Kantian Sentence Examples

Vico founded no school, and though during his lifetime and for a while after his death he had many admirers both in Naples and the northern cities, his fame and name were soon obscured, especially as the Kantian system dominated the world of thought.

Mansel tried (1858) to play Pascal's game on Kantian principles, developing the sceptical side of 'Kant's many-faceted mind.

The transcendental deduction, or proof from the possibility of experience in general, which forms the vital centre of the Kantian scheme, is wanting in Reid; or, at all events, if the spirit of the proof is occasionally present, it is nowhere adequately developed.

Brown wrote a criticism of Darwin's Zoonomia (1798), and was one of the first contributors to the Edinburgh Review, in the second number of which he published a criticism of the Kantian philosophy, based entirely on Villers's French account of it.

In 1789 he published his chief work, the Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermägens, in which he attempted to simplify the Kantian theory and make it more of a unity.

The development of the Kantian standpoint contained in the "New Theory of Human Understanding" (1789), and in the Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791), was called by its author Elementarphilosophie.

Thus his theoretic opposition to the Kantian aesthetics is but the reflection of his practical opposition to the form-idolatry of the Weimar poets.

Schubert, he published an edition of the works of Kant, to which he appended a history of the Kantian doctrine.

He felt that any philosophical advance must be based on the Kantian methods.

He has been called Kantian and Neo-Kantian, Realist and Idealist (by himself, for he held that appearance and reality are co-extensive and coincident).

It effected a revolution in his mode of thinking; so completely did the Kantian doctrine of the inherent moral worth of man harmonize with his own character, that his life becomes one effort to perfect a true philosophy, and to make its principles practical maxims. At first he seems to have thought that the best method for accomplishing his object would be to expound Kantianism in a popular, intelligible form.

He resolved to bring himself before Kant's notice by submitting to him a work in which the principles of the Kantian philosophy should be applied.

The Critique of Revelation marks the culminating point of Fichte's Kantian period.

It was not possible that having reached this point he should not press forward and leave the Kantian position.

The remainder of the year he spent at Zurich, slowly perfecting his thoughts on the fundamental problems left for solution in the Kantian philosophy.

Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian view - lying, indeed, at the foundation of it - was the doctrine that the matter of cognition is altogether given, or thrown into the form of cognition from without.

In Kantian terminology Dialektik is the name of that portion of the Kritik d.

It was by asking precisely these questions that Hegel gave the finishing strokes to the Kantian philosophy.

Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity.

He devoted himself to criticism and explanation of the doctrine of Kant, and in 1793 published the Erlduternder Auszug aus Kants kritischen Schriften, which has been widely used as a compendium of Kantian doctrine.

Philosophic (1796), containing an interpretation of the Kantian Kritik in the manner of Salomon Maimon.

In order to prove this novel conclusion he started afresh from the Cartesian " I think " in the Kantian form of the synthetic unity of apperception acting by a priori categories; but instead of allowing, with all previous metaphysicians, that the Ego passively receives sensations from something different, and not contenting himself with Kant's view that the Ego, by synthetically combining the matter of sensations with a priori forms, partially constructs objects, and therefore Nature as we know it, he boldly asserted that the Ego, in its synthetic unity, entirely constructs things; that its act of spontaneity is not mere synthesis of passive sensations, but construction of sensations into an object within itself; and that therefore understanding makes as well as shapes Nature.

As long as even the meagre realism of the Kantian thing in itself is maintained, the account of there being one sun is simply that one thing causes different phenomena in different minds.

If things different but similar have the same attributes, and are thereby the same, then in the first place the Kantian categories, though thoughts of mental origin and therefore confined to mind, are nevertheless applicable to things, because things, though different from, are the same as, thoughts, and have the categories of thoughts; in the second place, the Fichtian Ego of mankind is not the Absolute Reason of God, and yet is the same Absolute Reason; in the third place, the Schellingian Nature is the "other " of Spirit, and yet, being a mere reflex of the Idea of Nature, is identical with Spirit; and as this Spirit is everywhere the same in God and men, Nature is also identical with our Spirit, or rather with the Infinite Spirit, or Absolute Reason, which alone exists.

