Herbart Sentence Examples
Lotze publicly and formally denied that he belonged to the school of Herbart, though he admitted that historically the same doctrine which might be considered the forerunner of Herbart's teachings might lead to his own views, viz.
Though he disclaims being a follower of Herbart, his formal definition of philosophy and his conception of the object of metaphysics are similar to those of Herbart, who defines philosophy as an attempt to remodel the notions given by experience.
But this formal agreement includes material differences, and the spirit which breathes in Lotze's writings is more akin to the objects and aspirations of the idealistic school than to the cold formalism of Herbart.
His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz).
He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.Advertisement
Peter Bihari and Maurice Kai-man have in various writings spread the ideas of Herbart.
The philosophers from whom Croce learned most are Vico, the author of the Scienza nuova, and Hegel, but the thought of all other thinkers flows in his writings, in conformity with its historical character, and for this reason may, for instance, be found in it traces of some of Hegel's most active opponents, such as Herbart.
Smetana, while the philosophy of Herbart had a deep influence on educationists like Lindner, Durdik and Hostinsky.
Masaryk, who, as a counterpoise to German speculation and the intellectualism of Herbart, emphasized the critical study of English philosophy, notably Hume, Spencer and Mill, and the French Comte; at the same time he fully appreciated the value of Kant in epistemology.
Schulze's period of prominence in Berlin closely corresponded to that of Herbart at Konigsberg (1809-1833) and GÃ¶ttingen (1833-1841), who insisted that for boys of eight to twelve there was no better text-book than the Greek Odyssey, and this principle was brought into practice at Hanover by his distinguished pupil, Ahrens.Advertisement
Lotze agreed with Leibnitz that the things which cause phenomena are immaterial elements, but added that they are not simple substances, self-acting, as Leibnitz thought, or preserving themselves against disturbance, as Herbart thought, but are interacting modifications of the one substance of God.
Herbart and Lotze, both deeply affected by the Leibnitzian hypothesis of indivisible monads, supposed that man's soul is seated at a central point in the brain; and Lotze supposed that this supposition is necessary to explain the unity of consciousness.
But he also recognizes association by similarity, or assimilation, or " apperception " in Herbart's more confined sense of the word, and association by contiguity, or complication.
So far he reminds one of Herbart, who founded his " realistic " metaphysics on similar misunderstandings; except that, while Herbart concluded that the world consists of a number of simple " reals," each with a simple quality but unknown, Bradley concludes that reality is one absolute experience which harmonizes the supposed contradictions in an unknown manner.
If his starting-point recalls Herbart his method of arriving at the absolute recalls Spinoza.Advertisement
Bradley, however, having satisfied himself, like Spinoza, by an abuse of the word " independent," that " the finite is self-discrepant," goes on to ask what the one Real, the absolute, is; and, as he passed from Herbart to Spinoza, so now he passes from Spinoza to Kant.
In Germany, since the victory of Kant over Wolff, realism has always been in difficulties, which we can appreciate when we reflect that the Germans by preference apply the term " realism " to the paradoxes of Herbart (1776-1841), who, in order to avoid supposed contradictions, supposed that bodies are not substances, but show (Schein), while " reals" are simple substances, each with a simple quality, and all preserving themselves against disturbance by one another, whether physically or psychologically, but not known to be either material or spiritual because we do not know the simple quality in which the nature of the real consists.
Herbart (q.v.) improved on Clarke's statement of the case.
Without realizing their debt to tradition, Herbart, Mill and recently Sigwart, have repeated Aristotle's separation of the copula from the verb of existence, as if it were a modern discovery that " is " is not the same as " exists."
On the one hand, early in the igth century Herbart started the view that a categorical judgment is never a judgment of existence, but always hypothetical; on the other hand, in the latter part of the century Brentano started the view that all categorical judgments are existential.Advertisement
The view of Herbart and his school is contradicted by our primary judgments of and from sense, in which we cannot help believing existence; and it gives an inadequate account even of our secondary judgments in which we no longer indeed believe existence, but do frequently believe that a nonexistent thing is (or is not) somehow determined unconditionally.
