Hegel Sentence Examples

To the former he owes his appreciation of exact investigation and a complete knowledge of the aims of science, to the latter an equal admiration for the great circle of ideas which had been diffused by the teaching of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.

The true method of science which he possessed forced him to condemn as useless the entire form which Schelling's and Hegel's expositions had adopted, especially the dialectic method of the latter, whilst his love of art and beauty, and his appreciation of moral purposes, revealed to him the existence of a transphenomenal world of values into which no exact science could penetrate.

Here, too, it was that Hegel's philosophy of history made a deep impression upon him.

Up to the revolutionary year 1830 his religious views had remained strongly tinged with rationalism, Hegel remaining his guide in religion as in practical politics and the treatment of history.

In earlier life he had been a zealous student of Kant and Hegel, and to the end he never ceased to cultivate the philosophic spirit; but he had little confidence in metaphysical systems, and sought rather to translate philosophy into the wisdom of life.

His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz).

The same reason that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy.

Hegel was such a system.

Hegel offers a supposed proof that Time and Space, Matter, Nature, are ascertainable and definable 2 This is Kant's positive refutation of Hume's scepticism.

As a result, Hegel's system undertakes to show candid minds that incompatible assertions not only may but must both be true.'

Hegel wrote extensively upon religion, especially in his Philosophy of Religion.

If perfect knowledge be possible for us, it must take, the form of such a system as Hegel offers.

If the world exists purely to be known, and if every other working of reason comes into consideration qua incomplete knowledge, Hegel is right with his sweeping intellectualism.

Used by Kant sceptically of the limitations of reason, dialectic in Hegel becomes constructive; and scepticism itself becomes a stage in knowledge.

Not that a posteriori is denied, or that idealism even in Hegel tries to evolve reality out of the philosopher's inner consciousness.

The element of givenness, dominant in empiricism, and partially surviving through intuitionalism even into Kant, is sublimated in Hegel's thinking.

More peculiarly his own is Hegel's great doctrine The of contradiction, whereby opposing views of truth " rank as stages in one progressive definition.

The English thinkers influenced by Hegel are inclined to assert mechanism unconditionally, as the very expression of reason - the only thinkable form of order.

And, as the sympathizers with Hegel try to force mechanical necessity into the garb of absolute or ideal necessity, so they seek to show that moral necessity is only an inferior form of absolute or ideal or, we might say, mathematical necessity.

Hegel's system is, in its own way, a great evolutionary philosophy of an ideal type.

Malebranche gave all causation to God; and the acosmist - as Hegel called him, in repudiation of Bayle's nickname " atheist " - Spinoza, from the premises of Carte.

Kant puts together, as belonging to " Rational Theology," three arguments - he is critic of fond of triads, though they have not the significance for him which they came to have for Hegel.

Hegel inherits from Kant the three arguments, and takes them as stages in one developing process of argu- thought.

Trace out the clue of causation to the end, says Hegel in effect, and it introduces you, not to a single first cause beyond nature, but to the totality of natural process - a substance, as it were, in which all causes inhere.

And, in some sense not clearly explained, Hegel identifies this final religion with Christianity.

The idealisms of Fichte and Schelling made contributions to Hegel's thought; Krause and the Roman Catholic Baader represent parallel if minor phases of idealism.

Obviously this writer is harder to focus than Kant or Hegel.

When Otto Ritschl interprets values hedonistically - recoiling from Hegel's idealism the whole way to empiricism - he brings again to our minds the doubt whether hedonist ethics can serve as a foundation for any religious belief.

Like Schelling, Hegel conceives the problem of existence as one of becoming.

With Hegel the absolute is itself a dialectic process which contains within itself a principle of progress from difference to difference and from unity to unity.

Nature to Hegel is the idea in the form of hetereity; and finding itself here it has to remove this exteriority in a progressive evolution towards an existence for itself in life and mind.

Nature (says Zeller) is to Hegel a system of gradations, of which one arises necessarily out of the other, and is the proximate truth of that out of which it results.

Only spirit has a history; in nature all forms are contemporaneous.2 Hegel's interpretation of mind and history as a process of evolution has more scientific interest than his conception of nature.

Yet while, in its application to history, Hegel's theory of evolution has points of resemblance with those doctrines which seek to explain the worldprocess as one unbroken progress occurring in time, it constitutes on the whole a theory apart and sui generis.

Hegel gives a place in his metaphysical system to the mechanical and the teleological views; yet in his treatment of the world as an evolution the idea of end or purpose is the predominant one.

Of the followers of Hegel who have worked out his peculiar idea of evolution it is hardly necessary to speak.

Rosenkranz, who in his work Hegel's Naturphilosophie seeks to develop Hegel's idea of an earthorganism in the light of modern science, recognizing in crystallization the morphological element.

