How to use Idealism in a sentence
Idealism in one way or other supposes that mind is more real than matter.
Here then characteristically intuitionalism occupies a half-way house between empiricism, with its appeal to real given fact, and idealism, with its appeal to necessity.
If we answer " Yes " to that question, we pass on from intuitionalism to idealism - an idealism not on the lines of Berkeley (matter does not exist) but of Plato (things A obey an ascertainable rational necessity).
With all its idealism, Greek thought had difficulty in regarding rational necessity as absolute master of the physical world.
Such vicissitudes were the ordinary lot of the Jews for several centuries, and it was their own inner life - the pure life of the home, the idealism of the synagogue, and the belief in ultimate Messianic redemption - that saved them from utter demoralization and despair.Advertisement
Whatever is to be said of ancient Idealism, the modern doctrine may be said notably in Kant to have been in the main a vindication of the subjective factor in knowledge.
His principle, however, was essentially sound, and led directly to the Platonic Idealism.
If there be any truth in this suggestion it seems likely that the last word of idealism, like the first, will prove to be that the type of the highest reality is to be sought for not in any fixed Parmenidean circle of achieved being but in an ideal of good which while never fully expressed under the form of time can never become actual and so fulfil itself under any other.
Yet the Megarians were by no means in agreement with the Platonic idealism.
The swellings on the palmar faces of the phalanges of the several fingers are also indicative, the 1st and and of the thumb respectively, of the logical faculty and of the will; the 1st, and and 3rd of the index finger, of materialism, law and order, idealism; those of the middle finger, humanity, system, intelligence; of the ring finger, truth, economy, energy; and of the little finger, goodness, prudence, reflectiveness.Advertisement
At the same time, the repression of idealism and sentiment during the period of " illumination " was amply revenged, and the barren age of reason gave place to Romanticism.
But as to the greatness of his work, the profundity of his philosophy and the brilliance of his religious idealism, there can be no question.
The remarks made above would not apply to the coherent system of idealism which may be evolved from Kant's writings, and which many would consider alone to deserve the name of Kantianism or Criticism.
Passing to the more indirect influence of Laud on his times, we can observe a narrowness of mind and aim which separates him from a man of such high imagination and idealism as Strafford, however closely identified their policies may have been for the moment.
It is a proof of the strength of the moral instincts of mankind that the only phase of culture which we can survey in all its stages from beginning to end culminated not in materialism, but in the boldest idealism.Advertisement
This idealism, however, is also in its way a mark of intellectual bankruptcy.
The idealism of the new philosophy was too heavenly to be naturalized in the Byzantine empire, which stood more in need of police officials than of philosophers.
With Goethe, who viewed with interest and appreciation the poetical fashion of treating fact characteristic of the Naturphilosophie, he continued on excellent terms, while on the other hand he was repelled by Schiller's less expansive disposition, and failed altogether to understand the lofty ethical idealism that animated his work.
Fichtean idealism therefore at once stood out negatively, as abolishing the dogmatic conception of the two real worlds, subject and object, by whose interaction cognition and practice arise, and as amending the critical idea which retained with dangerous caution too many fragments of dogmatism; positively, as insisting on the unity of philosophical interpretation and as supplying a key to the form or method by which a completed philosophic system might be constructed.
But the Fichtean teaching appeared on the one hand to identify too closely the ultimate ground of the universe of rational conception with the finite, individual spirit, and on the other hand to endanger the reality of the world of nature by regarding it too much after the fashion of subjective idealism, as mere moment, though necessitated, in the existence of the finite thinking mind.Advertisement
Hence the stress laid on will as the realizing factor, in opposition to thought, a view through which Schelling connects himself with Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, and on the ground of which he has been recognized by the latter as the reconciler of idealism and realism.
Beck maintains that the real meaning of Kant's theory is idealism; that of objects outside the domain of consciousness, knowledge is impossible, and hence that nothing positive remains when we have removed the subjective element.
In neither, however, are they a grammatical classification of words by their structure; and in neither are they a psychological classification of notions or general conceptions (voi uara), such as they afterwards became in Kant's Critique and the post-Kantian idealism.
Idealism has since followed it, and is the metaphysical doctrine that all things are mind and states of mind.
Aristotelianism intervenes between ancient Platonism and modern Idealism, and is the metaphysical doctrine that all things are substances, natural and supernatural and human.Advertisement
Or are they, as modern Idealism says, mind and states of mind?
To this conclusion Berkeley seems, in the first place, to have been led by the train of reflection that naturally conducts to subjective or egoistic idealism.
To merely subjective idealism, sense percepts differ from ideas of imagination in degree, not in kind; both belong to the individual mind.
His theory is quite distinct from this, which really amounts to nothing more than subjective idealism.
Metaphysical idealism is the view that everything known is mind, or some mental state or other, which some idealists suppose to require a substantial soul, others not; while all agree that body has no different being apart from mind.
Idealism; Pragmatism; Relativity Of Knowledge, while separate discussions of ancient and medieval philosophers will be found in biographical articles and articles on the chief philosophical schools, e.g.
We shall return, then, to the clearer and more authoritative division, and proceed to discuss materialism, idealism and realism in their order.
Idealism was receding for the moment.
This then is his transfigured realism, which, as far as what is known goes, is idealism, but as far as what exists goes, realism - of a sort.
So far as this main point of transfigured realism is steadily maintained, it is a compound of idealism and realism, but not materialism.
By combining materialism with idealism he made consciousness a product of itself.