It is true, as Herbart says, that the judgment, " A square circle is an impossibility," does not contain the belief, " A square circle is existent "; but when he goes on to argue that it means, " If a square circle is thought, the conception of impossibility must be added in thought," he falls into a non-sequitur.
Herbart says that the judgment " A is B " does not contain the usually added thought that A is, because there is no statement of A's existence; as if the statement mattered to the thought.
Syllogism as formula for the exhibition of truth attained, and construction or what not as the instrumental process by which we reach the truth, have with writers since Hegel and Herbart tended to fall apart.
After Mill means after Kant and Hegel and Herbart, and it means after the emergence of evolutionary naturalism.Advertisement
The formula of identity passed in another form to Herbart and therefore to Lotze.
In recognizing, further, that the relation of an actual individual fact to its sufficient ground was not reducible to identity, he set a problem diversely treated by Kant and Herbart.
A truer continuator of Leibnitz in the spirit was Herbart.
Kant's Logic. Herbart's admitted allegiance, however, was Kantian with the qualification, at a relatively advanced stage of his thinking, that it was " of the year 1828 " - that is, after controversy had brought out implications of Kant's teaching not wholly contemplated by Kant himself.
This tendency is to be seen in the activity of Fries and Herbart and Beneke, and was actualized as the aftermath of their speculation.
It is no accident that it was the psychology of apperception and the voluntaryist theory or practice of Herbart, whose logical theory was so closely allied to that of the formal logicians proper, that contributed most spring from a common stock, though to us unknown - namely sense and understanding."
The brief logic of Herbart 4 is altogether formal too.
It is in the logic of judgment that Herbart inaugurates a new era.
In indicating specifically, too, the case of conclusion from a copulative major premise with a disjunctive minor, Herbart seems to have suggested the cue for Sigwart's exposition of Bacon's method of exclusions.
That it was the formal character of Herbart's logic which was ultimately fatal to its acceptance outside the school as an independent discipline is not to be doubted.
In the first place, Herbart is quite aware of the nature of abstraction.
In the second, there is no claim that thought at one and the same time imposes form on " the given " and is susceptible of treatment in isolation by logic. With Herbart the forms of common experience, and indeed all that we can regard as his categories, are products of the psychological mechanism and destitute of logical import.
For at the basis of Herbart's speculation there lies a conception of identity foreign to the thought of Kant with his stress on synthesis, in his thoroughgoing metaphysical use of which Herbart goes back not merely to Wolff but to Leibnitz.
It was in the pressing to its extreme consequences of the conception of uncompromising identity which is to be found in Leibnitz, that the contradictions took their rise which Herbart aimed at solving, by the method of relations and his doctrine of the ultimate plurality of " reals," The logic of relations between conceptual units, themselves unaltered by the relation, seems a kind of reflection of his metaphysical method.
To those, of course, for whom the only real identity is identity in difference, while identity without difference, like difference without identity, is simply a limit or a vanishing point, Herbart's logic and metaphysic will alike lack plausibility.
The setting of Herbart's logic in his thought as a whole might of itself perhaps justify separate treatment.
Bradley, far though his metaphysic is removed from Herbart's.
Herbart's influence is surely to be found too in the evolution of what is called Gegenstandstheorie.
Reference has been made above to the effect upon the rise of the later psychological logic produced by Herbart's psychology of apperception, when disengaged from the background of his metaphysic taken in conjunction with his treatment in his practical philosophy of the judgment of value or what he calls the aesthetic judgment.
Emerson's verdict upon a greater thinker - that his was " not a mind to nestle in " - may be true of Herbart, but there can be no doubt as to the stimulating force of this master.
Beneke's philosophy is a striking instance of this, with application to Fries and affinity to Herbart conjoined with obligations to Schelling both directly and through Schleiermacher.
His metaphysical method, however, is like Herbart's, not identifiable with his logic, and the latter has for its central characteristic its thorough restatement of the logical forms traditional in language and the text-books, in such a way as to harmonize with the doctrine of a reality whose organic unity is all-inclusive.