His philosophical standpoint may be characterized as a reaction from the pantheistic tendency of Hegel's idealistic rationalism towards a more pronouncedly theistic position.

Hegel's theological followers, of every shade and party, represent the first, and Schleiermacher's the second.

To appreciate the significance of the doctrines of Heraclitus, it must be borne in mind that to Greek philosophy the sharp distinction between subject and object which pervades modern thought was foreign, a consideration which suggests the conclusion that, while it is a great mistake to reckon Heraclitus with the materialistic cosmologists of the Ionic schools, it is, on the other hand, going too far to treat his theory, with Hegel and Lassalle, as one of pure Panlogism.

Ethics here stands to sociology in a close relation, similar, in many respects, to that which we find in Hegel and in Comte.

Hegel therefore, to take an instance, can no more fitly be classed as a mystic than Spinoza can.

Schopenhauer emphasizes the pessimistic side of Hegel's thought.

He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.

Through the influence of Prof. Daub he was led to an interest in the then predominant philosophy of Hegel and, in spite of his father's opposition, went to Berlin to study under the master himself.

The Unconscious appears as a combination of the metaphysic of Hegel with that of Schopenhauer.

In 1858, under the stimulus of Henry C. Brockmeyer, Harris became interested in modern German philosophy in general, and in particular in Hegel, whose works a small group, gathering about Harris and Brockmeyer, began to study in 1859.

In 1899 the university of Jena gave him the honorary degree of Doctor of Philosophy for his work on Hegel.

Besides being a contributor to the magazines and encyclopedias on educational and philosophical subjects, he wrote An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy (1889); The Spiritual Sense of Dante's Divina Commedia (1889); Hegel's Logic (1890); and Psychologic Foundations of Education (1898); and edited Appleton's International Education Series and 'Webster's International Dictionary.

In philosophy he was a follower of Victor Cousin, and through him of Hegel.

Hegel's is an intellectualist monism, explaining matter, sensation, personal individuality and will as forms of thought.

In his studies he had come under the influence of Schleiermacher, Hegel and Franz Baader; but he was a man of independent mind, and developed a peculiar speculative theology which showed a disposition towards mysticism and theosophy.

In the Philosophy of the Practical, but more especially in the work entitled What is living and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel Croce criticizes the erroneous treatment of the opposites, and shows that on the contrary every opposition has at bottom a distinction from which it arises, and that therefore the true unity is unity-distinction, which is development and, as such, opposition that is continuously surpassed and continually re-appearing to be again surpassed.

The philosophers from whom Croce learned most are Vico, the author of the Scienza nuova, and Hegel, but the thought of all other thinkers flows in his writings, in conformity with its historical character, and for this reason may, for instance, be found in it traces of some of Hegel's most active opponents, such as Herbart.

If, as Hegel asserted, our experience is all knowledge, and if knowledge is indefinitely transformed by the conditions of knowing, then we are tempted to regard the object as superfluous, and to treat our innate conviction that knowledge has reference to objects as a delusion which philosophical reflection is destined to dispel.

But the world will take what is available in Comte, while forgetting that in his work which is as irrational in one way as Hegel is in another.

He has, indeed, described in graphic terms the greatest of the more superficial changes he underwent; how he had " carried into logical and ethical problems the maxims and postulates of physical knowledge," and had moved within the narrow lines drawn by the philosophical instructions of the class-room " interpreting human phenomena by the analogy of external nature "; how he served in willing captivity " the ` empirical ' and ` necessarian ' mode of thought," even though " shocked " by the dogmatism and acrid humours " of certain distinguished representatives "; 1 and how in a period of " second education " at Berlin, " mainly under the admirable guidance of Professor Trendelenburg," he experienced " a new intellectual birth" which " was essentially the gift of fresh conceptions, the unsealing of hidden openings of self-consciousness, with unmeasured corridors and sacred halls behind; and, once gained, was more or less available throughout the history of philosophy, and lifted the darkness from the pages of Kant and even Hegel."

Fichte a new speculative theism, and became an opponent of Hegel's pantheistic idealism.

Ordinary scryers of fancy pictures are common enough, but scryers capable of apparently supra-normal successes 1 "Philosophie der Geistes," Hegel's Werke, vii.

He read philosophy at Berlin, Halle and Heidelberg, devoting himself mainly to the doctrines of Hegel and Schleiermacher.

Two other of his works on Hegel are important, the Leben Hegels (1844) and the Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph (1870).

In the system of Hegel the word resumes its original Socratic sense, as the name of that intellectual process whereby the inadequacy of popular conceptions is exposed.

It was by asking precisely these questions that Hegel gave the finishing strokes to the Kantian philosophy.

Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity.

For this Hegel was doubtless partly to blame.