This occasionalism is not idealism, but its emphasis on the will of God gave it an idealistic tendency.
Spinozism, however, though it tramples down the barrier between body and soul, is not yet metaphysical idealism, because it does not reduce extension to thought, but only says that the same substance is at once extended and thinking - a position more akin to materialism.
It remained, however, for Schelling to convert this parallelism into identity by identifying motion with the intelligence of God, and so to transform the pantheism of Spinoza into pantheistic idealism.
Leibnitz, again, having become equally dissatisfied with Cartesianism, Spinozism and the Epicurean realism of Gassendi, in the latter part of his life came still nearer than Spinoza to metaphysical idealism in his monadology, or half-Pythagorean,half-Brunistic analysis of bodies into monads, or units, or simple substances, indivisible and unextended, but endowed with perception and appetite.
Up to this point, then, Leibnitz opened one of the chief avenues to metaphysical idealism, the resolution of the material into the immaterial, the analysis of bodies into mental elements.
According to one alternative, which consistently flowed from the psychological idealism of Descartes, as well as from his own monadism, he suggested that bodies are real phenomena; phenomena, because they are aggregates of monads, which derive their unity only from appearing together to our perceptions; real phenomena well founded, because they result from real monads.
He therefore concluded that all we know from the data of psychological idealism is impressions or sensations, ideas, and associations of ideas, making us believe without proof in substances and causes, together with " a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our preceptions."
We have here, in this sceptical idealism, the source of the characteristically English form of idealism still to be read in the writings of Mill and Spencer, and still the starting-point of more recent works, such as Pearson's Grammar of Science and James's Principles of Psychology.
This second position is a new form of metaphysical idealism, containing the supposition, which lies at the foundation of later German philosophy, that since understanding shapes the objects out of sensations, and since nature, as we know it, consists of such objects, " understanding, though it does not make, shapes nature," as well as our knowledge.
Fichte now set himself in the Wissenschaftslehre (1794) to make transcendental idealism into a system of metaphysical idealism without Kant's inconsistencies and relics of realism.
Fichte thus transformed the transcendental idealism of Kant by identifying the thing with the object, and by interpreting noumenon, not in Kant's sense of something which speculative reason conceives and practical reason postulates to exist in accordance with the idea, but in the new meaning of a thought, a product of reason.
Here he was for the first time grappling with a fundamental difficulty in metaphysical idealism which is absent from realism, namely, the difficulty of explaining the identity of a thing, e.g.
Thus the complete metaphysical idealism of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre formed out of the incomplete metaphysical idealism of Kant's Kritik, is the theor y on its epistemological side that the Ego posits the non-Ego as a thing in itself, and yet as only a thing existing for it as its own noumenon, and on its metaphysical side that in consequence all reality is the Ego and its own determinations, which are objective, or valid for all, as determinations, not of you or of me, but of the consciousness common to all of us, the pure or absolute Ego.
Lastly, Fichte called this system realism, in so far as it posits the thing in itself as another thing; idealism, in so far as it posits it as a noumenon which is a product of its own thinking; and on the whole real idealism or ideal realism.
In this extension of metaphysical idealism he was influenced by his disciple, Schelling.
Fichte completed the process from psychological and epistemological to metaphysical idealism, which it has been necessary to recall from its beginnings in France, England and Germany, in order to understand modern idealism.
Berkeley and Hume produced the English idealism of Mill and Spencer, with their successors, and occasioned the German idealism of Kant.
Kant's a priori synthesis of sensations into experience lies at the root of all German idealism.
He carried metaphysical idealism to its height, by not only resolving the bodily into the mental, but also elevating the action of mind into absolute mental construction; not inferring things in themselves beyond, but originating things from within, mind itself.
This was the starting-point of their metaphysical idealism.
By the same dialectic Hegel was able to justify the gradual transformation of transcendental into noumenal idealism by Fichte and Schelling.
The crux of all metaphysical idealism is the difficulty of reconciling the unity of the object with the plurality of subjects.
This new noumenal idealism began, like the preceding, by combining psycho l0 ical idealism with the transcendentalism of Kant and Fichte.
Lotze (1817-1881) elaborated a very different noumenal idealism, which perhaps we may express by the name " Pan.
This hypothesis of an acquired perception of a space mentally constructed by " local signs " supplied Lotze and many succeeding idealists, including Wundt, with a new argument for metaphysical idealism.
Lotze's metaphysics is thus distinguished from the theism of Newton and Leibnitz by its pantheism, and from the pantheism of Spinoza by its idealism.
Thus his pantheistic is also a teleological idealism, which in its emphasis on free activity and moral order recalls Leibnitz and Fichte, but in its emphasis on the infinity of God has more affinity to Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel.
But, while it differs from both in denying the reality of body, it differs from the former in extending conscious soul not only to plants, as Stahl did, but to all Nature; and it differs from the latter in the different consequences drawn by materialism and idealism from this universal animism.
Noumenal idealism is not dead in Germany.
The pure idealism of Fichte is at the bottom of it all.
Phenomenal Idealism In Germany Phenomenal idealism is the metaphysics which deduces that, as we begin by perceiving nothing but mental phenomena of sense, so all we know at last from these data is also phenomena of sense, actual or possible.
On the other hand, as the speculative systems of noumenal idealism, starting from Fichte, succeeded one another, like ghosts who " come like shadows, so depart," without producing.
Phenomenal idealism is the Kantian contention that Nature, as known to science, is phenomena of experience.