He really accepted, like Kant, the hypothesis of a sense of sensations which led to the Kantian conclusion that the Nature we know in time and space is mere sensible appearances in us.

But he has a different theory of human nature and soul, and so does not accept the Kantian conclusion that things in themselves, in the sense of things beyond phenomena, are all unknowable.

Phenomenal idealism is the Kantian contention that Nature, as known to science, is phenomena of experience.

Lange (q.v.) by his History of Materialism has exercised a profound influence, which is due partly to its apparent success in answering materialism by Kantian arguments, and partly to its ingenious attempt to give.

But this modification made no difference to the Kantian and Neo-Kantian deduction from the epistemological to the metaphysical.

Having, however, made a deduction, which is at all events consistent, that on Kantian assumptions all we know is mental phenomena, Lange proceeded to reduce the rest of Kantism to consistency.

He accepts the Kantian positions that unity of consciousness combines sensations by a priori synthesis, and that therefore all that natural science knows about matter moving in space is merely phenomena of outer sense; and he agrees with Kant that from these data we could not infer things in themselves by reason.

Further, holding that, " like every other perception, the perception of a human body immediately involves the existence of that body," and, like Fichte, believing in a " common consciousness," he concludes that the evidence of sense is verined by " common consciousness " of the external world as objective in the Kantian sense of universally valid.

He has a special relation to Fichte in developing the Kantian activity of consciousness into will and substituting activity for substantiality as the essence of soul, as well as in breaking down the antithesis between phenomena and things in themselves.

He constructs his system on the Kantian order - sense, understanding, reason - and exhibits most clearly the necessary consequence from psychological to metaphysical idealism.

When Fichte had rejected the Kantian Soul in itself and developed the Kantian activity of apperception, he considered that soul consists in constructive activity.

But, using substance as he does always in the Kantian sense of permanent substratum beneath changing phenomena, and never in the Aristotelian sense of any distinct thing, he proceeds to make distinctions between the applications of causality and of substance.

Secondly, when Wundt comes to the psychical, he naturally infers from his narrow Kantian definition of substance that there is no proof of a substrate over and above all mental operations, and falsely thinks that he has proved that there is no substance mentally operating in the Aristotelian sense.

But natural realism, as finally interpreted by Hamilton, was too dogmatic, too unsystematic, and too confused with elements derived from Kantian idealism to withstand the brilliant criticism of Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), a work which for a time almost persuaded us that Nature as we know it from sensations is nothing but permanent possibilities of sensation, and oneself only a series of states of consciousness.

Taken for granted the Kantian hypothesis of a sense of sensations requiring synthesis by understanding, and the Kantian conclusion that Nature as known consists of phenomena united by categories as objects of experience, Green argued, in accordance with Kant's first position, that knowledge, in order to unite the manifold of sensations by relations into related phenomena, requires unifying intelligence, or what Kant called synthetic unity of apperception, which cannot itself be sensation, because it arranges sensations; and he argued, in accordance with Kant's second position, that therefore Nature itself as known requires unifying intelligence to constitute the relations of its phenomena, and to make it a connected world of experience.

When Green said that " Nature is the system of related appearances, and related appearances are impossible apart from the action of an intelligence," he was speaking as a pure Kantian, who could be answered only by the Aristotelian position that Nature consists of related bodies beyond appearances, and by the realistic supposition that there, , h is a tactical sense of related bodies, of the inter-resisting members of the organism, from which reason infers similar related bodies beyond sense.

But it is not a Kantian view; and it is necessary to correct two confusions of Kant and Hegel, which have been iYnported with Hegelianism by Green and Caird.

Green, on the other hand, in deducing his own conclusion that the world is, or is a system of, one eternal intelligence, incautiously put it forward as " what may be called broadly the Kantian view " (Prolegomena, § 36), and added that he follows Kant " in maintaining that a single active conscious principle, by whatever name it be called, is necessary to constitute such a world, as the condition under which alone phenomena, i.e.

He admitted, however, that Kant also asserted, beyond this single universe of a single principle, a world of unknowable things in themselves, which is a Kantian not a Hegelian world.