Hegel undoubtedly meant to affirm that the actual was rational in the face of the philosophy which set up subjective feeling and reason against it.

Hegel carried this principle further than had yet been done.

The " Logic " of Hegel is merely the continuation of Kant's " Deduction " of the categories and ideas of the reason which has generally been recognized as the soberest of attempts to set forth the presuppositions which underlie all experience.

The mistake is not Hegel's but ours.

Dr Smith contributed articles on Calvin, Kant, Pantheism, Miracles, Reformed Churches, Schelling and Hegel to the American Cyclopaedia, and contributed to McClintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia; and was editor of the American Theological Review (1859 sqq.), both in its original form and after it became the American Presbyterian and Theological Review and, later, the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review.

It was in some ways the herald of a new school of German historical thought, for it shows that idealization of power and success which he had learnt from the teaching of Hegel.

Originally a follower of Hegel, he turned to Fichte and Beneke (q.v.), with whose insistence on psychology as the basis of all philosophy he fully agreed.

Both Zeller and Hegel remark upon the difference between the calm of ancient scepticism and the perturbed state of mind evinced by many modern sceptics.

In part it may fairly be attributed to the retarding influence of the school of Ewald, but in large part also Well- to the fact that Vatke, a pupil of Hegel, had developed his theory on a priori grounds in accordance with the principles of Hegel's philosophy of history.

This period was marked by considerable changes in his views and by the final breach on the one hand with Fichte and on the other hand with Hegel.

Public attention was powerfully attracted by these vague hints of a new system which promised something more positive, as regards religion in particular, than the apparent results of Hegel's teaching.

An interesting little work is Klaiber, Holderlin, Hegel, u.

In the course of his intellectual development, he came successively under the influence of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, and on account of the different phases through which he passed he was called the Talleyrand of German thought.

Educated at first at Eisenberg, he proceeded to Jena, where he studied philosophy under Hegel and Fichte and became privatdozent in 1802.

The comparatively small area of Krause's influence was due partly to the overshadowing brilliance of Hegel, and partly to two intrinsic defects.

The assertion of absolute substance by Spinoza incited Schelling and Hegel.

By changing the meaning of "noumenon " from the thing apprehended (voouµevov) to the thought (vOnya), and in the hypothesis of a common consciousness, he started the view that a thing is not yours or my thought, but a common thought of all mankind, and led to the wider view of Schelling and Hegel that the world is an absolute thought of infinite mind.

In the doctrine - no object, no subject - no subject, no object - that is, in the utter identification of things with objects of subjects, he anticipated not only Schelling and Hegel, but also Schuppe and Wundt with their congeners.

Schelling and Hegel thought it was infinite reason; Schopenhauer, unconscious will; Hartmann, unconscious intelligence and will; Lotze, the activity or life of the divine spirit; Fechner, followed by Paulsen, a world of spiritual actualities comprised in the one spiritual actuality, God, in whom we live and move and have our being.

Of these noumenal idealisms the earliest in time and the nearest to Fichte's philosophy was the panlogism, begun by Schelling (1775-18J4), completed by his disciple Hegel (1770-1831), and then modified by the master himself.

On Schelling's idealistic pantheism, or the hypothesis that there is nothing but one absolute reason identifying the opposites of subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel based his panlogism.

By the same dialectic Hegel was able to justify the gradual transformation of transcendental into noumenal idealism by Fichte and Schelling.

Hegel's assumption of identity in difference at once enabled him to deal with the whole difficulty by holding that different subjects are yet one subject, and any one object, e.g.

Schelling himself, as soon as he saw his own formulae exposed in the logic or rather dialectic of his disciple, began to reconsider his philosophy of identity, and brought some powerful objections against both the conclusions and the method of Hegel.

Hegel, he said, had only supplied the logic of negative philosophy; and it must be confessed that the most which could be extracted from the Hegelian dialectic would be some connexion of thoughts without proving any existence of corresponding things.

Hence he rejected the infinite intelligence supposed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel against whom he urged that blind will produces intelligence, and only becomes conscious in us by using intelligence as a means to ends.

In his tract entitled Schelling's positive Philosophie als Einheit von Hegel and Schopenhauer (1869) he further showed that, in his later philosophy, Schelling had already combined reason and will in the Absolute.

Thus his pantheistic is also a teleological idealism, which in its emphasis on free activity and moral order recalls Leibnitz and Fichte, but in its emphasis on the infinity of God has more affinity to Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel.

At the same time, while accepting the Schellingian parallelistic identity of all things in God, Fechner was restrained by his accurate knowledge of physics from the extravagant construction of Nature, which had failed in the hands of Schelling and Hegel.

It resembles the views of Hegel and Lotze in its pantheistic tendency.