In Great Britain Mach's scepticism was welcomed by Karl Pearson to support an idealistic phenomenalism derived from Hume, and by Ward to support a noumenal idealism derived from Lotze.
At the same time, in spite of his sympathy with the whole development of idealism since Kant, which leads him to reject the thing in itself, to modify a priorism, and to stop at transcendent " ideals," without postulates of practical reason, he nevertheless has so much sympathy with Kant's Kritik as on its theories of sense and understanding to build up a system of phenomenalism, according to which knowledge begins and ends with ideas, and finally on its theory of pure reason to accord to reason a power of logically forming an " ideal " of God as ground of the moral " ideal " of humanity - though without any power of logically inferring any corresponding reality.
He constructs his system on the Kantian order - sense, understanding, reason - and exhibits most clearly the necessary consequence from psychological to metaphysical idealism.
His philosophy is the best exposition of the method and argument of modern idealism - that we perceive the mental and, therefore, all we know and conceive is the mental.
He describes it as idealism in the form of ideal realism, because it recognizes an ideating will requiring substance as substratum or matter for outer relations of phenomena.
It is not to be idealism which resolves everything into spirit, but realism which gives the spiritual and the material each its own place in harmony with scientific consciousness.
It is not to be a species of idealism, as in the System - but of realism.
To understand phenomenal idealism in Germany is to discover what a narrow world is to be known from the transcendental idealism of Kant shorn of Kant's inconsistencies.
To understand noumenal idealism in Germany and the rise of metaphysical idealism in modern times is to discover that psychological is the origin of all metaphysical idealism.
He develops this belief in an absolute in connexion with his own theory of evolution into something different both from the idealism of Hume and the realism of Hamilton, and rather falling under the head of materialism.
But natural realism, as finally interpreted by Hamilton, was too dogmatic, too unsystematic, and too confused with elements derived from Kantian idealism to withstand the brilliant criticism of Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), a work which for a time almost persuaded us that Nature as we know it from sensations is nothing but permanent possibilities of sensation, and oneself only a series of states of consciousness.
Coleridge (1772-1834) not only called attention to Kant's distinction between understanding and reason, but also introduced his countrymen to the noumenal idealism of Schelling.
In fact, his dualism is not realism, but merely the distinction of subject and object within idealism.
The resemblance of this noumenal idealism to that of Fechner is unmistakable.
Karl Pearson (The Grammar of Science, 1892, 2nd enlarged ed., 1900), starting from Hume's phenomenal idealism, has developed views closely allied to Mach's universal physical phenomenology.
Hence his personal or pluralistic idealism is the view that the world is a plurality of many coexisting and interacting centres of experience, while will is the most fundamental form of experience.'
Howison, published The Limits of Evolution, and other Essays illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism (1901).
The advent of personal idealism is a welcome protest against the confusion of God and man in one mind, and against the confusion of one man's mind with another's.
As a human person, I am body and soul; and the idealistic identification of the Ego with soul or mind, involving the corollary that my body belongs to the non-Ego and is no part of myself, is the reductio ad absurdum of idealism.
No idealism can explain how we all know one sun, except by supposing that we all have one mind.
The difficulty of personal idealism, on the other hand, is to reconcile the unity of the thing with the plurality of thinkers.
Personal idealism, therefore, must end in personal realism.
This is the method which, as we have seen, has led from psychological to metaphysical idealism, by the argument that what we begin by perceiving is mental, and, therefore, what we end by knowing is mental.
Hence, to proceed from psychology to metaphysics is to proceed from the less to the more known; and the paradoxes of psychological have caused those of metaphysical idealism.
He must ask what are known things, and especially what has been discovered in the sciences; in mechanics, in order to find the essence of bodies which is neglected by idealism; in mental science, in order to understand consciousness which is neglected by materialism.
With the conviction that the only fair way of describing metaphysics has been to avoid putting forward one system, and even to pay most attention to the dominant idealism, we have nevertheless been driven occasionally to test opinions by this independent metaphysical method.
The chief results we have found against idealism are that bodies have not been successfully analysed except into bodies, as real matter; and that bodies are known to exert reciprocal pressure in reducing one another to a joint mass with a common velocity by being mutually impenetrable, as real forces.
Two psychological errors, among many others, constantly meet us in the history of idealism - the arbitrary hypothesis of a sense of sensations, or of ideas, and the intolerable neglect of logical inference.
Without here aiming at exhaustiveness, we may bring forward against the dominant idealism a psychological theory of sense and reason.
Their position was so illogical that it was easily turned into metaphysical idealism.
But their psychological method and idealism produced another mistake - the tendency to a modicum of realism, as much as seemed to this or that author to follow from psychological idealism.
Trendelenburg (1802-1872), a formidable opponent of Hegel, tried to surmount Kant's transcendental idealism by supposing that motion, and therefore time, space and the categories, though a priori, are common to thought and being.
But German realism lacks critical power, and is little better than a weed overshadowed by the luxuriant forest of German idealism.
But when we examine his theory of the non-ego, and find that it resolves matter into active force and this into animated activity, identifies law with reason, and calls God absolute substance, we see at once that this spiritual realism is not very far from idealism.
The psychological metaphysics of Cousin and of Janet was, however, too flimsy a realism to withstand its passage into this very idealism of matter which has become the dominant French metaphysics.
Jules Lachelier (born 1832) agreed with Ravaisson that beauty is the last word of things, but, under the influence of Kant and his successors, put his idealism rather in the form that all is thought.