The former error needs something deeper than a Kantian critique of reason, or an Avenarian criticism of experience; it needs a criticism of the senses.

Although he does not agree with Kant that either the formal element in sense or the synthesis of sensations is a priori, yet in very Kantian fashion, through not distinguishing between operation and object, he holds that, in synthetically combining sensations of touch and sight, we not only have a complex perception of a solid body, but also know this " object thought of " as itself the complex of these sensations objectified.

Here you would expect him to stop, as the German Neo-Kantism of Lange stops, with the consistent conclusion that all we know of Nature from such data is these complexes of sensation-elements, or phenomena in the Kantian meaning.

Whatever its origin may be, it could not, any more than a Kantian category of cause, justify us in concluding anything more than a relation of perceptions as conditions of one another, seeing that they were supposed to be the whole data, and matter itself to be " sensation-elements."

If?li there is one thing certain in the Kantian philosophy, it is its author's perception that what is contributed by mind must not be extended to things beyond mind.

He dissented strongly from the Kantian distinction between matter and form of thought, and urged that philosophy should consider only thought in itself, pure thought, the ground or possibility of being.

The closing sentences of this passage may be regarded as pointing to the very essence of the Kantian attempt at solution of the problem of knowledge.

It was not till 1788 that he made the acquaintance of the Kantian philosophy, which was to form the basis of his lifework, and as early as 1790 he published the Versuch fiber die Transcendentalphilosophie, in which he formulates his objections to the system.

The Kantian categories are, indeed, demonstrable and true, but their application to the given is meaningless and unthinkable.

Quite naturally, then, Hamann is led to object strongly to much of the Kantian philosophy.

Kant's Logic. Herbart's admitted allegiance, however, was Kantian with the qualification, at a relatively advanced stage of his thinking, that it was " of the year 1828 " - that is, after controversy had brought out implications of Kant's teaching not wholly contemplated by Kant himself.

The exponent of logic as metaphysic, for whom the rational is the real is necessarily in revolt against all that is characteristically Kantian in the theory of knowledge, against the transcendental method itself and against the doctrine of limits which constitutes the nerve of " criticism."

In all else the claim is made to have left the Kantian teaching behind as a cancelled level of speculation.

Stuart Mill, despite of his relation of antagonism to Hamilton and Mansel, who held themselves to be Kantian in spirit, is still wholly pre-Kantian in his outlook.

Moreover, few of the writers who, whatsoever it was that they baptized with the name of logic, were at least earnestly engaged in an endeavour to solve the problem of knowledge within a circle of ideas which was on the whole Kantian, were under the dominance of a single inspiration.

The concept is accounted for in Kantian terms. There is no discontinuity between the pre-logical or sub-logical ' See Ueberweg, System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, § 34.

His solution, within the Kantian circle of ideas, was that such principles as the Kantian principle of causality were justified as " postulates of the endeavour after complete knowledge."

The System der Logik (1828) of Bachmann (a Kantian logician of distinction) contains a historical survey (pp. 569-644), as does the Denklehre (1822) of van Calker (allied in thought to Fries), pp. 12 sqq.; Eberstein's Geschichte der Logik and Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz bis auf gegenwartige Zeit (latest edition, 1 799) is still of importance in regard to logicians of the school of Wolff and the origines of Kant's logical thought.

To explain the formal organization of our experience he adopts a modified version of the Kantian categories.

In Kantian terminology apperception is (1) transcendental - the perception of an object as involving the consciousness of the pure self as subject, and (2) empirical, - the cognition of the self in its concrete existence.

In the Kantian system the term "noiimena" means things-in-themselves as opposed to "phenomena" or things as they appear to us.

The relation of noiimena to phenomena in the Kantian system is a most difficult one; and, in view of the fact that the acutest intellects of Europe have been engaged vainly for more than a century in reconciling the various passages on the subject, the safest conclusion is that they are irreconcilable.

At first he followed Beneke's empiricism, and strongly opposed the subjectivistic tendency of the Kantian system, maintaining in particular the objectivity of space and time, which involved him in a somewhat violent controversy.