By this ingenious suggestion of the membership of one spirit in another, Fechner's " day-view " also puts Nature in a different position; neither with Hegel sublimating it to the thought of God's mind, nor with Lotze degrading it to the phenomena of our human minds, but identifying it with the outer appearance of one spirit to another spirit in the highest of spirits.

The panlogism of Schelling and Hegel survives in its influence.

His third position is his actualistic theory of soul, which he shares with Fichte, Hegel, Fechner and Paulsen.

It is to be monistic ideal realism, like that of Fichte and Hegel; not, however, like theirs idealistic in method, a Phantastisches Begrifsgebaude, but realistic in method, a Wissenschaftliche Philosophie.

About the same time Benjamin Jowett had been studying the philosophy of Hegel; but, being a man endowed with much love of truth but with little belief in first principles, he was too wise to take for a principle Hegel's assumption that different things are the same.

But it is not a Kantian view; and it is necessary to correct two confusions of Kant and Hegel, which have been iYnported with Hegelianism by Green and Caird.

Kant, then, as interpreted by English Hegelians, already believed, before Hegel, that there is one intelligence common to all individuals, and that a noumenon is a thought of this common intelligence, " an ideal of reason "; so that Kant was trying to be a Hegelian, holding that the world has no being beyond the thoughts of one intelligence.

What Kant never said and what his whole philosophy prevented his saying, was that a single thing is a single thought of a single consciousness; either of men, as in Fichte's philosophy, or of God and man, as in Hegel's.

The passage from Kant to Hegel attempted by Green, and the harmony of Kant and Hegel attempted by Green and Caird, are unhistorical, and have caused much confusion of thought.

His theory of "attuition," by which he supposes that we become conscious of objects outside ourselves, is his " return to dualism," and is indeed so like natural realism as to suggest that, like Ferrier, he starts from Hamilton to end in Hegel.

He agrees with Hegel that there are two fundamental identities, the identity of all reason, and the identity of all reason and all being.

Rejecting everything in the Kritik which savoured of the " metempirical," he yet sympathized so far with Hegel's noumenalism as to accept the identification of cause and effect, though he interpreted the hypothesis phenomenalistically by saying that cause and effect are two aspects of the same phenomenon.

But his metaphysics is an interesting example of a phenomenalist, sympathizing with noumenalists so different as Hegel and Fechner, and yet maintaining his phenomenalism.

What makes his vindication of conscious personality all the more interesting is that he has so much in common with the Hegelians; agreeing as he does with Hegel that self-consciousness is the highest fact, the ultimate category of thought through which alone the universe is intelligible, and an adequate account of the great fact of existence.

It is difficult to see exactly where he begins to differ from Hegel; but at any rate he believes in different self-conscious persons; he does not accept the dialectical method, but believes in beginning from the personal experience of one's own self-consciousness; and, though he is not very clear on the subject, he would have to admit that a thing, such as the sun, is a different object in each person's consciousness.

Hegel said that spirit is not substance but subject, which to Aristotle would have meant that it is not a distinct thing, yet is a distinct thing.

Trendelenburg (1802-1872), a formidable opponent of Hegel, tried to surmount Kant's transcendental idealism by supposing that motion, and therefore time, space and the categories, though a priori, are common to thought and being.

Etienne Vacherot deserted Descartes for Hegel.

He accepted from Hegel " the real is rational " without the Hegelian method, for which he substituted conscious experience as a revelation of the divine.

Hegel only extended a priori forms to things by resolving things into thoughts.

One cannot but feel regret at seeing the Reformed Churches blown about by every wind of doctrine, and catching at straws now from Kant, now from Hegel, and now from Lotze, or at home from Green, Caird, Martineau, Balfour and Ward in succession, without ever having considered the basis of their faith; while the Roman Catholics are making every effort to ground a Universal Church on a sane system of metaphysics.

Clarke, include General Metaphysics (1890), by John Rickaby, who effectively criticizes Hegel by precise distinctions, which, though scholastic, did not deserve to be forgotten.

Schelling (in his Identity-philosophy) and Hegel both carried on the pantheistic tradition, which after Hegel broke up into two lines of thought, the one pantheistic the other atheistic.

Yet in some respects his ideas opened the way for the later speculations of Schelling and Hegel.

He concluded his years of preparation by a European tour, in the course of which he received kind attention from almost every distinguished man in the world of letters, science and art; among others, from Goethe, Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Byron, Niebuhr, Bunsen, Savigny, Cousin, Constant and Manzoni.

Like Schleiermacher he combined with the keenest logical faculty an intensely religious spirit, while his philosophical tendencies were in sympathy rather with Hegel than with Schleiermacher, and theosophic mysticism was more congenial to him than the abstractions of Spinoza, to whom Schleiermacher owed so much.

At the grammar school of Stuttgart, where Hegel was educated between the ages of seven and eighteen, he was not remarkable.