Renouvier (q.v.)has worked out an idealism which he calls "Neo-criticisme," rejecting the thing-in-itself, while limiting knowledge to phenomena constituted by a priori categories.
These examples are enough to show that the psychological metaphysics of spiritual realism has not been able to withstand the rise and progress of spiritual idealism in France.
No opposition to idealism could be more distinct.
The cause Of this anachronism has been the failure of intuitive realism and the domination of idealism, which makes short-sighted men suppose that at all events they must begin with the psychology and the psychological idealism of the day, in the false hope that on the sands of psychological idealism they may build a house of metaphysical realism.
He avers that this " metaphysic of experience " is not idealism, or the tenet that consciousness is the only reality.
For Alexandria little can be urged save a certain strain of "Alexandrine" idealism and allegorism, mingling with the more Palestinian realism which marks the references to Christ's sufferings, as well as the eschatology, and recalling many a passage in Philo.
He produced some Parisian and purely imitative work; but the best part of his production is the outcome of a passionate idealism of the quiet Flemish towns in which he had passed his childhood and early youth.
Nobody could be more in sympathy with aspirations for a spiritual religion and for a lofty idealism in political and social life.
For this unfortunate issue Louis was not without blame; for from the very first, owing to an exaggerated idealism and love of antiquity, he had totally misunderstood the national character of the Greeks and the problems involved in the attempts to govern them by bureaucratic methods.
It sets its face against the idealism which either thundered against the world for its deficiencies, or sought something finer than reality.
The philosophy of Hegel is idealism, but it is an idealism in which every idealistic unification has its other face in the multiplicity of existence.
It is realism as well as idealism, and never quits its hold on facts.
As time went on it became obvious that without de p arture from the spirit of idealism Hegel's principle was susceptible of a different interpretation.
This has taken the direction on the one hand of a revival of realism (see Metaphysics), on the other of a new form of subjective idealism (see Pragmatism).
This will probably be the main work of the next generation of thinkers in England (see Idealism).
As a moralist and a guide to the conduct of life - an aspect of Goethe's work which Carlyle, viewing him through the coloured glasses of Fichtean idealism, emphasized and interpreted not always justly - Goethe was a powerful force on German life in years of political and intellectual depression.
The Babylonian code is essentially class-legislation, and from the point of view of the idealism of the Old Testament prophets, which raises the rights of humanity above everything else, the steps which the code takes to safeguard the rights of property (slaves included therein) would naturally seem harsh.
By this Transcendental Synthesis he proposed to reconcile Realism and Idealism, and to destroy the traditional difficulty between transcendental, or pure, thought and "things in themselves."
He opposed both the extreme realism of Herbart and what he regarded as the one-sided idealism of Hegel, and endeavoured to find a mean between them, to discover the ideal or formal principle which unfolds itself in the real or material world presented to it.
Mandeville's ironical paradoxes are interesting mainly as a criticism of the "amiable" idealism of Shaftesbury, and in comparison with the serious egoistic systems of Hobbes and Helvetius.
Anterior to Kant the gradual advance of idealism had been the most conspicuous feature in philo sophic speculation.
It is unnecessary to multiply instances to prove that idealism was never without a protest that there is a heart of existence, life, will, action, which is presupposed by all knowledge and is not itself amenable to explanation.
It is under the banner of this protest against rationalizing idealism that Schopenhauer advances.
If it is daringly realistic, it is no less audacious in its idealism.
He started authorship with a book of verse in 1888, after which time he led a reaction against realism and pessimism, and has turned back to a rich romantic idealism in his novels of Endymion (1889) and Hans Alienus (1892), and in his stories (1897) of the time of Charles XII.
Of these, Nyblaeus compiled a lucid account of Swedish philosophy from the beginning of the 18th century up to and including Bostrom; Ribbing (Platos Ideelara and Socratische Studien) showed how closely Swedish idealism is allied to Greek.
Rydberg (q.v.) (1828-1895) closely followed Bostrom, and in his numerous and varied writings did much to crystallize and extend the principles of idealism.
In all that the older Stoics taught there breathes that enthusiasm for righteousness in which has been traced the earnestness of the Semitic spirit; but nothing presents more forcibly the pitch of their moral idealism than the doctrine of the Wise Man.
Gomes Coelho, better known as Julio Diniz, records his experiences of English society in Oporto in A Familia ingleza, and for his romantic idealism he has been dubbed British; Portuguese critics have accused him of imitating Dickens.
Trendelenburg's philosophizing is conditioned throughout by his loving study of Plato and Aristotle, whom he regards not as opponents but as building jointly on the broad basis of idealism.
And yet it was to this property-holding, debt-paying, law-abiding, well-dressed, courteous-mannered citizen of Concord that the ardent and enthusiastic turned as the prophet of the new idealism.
Idealism in him assumed the form of a vivid illumination of the real.
The course adopted by Kant's immediate successors in German idealism was to reject the whole conception of noiimena, for the reason that what is essentially unknowable has no existence for our intelligence.
Xenocrates, however, failing, as it would seem, to grasp the idealism which was the metaphysical foundation of Plato's theory of natural kinds, took for his principles arithmetical unity and plurality, and accordingly identified ideal numbers with arithmetical numbers.
Confronting the various systems co-ordinated as sensualism, idealism, scepticism, mysticism, with the facts of consciousness, the Elects= sm ?