Historically this doctrine was formulated as the declaration of independence of the insurgents in revolt against the pretensions of absolutist logic. It drew for support upon the psychological movement that begins with Fries and Herbart.
He opposed both the extreme realism of Herbart and what he regarded as the one-sided idealism of Hegel, and endeavoured to find a mean between them, to discover the ideal or formal principle which unfolds itself in the real or material world presented to it.
A similar distinction is made by Herbart.
Herbart apperception is that process by which an aggregate or "mass" of presentations becomes systematized (apperceptionssystem) by the accretion of new elements, either sense-given or product of the inner workings of the mind.
Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these - its three primary divisions being determined by as many distinct forms of elaboration.
In Herbart's writings logic receives comparatively meagre notice; he insisted strongly on its purely formal character, and expressed himself in the main at one with Kantians such as Fries and Krug.
We may, however, take the Ms not singly but together; and again, no other course being open to us, this is what we must do; we must assume that N results from a combination of Ms. This is Herbart's method of relations, the counterpart in his system of the Hegelian dialectic.
Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real.
The doctrine here developed is the first cardinal point of Herbart's system, and has obtained for it the name of "pluralistic realism."
By way of concrete illustration Herbart instances "the common observation that the properties of things exist only under external conditions.
The answer to this question is the second hinge-point of Herbart's theoretical philosophy.
The elementary spatial relation Herbart conceives to be "the contiguity (Aneinander) of two points," so that every "pure and independent line" is discrete.
But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidolology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology.
In his Psychology Herbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics, and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen).
What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves concerning the future.
In Theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable.
Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education.
Allihn in Zeitschrift far exacte Philosophie (Leipzig, 1861), the organ of Herbart and his school, which ceased to appear in 1873.
In America the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education was originally founded as the National Herbart Society.
He laid the foundation of his philosophical system very early in his Metaphysik (Leipzig, 1841) and his Logik (1843), short books published while he was still a junior lecturer at Leipzig, from which university he migrated to Gottingen, succeeding Herbart in the chair of philosophy.
Fichte (the younger) did not escape this misinterpretation of Lotze's true meaning, though they had his Metaphysik and Logik to refer to, though he promised in his Allgemeine Physiologie (1851) to enter in a subsequent work upon the "bounding province between aesthetics and physiology," and though in his Medizinische Psychologie he had distinctly stated that his position was neither the idealism of Hegel nor the realism of Herbart, nor materialism, but that it was the conviction that the essence of everything is the part it plays in the realization of some idea which is in itself valuable, that the sense of an all-pervading mechanism is to be sought in this that it denotes the ways and means by which the highest idea, which we may call the idea of the good, has voluntarily chosen to realize itself.
The opposition which he had made to Hegel's formalism had induced some to associate him with the materialistic school, others to count him among the followers of Herbart.
In this endeavour he forms with Herbart an opposition to the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, which aimed at objective and absolute knowledge, and also to the criticism of Kant, which aimed at determining the validity of all human knowledge.
Schulze's period of prominence in Berlin closely corresponded to that of Herbart at Konigsberg (1809-1833) and GÃƒ¶ttingen (1833-1841), who insisted that for boys of eight to twelve there was no better text-book than the Greek Odyssey, and this principle was brought into practice at Hanover by his distinguished pupil, Ahrens.
Under the influence of Leibnitz, Boscovich, Kant and Herbart, he supposed that bodies are divisible into punctual atoms, which are not bodies, but centres of forces of attraction and repulsion; that impenetrability is a result of repulsive force; and that force itself is only law - taking as an instance that Newtonian force of attraction whose process we do not understand, and neglecting that Newtonian force of pressure and impact whose process we do understand from the collision of bodies already extended and resisting.
The paradox of the theory of judgment is due to the ideal of identity, and the way in which this is evaded by supplementation to produce a non-judgmental identity, followed by translation of the introduced accessories with conditions in the hypothetical judgment, is thoroughly in Herbart's manner.
But we are most of all indebted to Herbart for the enormous advance psychology has been enabled to make, thanks to his fruitful treatment of it, albeit as yet but few among the many who have appropriated and improved his materials have ventured to adopt his metaphysical and mathematical foundations.