With Holderlin Hegel learned to feel for the old Greeks a love which grew stronger as the semi-Kantianized theology of his teachers more and more failed to interest him.

During these years Hegel kept up a slack correspondence with Schelling and Holderlin.

Schelling, already on the way to fame, kept Hegel abreast with German speculation.

Meanwhile, Holderlin in Jena had been following Fichte's career with an enthusiasm with which he infected Hegel.

It is pleasing to turn from these vehement struggles of thought to a tour which Hegel in company with three other tutors made through the Bernese Oberland in July and August 1796.

Fortunately his friend Holderlin, now tutor in Frankfort, secured a similar situation there for Hegel in the family of Herr Gogol, a merchant (January 1797).

Here, as in contemporaneous criticisms of Kant's ethical writings, Hegel aims at correcting the abstract discussion of a topic by treating it in its systematic interconnexions.

But the best evidence of Hegel's attention to contemporary politics is two unpublished essays - one of them written in 1798, " On the Internal Condition of Wurttemberg in Recent Times, particularly on the Defects in the Magistracy," the other a criticism on the constitution of Germany, written, probably, not long after the peace of Luneville (1801).

Referring the collapse of the empire to the retention of feudal forms and to the action of religious animosities, Hegel looked forward to reorganization by a central power (Austria) wielding the imperial army, and by a representative body elected by the geographical districts of the empire.

Even philosophy with Hegel at this epoch was subordinate to religion; for philosophy must never abandon the finite in the search for the infinite.

Soon, however, Hegel adopted a view according to which philosophy is a higher mode of apprehending the infinite than even religion.

At Frankfort, meanwhile, the philosophic ideas of Hegel first assumed the proper philosophic form.

Circumstances soon put Hegel in the way to complete these outlines.

His father died in January 1799; and the slender sum which Hegel received as his inheritance, 3154 gulden (about 260), enabled him to think once more of a studious life.

The upshot was that Hegel arrived at Jena in January 1801.

Schelling was the main philosophical lion of the time; and in some quarters Hegel was spoken of as a new champion summoned to help him in his struggle with the more prosaic continuators of Kant.

Hegel's first performance seemed to justify the rumour.

Still more striking was the agreement shown in the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which Schelling and Hegel wrote conjointly during the years 1802-1803.

Even at a later period foreign critics like Cousin saw much that was alike in the two doctrines, and did not hesitate to regard Hegel as a disciple of Schelling.

The dissertation by which Hegel qualified for the position of Privatdozent (De orbitis planetarum) was probably chosen under the influence of Schelling's philosophy of nature.

For while Hegel, depending on a numerical proportion suggested by Plato, hinted in a single sentence that it might be a mistake to look for a planet between Mars and Jupiter, Giuseppe Piazzi (q.v.) had already discovered the first of the asteroids (Ceres) on the ist of January 1801.

Apparently in August, when Hegel qualified, the news of the discovery had not yet reached him, but critics have made this luckless suggestion the ground of attack on a priori philosophy.

Hegel's lectures, in the winter of 1801-1802, on logic and metaphysics were attended by about eleven students.

Meanwhile, after the departure of Schelling from Jena in the middle of 1803, Hegel was left to work out his own views.

Hegel, as we have already seen, was fully aware of the change that was coming over the world.

Hegel's fortunes were now at the lowest ebb.

The school system was reorganized by new regulations, in accordance with which Hegel wrote a series of lessons in the outlines of philosophy - ethical, logical and psychological.

They were published in 1840 by Rosenkranz from Hegel's papers.

As a teacher and master Hegel inspired confidence in his pupils, and maintained discipline without pedantic interference in their associations and sports.

On the 16th of September 1811 Hegel married Marie von Tucher (twenty-two years his junior) of Nuremberg.

Hegel's letters to his wife, written during his solitary holiday tours to Vienna, the Netherlands and Paris, breathe of kindly and happy affection.

Hegel the tourist - recalling happy days spent together; confessing that, were it not because of his sense of duty as a traveller, he would rather be at home, dividing his time between his books and his wife; commenting on the shop windows at Vienna; describing the straw hats of the Parisian ladies - is a contrast to the professor of a profound philosophical system.

Hinrichs (q.v.), to whose Religion in its Inward Relation to Science (1822) Hegel contributed an important preface.

The strangest of his hearers was an Esthonian baron, Boris d'Yrkull, who after serving in the Russian army came to Heidelberg to hear the wisdom of Hegel.

But his books and his lectures were alike obscure to the baron, who betook himself by Hegel's advice to simpler studies before he returned to the Hegelian system.

At Heidelberg Hegel was active in a literary way also.

It is the only exposition of the Hegelian system as a whole which we have direct from Hegel's own hand.