Lecky and Creighton are almost as dispassionate as Gardiner, but are more definitely committed to particular points of views, while democratic fervour pervades the fascinating pages of J.R.Green, and an intellectual secularism, which is almost religious in its intensity and idealism, inspired the genius of Maitland.
Not only did Planck oppose the idealism of his confreres; his views were, in another aspect, directly antagonistic to the Darwinian theory of descent, which he specifically attacked in Wahrheit and Flachheit des Darwinismus (Ndrdlingen, 1872).
If so, Mysticism includes in itself a prophecy of modern Christian Platonism or idealism, with its cry of " Back to Alexandria."
The second, from 1835 to 1885, profoundly influenced by German idealism, was increasingly rationalistic, though its theology was largely flavoured by mysticism.
The leaders of this period were Emerson, with his idealism, and Theodore Parker, with his acceptance of Christianity as absolute religion.
Accordingly the ethics of Plotinus represent, we may say, the moral idealism of the Stoics cut loose from nature.
There is, however, a yet higher point to be reached in the upward ascent of the Neoplatonist from matter; and here the divergence of Plotinus from Platonic idealism is none the less striking, because it is a bona fide result of reverent reflection on Plato's teaching.
The other great movement in modern moral philosophy due to the influence of German, and especially Hegelian, idealism followed naturally for the most part from the revival of interest in metaphysics noticeable in the latter half of the 10th century.
But further, it is becoming increasingly apparent that psychology (upon which Taylor would base morality) itself involves metaphysical assumptions; its position in fact cannot be stated except as a metaphysical position, whether that of subjective idealism or any other.
Martineau is much more in sympathy with idealism than Sidgwick, whose work consists in a restatement from a novel and independent standpoint of the Utilitarian position.
If he did not always find it easy in his later years to follow the new developments, he preserved to his death the idealism of his youth, the hatred both of Liberalism and of State Socialism; and though he was to some extent overshadowed by Bebel's greater oratorical power, he was the chief support of the orthodox Marxian tradition.
Thus the "Holy Alliance" of the 26th of September 1815 was an attempt, inspired by the religious idealism of the emperor Alexander I.
Thus out of the depths rises unvanquished the essential idealism of Ernest Renan.
So soon as we make clear to ourselves the essential nature of this method, we are able to discern the specific difficulties or perplexities arising ' See further Idealism; Metaphysics; Logic, &c., where Kant's relation to subsequent thought is discussed.
And idealism in all its forms would say that man, interpreting through his reason, does rightly, and reaches truth.
First, forget idealism and dogmatism and get pragmatic!
Step 3. Finally some form of noble aspiration, or even idealism, is generated.
His whole behavior reflected spiritual idealism, with sometimes the postures of a visionary, sometimes the frank outbursts of a child.
The theory that reality is just an idea is called philosophical idealism.
Because I'd had the same ridiculous idealism when I was a musician, I found myself doing long-term residencies in health care.
I see that idealism in the faces of this academy class.
Kandinsky was driven by a fierce idealism and distinctly Slavic belief in the ' inner world ' of the soul.
That " point of view " is in fact two distinct species of transcendental idealism.
It is worth briefly sketching out some salient features of Hegelian idealism.
This process is enhanced by the person's ethical idealism.
The Republic has been seen as the classic text of Platonic Utopian idealism.
Hain is a shining example of youthful idealism being replaced by cynical self interest in later life.
Far from being a Pie in the Sky dream of Utopian idealism the authors contend that such a revolutionary change is within our grasp.
In effect, a person's idealism is channeled through the abreactive process.
First there was a critical, rationalist idealism, often involving a return to Descartes, Kant, Hegel or Husserl.
It marks the end of the sixties hippie idealism.
A secondary source of unpleasantness is generated eventually by the person's idealism.
As late as the 1940s and 1950s, education white papers were still imbued with the language of morality and idealism.
Only my idealism gives me reasons for practicing such self-control.
Utopian idealism the authors contend that such a revolutionary change is within our grasp.
Fichte (the younger) did not escape this misinterpretation of Lotze's true meaning, though they had his Metaphysik and Logik to refer to, though he promised in his Allgemeine Physiologie (1851) to enter in a subsequent work upon the "bounding province between aesthetics and physiology," and though in his Medizinische Psychologie he had distinctly stated that his position was neither the idealism of Hegel nor the realism of Herbart, nor materialism, but that it was the conviction that the essence of everything is the part it plays in the realization of some idea which is in itself valuable, that the sense of an all-pervading mechanism is to be sought in this that it denotes the ways and means by which the highest idea, which we may call the idea of the good, has voluntarily chosen to realize itself.
MacTaggart, works round from idealism to an eternal quasi polytheistic society of equal souls.
His original work is eclectic, combining the psychology of his teachers, Jules Simon, Saisset and Mamiani, with the idealism of Rosmini and Gioberti.
This complex view of life is exemplified by Plato, whose general theory of idealism is entirely optimistic. In analysing the world of phenomena he necessarily takes a pessimistic view because phenomena are merely imitations more or less removed from reality, i.e.
It is an unwarranted idealism and optimism which finds the course of nature so wise and so good that any change in it must be regarded as incredible.
At the same time he has nothing to say against the Platonic theory of universalia ante rem (see Idealism).
To meet these difficulties and give back to us the assurance of the substantiality of the world without us it has therefore been thought necessary to maintain two propositions which are taken to be the refutation of idealism.
Idealism starts from the relativity of the world to purposive consciousness.
