension escalates between Jack, Locke, Kate and Ana Lucia.

Introduction John Locke might be regarded as ' the father of modern empiricism ' .

His more general research interests include metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and Early Modern Philosophy, especially Descartes and Locke.

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There are the central dogmas of logic, metaphysics and physics, from which start the subsequent inquiries of Locke, Leibnitz and Newton.

Already antiquated, it could not resist the wit and raillery with which Voltaire, in his Lettres sur les Anglais (1728), brought against it the principles and results of Locke and Newton.

Of Cartesianism towards the close of the 17th century the only remnants were an overgrown theory of vortices, which received its death-blow from Newton, and a dubious phraseology anent innate ideas, which found a witt y executioner in Locke.

Define more carefully than Locke did, with his blunder about "ideas," the process of perception, and you cut up scepticism by the roots !

Finally, it is to be observed that Locke had a singularly clear view of organic arrangements (which of course he explained according to a theistic teleology) as an adaptation to the circumstances of the environment or to " the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us."

The accurate investigation of the lowest forms of animal life, commenced by Leeuwenhoek and Swammerdam, and continued by the remarkable labours of Reaumur, Abraham Trembley, Bonnet, and a host of other observers in the latter part of the 17th and the first half of the 18th centuries, drew the attention of biologists to the gradation in the complexity of organization which is presented by living beings, and culminated in the doctrine of the echelle des titres, so powerfully and clearly stated by Bonnet, and, before him, adumbrated by Locke and by Leibnitz.

If Socinianism had challenged natural theology - Christ, according to it, was the prophet who first revealed the way to eternal life - it had glorified the natural powers of man; and the learning of the Arminian divines (friends of Grotius and Locke) had helped to modernize Christian apologetics upon rational lines.

Buffier's aversion to scholastic refinements has given to his writings an appearance of shallowness and want of metaphysical insight, and unquestionably he failed entirely even to indicate the nature of that universality and necessity which he ascribed to his "eternal verities"; he was, however, one of the earliest to recognize the psychological as distinguished from the metaphysical side of Descartes's principle, and to use it, with no inconsiderable skill, as the basis of an analysis of the human mind, similar to that enjoined by Locke.

From the point of view which Berkeley had inherited from Locke it seemed to follow that not only material substance, but the whole conception of a world of objects, is at most an inference from subjective modifications which are the only immediately certain objects of knowledge.

During the middle ages the empiric spirit was in abeyance, but it revived from the time of Francis Bacon and was systematized especially in the English philosophers, Locke, Hume, the two Mills,.

Descartes died in 1650 in the communion of the Church, his philosophy contained seeds of revolt; and the sensualism of Locke, popularized in Italy by Genovesi, prepared the way for revolution.

It is, however, clear that from his earliest years he began to speculate upon the nature of knowledge in the abstract, and its concrete applications, as in theology, and that with this object he studied largely the writings of Cicero and Seneca and recent English philosophers (especially Locke, Berkeley and Butler).

But in any case, - and, as we shall see, Hume endeavours so to state his psychological premises as to conceal the assumption made openly by Locke, - it is apparent that this psychological solution does not contain the answer to the wider and radically distinct problem of the theory of knowledge.

Gibbon, describing his first stay at Lausanne (1752-1755), writes in his Autobiography, "the logic of de Crousaz had prepared me to engage with his master Locke and his antagonist Bayle."

Locke took no notice at the time, but his second winter at Otes was partly employed in An Examination of Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing all Things in God, and in Remarks upon some of Mr Norris's Books, tracts which throw light upon his own ambiguous theory of perception through the senses.

Locke believed that in attacking " innate principles " he was pleading for universal reasonableness instead of blind reliance on authority, and was thus, as he says, not " pulling up the foundations of knowledge," but " laying those foundations surer."

In the Fundamental Constitution, adopted by the proprietary board in 1669 John Locke and Lord Ashley (1621-1683) prepared for the colony an elaborate feudal system of government which would have been obsolete even in Europe (see North Carolina).

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In August, Tom Locke visited Guelph, Ontario and Wooster, Ohio to investigate verticillium wilt of potatoes.

For example, Kimberly Locke, Crystal Renn and Kate Dillon are among the plus size models used extensively by Lane Bryant who have become big-name stars.

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Locke was signed by Curb Records and has produced three albums as of 2010 and is working on her fourth.

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Some of the best-known protagonists include Terra Branford, Celes Chere, Locke Cole, and Edgar Roni Figaro.

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John Locke, the real father of English philosophy, took the field against what he regarded as Descartes's impossible programme of " Innate Ideas."

Yet while thus placing himself at a point of view opposed to that of a gradual evolution of the organic world, Locke prepared the way for this doctrine in more ways than one.

At an early age he had made himself familiar with The Pilgrim's Progress, with Locke, On the Human Understanding, and with a volume of The Spectator.