In 1818 Hegel accepted the renewed offer of the chair of philosophy at Berlin, vacant since the death of Fichte.

The hopes which this offer raised of a position less precarious than that of a university teacher of philosophy were in one sense disappointed; for more than a professor Hegel never became.

With the principle that whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real, Hegel fancied that he had stopped the mouths of political critics and constitution-mongers.

In his disgust at the crude conceptions of the enthusiasts, who had hoped that the war of liberation might end in a realm of internal liberty, Hegel had forgotten his own youthful vows recorded in verse to HBlderlin, " never, never to live in peace with the ordinance which regulates feeling and opinion."

During his thirteen years at Berlin Hegel's whole soul seems to have been in his lectures.

At these Hegel became a frequent and appreciative visitor and made extracts from the art-notes in the newspapers.

Hegel himself grew more and more into a belief in his own doctrine as the one truth for the world.

The journal was not solely in the Hegelian interest; and more than once, when Hegel attempted to domineer over the other editors, he was met by vehement and vigorous opposition.

Hegel and his family retired for the summer to the suburbs, and there he finished the revision of the first part of his Science of Logic. On the beginning of the winter session, however, he returned to his house in the Kupfergraben.

On this occasion an altercation occurred between him and his friend Gans, who in his notice of lectures on jurisprudence had recommended Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

Hegel, indignant at what he deemed patronage, demanded that the note should be withdrawn.

Hegel in his class-room was neither imposing nor fascinating.

Every one has heard the legend which makes Hegel say, " One man has understood me, and even he has not."

Even to the last Hegel had not so externalized his system as to treat it as something to be led up to by gradual steps.

For this reason the book is at once the most brilliant and the most difficult of Hegel's works - the most brilliant because it is to some degree an autobiography of Hegel's mind - not the abstract record of a logical evolution, but the real history of an intellectual growth; the most difficult because, instead of treating the rise of intelligence (from its first appearance in contrast with the real world to its final recognition of its presence in, and rule over, all things) as a purely subjective process, it exhibits this rise as wrought out in historical epochs, national characteristics, forms of culture and faith, and philosophical systems. The theme is identical with the introduction to the Encyklopddie; but it is treated in a very different style.

The mind coming through a thousand phases of mistake and disappointment to a sense and realization of its true position in the universe - such is the drama which is consciously Hegel's own history, but is represented objectively as the process of spiritual history which the philosopher reproduces in himself.

Here, according to Hegel, is the field of philosophy.

The philosophy of Hegel is idealism, but it is an idealism in which every idealistic unification has its other face in the multiplicity of existence.

Compared with Fichte and Schelling, Hegel has a sober, hard, realistic character.

The claims of the individual, the real, material and historical fact, it was said, had been sacrificed by Hegel to the universal, the ideal, the spiritual and the logical.

Thought in this primary form, when in all its parts completed, is what Hegel calls the " idea."

So far as this Hegel seems on the side of revolution.

Thought became only the result of organic conditions - subjective and human; and the system of Hegel was no longer an idealization of religion, but a naturalistic theory with a prominent and peculiar logic.

The logic of Hegel is the only rival to the logic of Aristotle.

What Aristotle did for the theory of demonstrative reasoning, Hegel attempted to do for the whole of human knowledge.

According to Hegel the terms in which thought exhibits itself are a system of their own, with laws and relations which reappear in a less obvious shape in the theories of nature and mind.

It is part of Hegel's plan to remedy this one-sided character of thought, by laying bare the gradations of ideas.

The merit of Hegel is to have indicated and to a large extent displayed the filiation and mutual limitation of our forms of thought; to have arranged them in the order of their comparative capacity to give a satisfactory expression to truth in the totality of its relations; and to have broken down the partition which in Kant separated the formal logic from the transcendental analytic, as well as the general disruption between logic and metaphysic. It must at the same time be admitted that much of the work of weaving the terms of thought, the categories, into a system has a hypothetical and tentative character, and that Hegel has rather pointed out the path which logic must follow, viz.

The charges of superficial analogies, so freely urged against the " Natur-philosophie " by critics who forget the impulse it gave to physical research by the identification of forces then believed to be radically distinct, do not particularly affect,Hegel.

In this account of the development of an independent, active and intelligent being from the stage where man like the Dryad is a portion of the natural life around him, Hegel has combined what may be termed a physiology and pathology of the mind - a subject far wider than that of ordinary psychologies, and one of vast intrinsic importance.

The Lectures on the Philosophy of History, edited by Gans and subsequently by Karl Hegel, is the most popular of Hegel's works.

A graver mistake, according to some critics, is that Hegel, far from giving a law of progress, seems to suggest that the history of the world is nearing an end, and has merely reduced the past to a logical formula.

And at any rate the method is greater than Hegel's employment of it.