He was the leading American exponent of idealism (see 14.284) and his works were distinguished for their literary qualities.
At first the influence of German thought, German enlightenment and idealism was apparent, particularly in Kollar (a Slovak); the influence of Kant was seen in Palacky, that of Hegel and post-Kantian speculation in Aug.
The more elaborate work, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie, oder g Ãƒ¼ber das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen (1795), which, still remaining within the limits of the Fichtean idealism, however, exhibits unmistakable traces of a tendency to give the Fichtean method a more objective application, and to amalgamate with it Spinoza's more realistic view of things.
Not to mention that it has led to another variety, calling itself pluralism, it confuses materialism and idealism.
On the other hand, it is the virtue of idealism to emphasize the fact of consciousness, but its vice to exaggerate it, with the consequence of resorting to every kind of paradox to deny the obvious and get rid of bodies.
Psychological idealism assumes without proof that we perceive nothing but mental objects, and metaphysical idealism draws the logical but hypothetical conclusion that all we can know from these mental objects of sense is mental objects of knowledge.
Descartes, the founder of psychological idealism, having proceeded from the conscious fact, cogito ergo sum, to the non sequitur that I am a soul, and all a soul can perceive is its ideas, nevertheless went on to the further illogical conclusion that from these mental ideas I can (by the grace of God) infer things which are extended substances or bodies, as well as thinking substances or souls.
Berkeley saw the inconsistency of this position, and, in asserting that all we perceive and all we know is nothing but ideas in " mind, spirit, soul, or myself," has the merit of having made, as Paulsen remarks, " epistemological idealism the basis of metaphysical idealism."
This first position is psychological idealism in a new form and supported by new reasons; for, if experience derives its matter from mental sensations and its form from mental synthesis of sensations, it can apprehend nothing but mental objects of sense, which, according to Kant, are sensible ideas having no existence outside our thought, not things in themselves; or phenomena, not noumena.
Again, in his Grundproblem der Erkenntnisstheorie (1889) he uses without proof the hypothesis of psychological idealism, that we perceive psychical effects, to infer with merely hypothetical consistency the conclusion of noumenal metaphysical idealism that all we can thereby know is psychical causes, or something transcendent, beyond phenomena indeed, yet not beyond mind.
He calls this epistemology " transcendent realism "; it is really " transcendent idealism."
Further, from an early period in his Medicinische Psychologie (1852) he reinforced the transcendental idealism of Kant by a general hypothesis of " local signs," containing the subordinate hypotheses, that we cannot directly perceive extension either within ourselves or without; that spatial bodies outside could not cause in us spatial images either in sight or in touch; but that besides the obvious data of sense, e.g.
Fechner (1801-1887) affords a conspicuous instance of the idealistic tendency to mysterize nature in his Panpsychism, or that form of noumenal idealism which holds that the universe is a vast communion of spirits, souls of men, of animals, of plants, of earth and other planets, of the sun, all embraced as different members in the soul of the world, the highest spirit - God, in whom we live and move and have our being; that the bodily and the spiritual, or the physical and the psychical, are everywhere parallel processes which never meet to interact; but that the difference between them is only a difference between the outer and inner aspects of one identical psychophysical process; and yet that both sides are not equally real, because while psychical and physical are identical, the psychical is what a thing really is as seen from within, the physical is what it appears to be to a spectator outside; or spirit is the self-appearance of matter, matter the appearance of one spirit to another.
He borrows from Kant's "rationalism " the hypothesis of a spontaneous activity of the subject with the deduction that knowledge begins from sense, but arises from understanding; and he accepts from Kant's metaphysical idealism the consequence that everything we perceive, experience and know about physical nature, and the bodies of which it consists, is phenomena, and not bodily things in themselves.
There is only one Neo-Kantian way out of this dilemma, but it is to alter the original assumptions of Kant's psychological idealism.
It has been largely borrowed either from previous English or from later German idealism, and what originality it has possessed has been mainly shown in that spirit of eclectic compromise which is so dear to the English mind.
After a period of struggle, the influence of Kant gradually extended, and, as we see in the writings of Coleridge and Carlyle, of Hamilton and Mansel, of Green and Caird, of Laurie, Martineau and others, has secured an authority over English thought almost equal to that of Hume (see Idealism).
Ravaisson (see Ravaisson-Mollien), by his Rapport (prepared for the Exhibition of 1867) on philosophy in France, gave a fresh impulse to the transition from spiritual realism to idealism, by developing the Aristotelian g okecn s of matter and the Leibnitzian appetition of monads into " l'amour " as the very being of things.
In point of fact, Schiller's genius lacks that universality which characterizes Goethe's; as a dramatist, a philosopher, an historian, and a lyric poet, he was the exponent of ideas which belong rather to the Europe of the period before the French Revolution than to our time; we look to his high principles of moral conduct, his noble idealism and optimism, rather as the ideal of an age that has passed away than as the expression of the more material ambitions of the modern world.
It has been suggested elsewhere (see Socrates) that the crude and unqualified " realism " of Plato's early manhood gave place in his later years to a theory of natural kinds founded upon a " thoroughgoing idealism," and that in this way he was led to recognize and to value the classificatory sciences of zoology and botany.
British doctors used to be renowned internationally for their high level of professional idealism.
Worse than confirming my darkest thoughts, it told me that my cynical pessimism is as starry-eyed idealism to the reality.
The view that I follow is that of objective Idealism, rather than the more usual subjective Idealism.