Philosophy may be said to be the explication of what is involved in this relation, or, in Kantian phraseology, a theory of its possibility.

This constitutes the theory of knowledge in the only tenable sense of the term, and it lays down, in Kantian language, the conditions of the possibility of experience.

Adopting the Kantian standpoint that we can know nothing but phenomena, Lange maintains that neither materialism nor any other metaphysical system has a valid claim to ultimate truth.

In these two works Dr Stirling endeavoured to establish an intimate connexion between Kant and Hegel, and even went so far as to maintain that Hegel's doctrine is merely the elucidation and crystallization of the Kantian system.

In this writing, and especially in the Appendix, Jacobi came into contact with the critical philosophy, and subjected the Kantian view of knowledge to searching examination.

The difficulties of the Kantian system are mainly to be looked for in his account of the relation between the phenomenal and noumenal world.

We find, however, distinct traces of Kantian influence in Whewell and other writers of the intuitional school, and at a later date it became so strong that its importance on subsequent ethical thought can scarcely be over-estimated.

As regards ethics, Baader rejects the Kantian or any autonomic system of morals.

In spite of its frequent obscurity, its novel terminology, and its declared opposition to prevailing systems, the Kantian philosophy made rapid progress in Germany.

Vaihinger to promote Kantian studies.

In any complete account of the Kantian system it is therefore necessary that there should be constant reference, on the one hand, to the peculiar character of the preceding 18th-century philosophy, and, on the other hand, to the problems left for renewed treatment to more modern thought.

Fortunately the development of the Kantian system itself furnishes such treatment as is necessary of the former reference.

To understand the Kantian work it is indispensable to trace the history of its growth in the mind of its author.

The individual as an agent, conscious of universal moral law, is yet regarded as in a measure opposed to experience, and the Kantian ethical code remains purely formal.

The difficulties or obscurities of the Kantian system, of which the above are merely the more prominent, may all be traced to the one source, the false or at least inadequate idea of the individual.

It would be necessary, also, in any such expanded treatment, to bring out clearly the Kantian classification of the philosophical sciences, and to indicate the relation between the critical or transcendental investigation of the several faculties and the more developed sciences to which that investigation serves as introduction.

Much that is of interest and value must necessarily be omitted in any sketch of so elaborate a system, and for all points of special interpretation reference must needs be made to the many elaborate dissertations on or about the Kantian philosophy.

The relation between phenomena and noumena in the Kantian system does not in the least resemble that which plays so important a part in modern psychology - between the subjective results of sense affection and the character of the objective conditions of such affection.

Critics who limit their view to the Kritik of Pure Reason, and there, in all probability, to the first or constructive portion of the work, must necessarily fail to interpret the doctrines of the Kantian system, which do not become clear or definite till the system has been developed.

The investigation of the conditions under which adaptation of nature to intelligence is conceivable and possible makes up the subject of the third great Kritik, the Kritik of Judgment, a work presenting unusual difficulties to the interpreter of the Kantian system.

The final conception of the Kantian philosophy is, therefore, that of ethical teleology.

Self-consciousness, or the subject of the transcendental unity of apperception, was likewise impervious to cognition from the Kantian standpoint.

In 1789 he published his chief work, the Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen VorstellungsvermÃgens, in which he attempted to simplify the Kantian theory and make it more of a unity.

But the phenomenal idealists have not, any more than Kant, noticed the ambiguity of the term " phenomenon "; they fancy that, in saying that all we know is phenomena in the Kantian sense of mental appearances, they are describing all the positive facts that science knows; and they follow Kant in supposing that there is no logical inference of actual things beyond experience.

In the Biographia this "Theistic faith" appears in its full development (see the concluding chapter), and is especially important as perhaps the nearest approach to Kantian ethics made by original English philosophy.

The Kantian paradox he explains as the result of an attempt to explain the origin of the "given" in consciousness.

Ere rationalismus vulgaris fell before the combined assault of Schleiermacher's subjective theology and the deeper historical insight of the Hegelians, it had found a refuge successively in the Kantian postulates of the practical reason, and in the vague but earnest faith-philosophy of Jacobi.