But as with Aristotle so with Hegel - beyond the ethical and political sphere rises the world of absolute spirit in art, religion and philosophy.

The so-called beauty of nature is for Hegel an adventitious beauty.

Hegel after expounding the nature of religion passes on to discuss its historical phases, but in the immature state of religious science falls into several mistakes.

As time went on it became obvious that without de p arture from the spirit of idealism Hegel's principle was susceptible of a different interpretation.

In reply to Bradley's argument for the unreality of the self, Hegel is interpreted as meaning that the opposition between self and not-self on which it is founded is one that is self-made and in being made is transcended.

Kym (Metaphysische Untersuchungen) and C. Hermann (Hegel and die logische Frage and other works) are noticeable as modern critics.

Meantime Baur had exchanged one master in philosophy for another, Schleiermacher for Hegel.

Hegel, having identified being with thought, merged metaphysics in logic. But he divided logic into objective and subjective, and thus practically confessed that there is one science of the objects and another of the pro cesses of thought.

In the first place, it tends to take up an intermediate position between the extremes of Kant and Hegel.

The basis of Bradley's logic is the fallacious dialectic of Hegel's metaphysics, founded on the supposition that two things, which are different, but have something in common, are the same.

For example, according to Hegel, being and not-being are both indeterminate and therefore the same.

The answer to Hegel is that being and not-being are at most similarly indeterminate, and to Bradley that each animal has its own different lungs, whereby they are only similar.

Syllogism as formula for the exhibition of truth attained, and construction or what not as the instrumental process by which we reach the truth, have with writers since Hegel and Herbart tended to fall apart.

After Mill means after Kant and Hegel and Herbart, and it means after the emergence of evolutionary naturalism.

This is the view of Hegel upon which logic comes to coincide with the progressive self-unfolding of thought in that type of metaphysic which is known as absolute, i.e.

Logic as post-Kantian period by antagonism to the speculative movement which culminated in the dialectic of Hegel.

Fichte cannot be said to have developed a logic, but this rhythm of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, foreshadowed in part for Fichte in Spinoza's formula, " omnis determinatio est negatio," and significantly in Kant's triadic grouping of his categories, gave a cue to the thought of Hegel.

Schelling, too, called for a single principle and claimed to have found it in his Absolute, " the night " said Hegel, "in which all cows are black," but his historical influence lay, as we have seen, in the direction of a parallelism within the unity, and he also developed no logic. It is altogether otherwise with Hegel.

Hegel's logic, 3 though it involves inquiries which custom regards as metaphysical, is not to be characterized as a meta.

As Fichte's Ego finds that its non-ego springs from and has its home within its very self, so with Hegel thought finds itself in its " other," both subsisting in the Idea which is both and neither.

Bare or indeterminate being, for instance, the first of the determinations of Hegel's logic, as the being of that which is not anything determinate, of Kant's thing-in-itself, for example, positively understood, implicated at once the notion of not-being, which negates it, and is one with it, yet with a difference, so that we have the transition to determinate being, the transition being baptized as becoming.

It is easy to raise difficulties not only in regard to the detail in Hegel's development of his categories, especially the higher ones, but also in regard to the essential rhythm of his method.

The consideration that mere double negation leaves us precisely where we were and not upon a higher plane where the dominant concept is richer, is, of course, fatal only to certain verbal expressions of Hegel's intent.

It is inferred then that Hegel complements from the stuff of experience, and fails to make good the pretension of his method to be by itself and of itself the means of advance to higher and still higher concepts till it can rest in the Absolute.

Yet in a less ambitious form the fundamental contentions of Hegel's method tend to find a qualified acceptance.

Yet if Hegel meant only this he has indeed succeeded in concealing his meaning.

Hegel's treatment of the categories or thought determinations which arise in the development of the immanent dialectic is rich in flashes of insight, but most of them are in the ordinary but to make explicit those justificatory notions which condition the form of our apprehension.

Ueberweg (System § Ioi) is, on the whole, justified in exclaiming that Hegel's rehabilitation of syllogism " did but slight service to the Aristotelian theory of syllogism," yet his treatment of syllogism must be regarded as an acute contribution to logical criticism in the technical sense.

Hegel's logic as a whole, however, stands and falls not with his thoughts on syllogism, but with the claim made for the dialectical method that it exhibits logic in its integral unity with metaphysic, the thought-process as the self-revelation of the Idea.

In such a logic, if and so far as coherence should be attained, would be found something akin to the spirit of what Hegel achieves, though doubtless alien to the letter of what it is his pretension to have achieved.

All other contemporary movements may be said to be in revolt from Hegel.

The philosophy of the former concludes to an Absolute by the annulment of contradictions, though the ladder of Hegel is conspicuous by its absence.