For many feminists, such unabashed idealism is not only conceptually untenable, it is politically suspect, since it denigrates the (traditionally feminized) body.
This sign can become blind to the faults of a partner because of the idealism that governs her or his water world.
The challenge then is for these natives to approach the world in a realistic manner that still allows them to retain their idealism.
Other popular motivations included romance, idealism and honor.
It is thus opposed both to natural realism and to idealism.
We may religion regard his ambitious programme as the last logical development of idealism and indeed of philosophy itself.
Perhaps in the department of thought where it is most in earnest - in ethics - it is an idealism.
The idealisms of Fichte and Schelling made contributions to Hegel's thought; Krause and the Roman Catholic Baader represent parallel if minor phases of idealism.
However absolute a philosopher's idealism may be, he is erroneously styled a mystic if he moves towards his conclusions only by the patient labour of the reason.
On the one hand there has arisen a school of thinkers of the type of Thomas Hill Green, who have brought to bear on his metaphysical views the idealism of modern German thinkers.
Fichte a new speculative theism, and became an opponent of Hegel's pantheistic idealism.
This practical idealism Eucken described by the term "Activism."
At the same time, in his criticism of other views he was almost typical of Hegelian idealism.
This theory is sometimes known as idealism.
It is for this reason that it is sometimes known as subjective or incomplete idealism.
On one side of his thought Aristotle represents a reaction against idealism and a return to the position of common-sense.
But Leibnitz's conception of the priority of spirit had too little foundation, and the different elements he sought to combine were too loosely related to one another to stand the strain of the two forces of empiricism and materialism that were opposed to his idealism.
Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity.
But idealism has insisted from the time of Plato on the distinction between what is actual in time and space and the reality that can only partially be revealed in it.
As little is idealism responsible for any attempt to pass off logical abstractions for concrete reality.
In taking root in England idealism had to contend against the traditional empiricism represented by Mill on the one hand and the pseudo-Kantianism which was rendered current by Mansel and Hamilton on the other.
Under the influence of these writers idealism, as above expounded though with difference of interpretation in individual writers, may be said towards the end of the 19th century to have been on its way to becoming the leading philosophy in the British Isles and America.
The conflict of idealism with these two lines of criticism - the accusation of subjectivism on the one side of intellectualism and rigid objectivism on the other - may be said to have constituted the history of Anglo-Saxon philosophy during the first decade of the 20th century.
Whatever the shortcomings of individual writers may be, modern idealism differs, as we have seen, from the arrested idealism of Berkeley precisely in the point on which dualism insists.
On this head there is no difference, and idealism need have no difficulty in accepting all that its opponents here contend.
To idealism there can be no ultimate test, but the possibility of giving any fact which claims to be true its place in a coherent system of mutually related truths.
As idealism differs from Berkeleyanism in asserting the reality of an " external " world so it differs from Spinozism in asserting the reality of difference within it.
Similarly from the side of logic. It is not the teaching of idealism alone but of the facts which logical analysis has brought home to us that all difference in the last resort finds its ground in the quality or content of the things differentiated, and that this difference of content shows in turn a double strand, the strand of sameness and the strand of otherness - that in which and that by which they differ from one another.
Idealism has, of course, no quarrel with numerical difference.
James's Will to Believe (1903) idealism has been subjected.
There need be no contradiction between idealism and a reasonable pragmatism.
To the older idealism as to the new the essence of mind or spirit is freedom.
It is not here possible to do more than indicate what appear to be the valid elements in these two conflicting interpretations of the requirements of a true idealism.
On the other hand, idealism would be false to itself if it interpreted the unity which it thus seeks to establish in any sense that is incompatible with the validity of moral distinctions and human responsibility in the fullest sense of the term.
What is thus suggested is not a rash departure from the general point of view of idealism (by its achievements in every field to which it has been applied, " stat mole sua ") but a cautious inquiry into the possibility of reaching a conception of the world ' The most striking statement of this argument is to be found in Boutroux's treatise De la contingence des lois de la nature, first published in 1874 and reprinted without alteration in 1905.
Any attempt here to anticipate what the course of an idealism inspired by such a spirit of caution and comprehension is likely to be cannot but appear dogmatic.
Taking for granted the unity of the world idealism is committed to interpret it as spiritual as a unity of spirits.
Now it is just to these implications in the idea of spirit that some of the prominent recent expositions of Idealism seem to have failed to do justice.
The solution here suggested is probably more likely to meet with opposition from the side of Idealism than of Pragmatism.
The sense of the gap between theory and fact gives to the religious element of Stoicism a new force; the soul, conscious of its weakness, leans on the thought of God, and in the philosopher's attitude towards external events, pious resignation preponderates over self-poised indifference; the old self-reliance of the reason, looking down on man's natural life as a mere field for its exercise, makes room for a positive aversion to the flesh as an alien element imprisoning the spirit; the body has come to be a " corpse which the soul sustains," 1 and life a " sojourn in a strange land "; 2 in short, the ethical idealism of Zeno has begun to borrow from the metaphysical idealism of Plato.
To attach a clear and definite meaning to the Cartesian doctrine of God, to show how much of it comes from the Christian theology and how much from the logic of idealism, how far the conception of a personal being as creator and preserver mingles with the pantheistic conception of an infinite and perfect something which is all in all, would be to go beyond Descartes and to ask for a solution of difficulties of which he was 1 Ouvres, vi.
The strain of the next three years' continuous work undermined his health and his eyesight, and he was compelled to retire from his professorship. During these years he had published works on Plato and Socrates and a history of philosophy (1875); but after his retirement he further developed his philosophical position, a speculative eclecticism through which he endeavoured to reconcile metaphysical idealism with the naturalistic and mechanical standpoint of science.
Whatever one may think of the cogency of such arguments, it seems safe to conclude that thinkers, who dislike constructive idealism, but accept time and space as boundless given quanta, reach in that way the thought of infinity, and if they are theists, necessarily connect their theism with reflexions on the nature of Time and Space.
The only motive for advocating it is the prejudice of absolute idealism which would deny that sensation has any part whatever in the constitution of experience.
On the whole then Butler in personal conviction is an intuitionalist, wavering towards the idealism of his age; but in argument he is an empiricist, trying to reason every question as one of given facts.
Besides the stream of tendency which flowed from Kant in the direction of idealism, two other streams emerged from him, often but not always blending.
Moreover, Schopenhauer's subjective idealism, and his view of time as something illusory, hindered him from viewing this process as a sequence of events in time.
But it falls short of idealism as above defined in that it recognizes only one side of the antithesis of subject and object, and so falls short of the doctrine which takes its stand on the complete correlativity of the two factors in experience.
While in its completer form it is thus a doctrine distinctive of modern times, idealism has its roots far back in the history of thought.
This Plato expressed in the myth of the Sun, but the garment of mythology in which Plato clothed his idealism, beautiful as it is in itself and full of suggestion, covered an essential weakness.
The foundations of idealism in the modern sense were laid by the thinkers who sought breathing room for mind and will in a deeper analysis of the relations of the subject to the world that it knows.
The parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, more particularly the " Deduction of the Categories " in which this theory is worked out, may be said to have laid the foundation of modern idealism - " articulum stantis aut cadentis dectrinae."
Ritchie's Natural Rights, from the point of view of a very hostile (evolutionary) idealism, sketches the early history of the phrase Natural Law.'
Not that a posteriori is denied, or that idealism even in Hegel tries to evolve reality out of the philosopher's inner consciousness.
When Otto Ritschl interprets values hedonistically - recoiling from Hegel's idealism the whole way to empiricism - he brings again to our minds the doubt whether hedonist ethics can serve as a foundation for any religious belief.
And idealism in some cases may interpret itself in favour of pantheism rather than of theism.
Wolff's list is of some historical importance - atheism, deism (a God without care for men) and naturalism (denial of supernatural revelation); anthropomorphism (assigning a human body to God); materialism, and idealism (non-existence of matter); paganism (polytheism); Manichaeism, Spinozism, Epicureanism.
Buchner was much less concerned to establish a scientific metaphysic than to protest against the romantic idealism of his predecessors and the theological interpretations of the universe.
To the theory of knowledge Spencer contributes a "transfigured realism," to mediate between realism and idealism, and the doctrine that "necessary truths," acquired in experience and congenitally transmitted, are a priori to the individual, though a posteriori to the race, to mediate between empiricism and apriorism.
Modern like ancient idealism came into being as a correction of the view that threatened to resolve the world of matter and mind alike into the changing manifestations of some single non-spiritual force or substance.
But Kant's refutation of subjective idealism and his vindication of the place of the object can be fully understood only.
More particularly by the confusion in which he left the relation between the two logical principles of identity and of sufficient reason underlying respectively analytic and synthetic, deductive and inductive thought, he may be said to have undermined in another way the idealism he strove to establish.
Anyhow, whatever the method or interpretation is to be, idealism, even more fully than materialism, is pledged to monism and to the rejection of dualism.
In the first place, his peculiar system of subjective idealism, involving the idea that time is but a mental form to which there corresponds nothing in the sphere of noiimenal reality, serves to give a peculiar philosophical interpretation to every doctrine of cosmic evolution.
In view of the results of this analysis, Reid's theory (and the theory of Scottish philosophy generally) has been dubbed natural realism or natural dualism, in contrast to theories like subjective idealism and materialism or to the cosmothetic idealism or hypothetical dualism of the majority of philosophers.
It is true that in some modern developments of idealism the ultimate reality is conceived of in an impersonal way, but it is usually added that this ultimate or absolute being is not something lower but higher than self-conscious personality, including it as a more fully developed form may be said to include a more elementary.
It was these paradoxes that Kant sought to rebut by a more thoroughgoing criticism of the basis of knowledge the substance of which is summed up in his celebrated Refuta tion of Idealism,' wherein he sought to undermine Hume's scepticism by carrying it one step further and demonstrating that not only is all knowledge of self or object excluded, but the consciousness of any series of impressions and ideas is itself impossible except in relation to some external permanent and universally accepted world of objects.
The great critic of scepticism has diverged from idealism toward scepticism again, or has given his idealism a sceptical colour, mitigated - but only mitigated - by faith in the moral consciousness.
And thus Kant's idealism is incomplete.
Thus defined, idealism is opposed to ordinary common-sense dualism, which regards knowledge or experience as the result of the more or less accidental relation between two separate and independent entities - the mind and its ideas on one side, the thing with its attributes on the other - that serve to limit and condition each other from without.
He was an idealist; but his idealism was of a type the exact reverse of that which the Revolution in arms had sought to impose upon Europe.
It was not less against this form of idealism than against the determinism of the early physicists that Socrates protested.
In spite of these and other anticipations of a fuller idealism, the idea remains as a form imposed from without on a reality otherwise conceived of as independent of it.