Wallace's prolegomena and notes to his Logic of Hegel (1874, revised and augmented 1892-1894) are of use for the history and terminology, as well as the theory.

In a wide sense, the system of Hegel or the system of Spinoza may be cited as examples of what is meant.

He opposed both the extreme realism of Herbart and what he regarded as the one-sided idealism of Hegel, and endeavoured to find a mean between them, to discover the ideal or formal principle which unfolds itself in the real or material world presented to it.

Yet there is reason to doubt the view of Hegel and Lassalle that Heraclitus recognized the fundamental distinction of subject and object and the relations of mind and matter.

Meanwhile he was feeling the influence to a certain degree of the romantic school, and of Schleiermacher and Hegel too, though he never sounded the depths of their systems. At length, in his twenty-first year, he finally decided to adopt the academical calling.

Hegel, before the anthropological stage, found it in magic. Max Muller, building on philosophy and mythology, affirmed that " Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man " (Natural Religion, 18 99, p. 188).

The gathered illhumour of many years, aggravated by the confident assurance of the Hegelians, found vent at length in the introduction to his next book, where Hegel's works are described as three-quarters utter absurdity and one-quarter mere paradox - a specimen of the language in which during his subsequent career he used to advert to his three predecessors Fichte, Schelling, but above all Hegel.

This last reason, while probably most effective with the judges, only stirred up more furiously the fury in Schopenhauer's breast, and his preface is one long fulmination against the ineptitudes and the charlatanry of his bête noire, Hegel.

But in his successors, from Fichte to Hegel, this axiom of the plain man is set aside as antiquated.

Lessing, Goethe, Herder, Novalis and Schleiermacher, not to mention philosophers like Schelling and Hegel, united in recognizing the unique strength and sincerity of Spinoza's thought, and in setting him in his rightful place among the speculative leaders of mankind.

Instead of his atheism Hegel speaks of his acosmism, and Novalis dubs him a God-intoxicated man.

It was most numerously attended about the middle of the 18th century; but the most brilliant professoriate was under the duke Charles Augustus, Goethe's patron (1787-1806), when Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schlegel and Schiller were on its teaching staff.

Inasmuch as he finally followed in philosophy the mainly poetical or theosophic movement of Schelling, which satisfied neither the logical needs appealed to by Hegel nor the new demand for naturalistic induction, Coleridge, after arousing a great amount of philosophic interest in his own country in the second quarter of the century, has ceased to "make a school."

To a generation that has been moulded by the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, by the historical criticism of modern theology, and by all that has been done in the field of comparative religion, the argument of the Analogy cannot but appear to lie quite outside the field of controversy.

At Berlin he came under the influence of Schleiermacher and Hegel, whose influences are seen in his work Das Wesen der Religion (1847).

While denying the possibility of an absolute method and an absolute philosophy, as contended for by Hegel and others, Trendelenburg was emphatically an idealist in the ancient or Platonic sense; his whole work was devoted to the demonstration of the ideal in the real.

Literature, science and art are represented in different parts of the city by statues and busts of Rauch, Schinkel, Thaer, Beuth, Schadow, Winckelmann, Schiller, Hegel and Jahn.

Within the first ten years of its existence it counted among its professors such names as Neander, Savigny, Eichhorn, Bockh, Bekker, Hegel, Raumer, Niebuhr and Buttmann.

Later inquirers, including Leo, Troya and Hegel, have found that the supposition does not tally with a whole series of facts, which point to a Lombard territorial law ignoring completely any parallel Roman and personal law, to a great restriction of full civil rights among the Romans, analogous to the condition of the rayah under the Turks, and to a reduction of the Roman occupiers to a class of half-free "aldii," holding immovable tenancies under lords of superior race and privilege, and subject to the sacrifice either of the third part of their holdings or the third part of the produce.

In October 1831 he resigned his office in order to study under Schleiermacher and Hegel in Berlin.

Hegel died just as he arrived, and, though he regularly attended Schleiermacher's lectures, it was only those on the life of Jesus which exercised a very powerful influence upon him.

It was amongst the followers of Hegel that he found kindred spirits.

Under the leading of Hegel's distinction, between Vorstellung and Begriff, he had already conceived the idea of his two principal theological works - the Leben Jesu and the Christliche Dogmatik.

Hegel got no closer to realities.

In the middle of the century two men sought to incorporate in their philosophy the physical basis which Hegel had ignored in his spiritism - recognizing that life is conditioned by an environment and not an abstraction for metaphysics.

With Hegel it passes into a completely articulated "logic," which apparently claims to be at the same time a metaphysic, or an ultimate expression of the nature of the real.

But it is not every thinker that can see his way with Hegel to assert in set terms the identity of thought and being.

Plato's Republic and Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts are the most typical examples of a fully developed philosophy of the state, but in the earlier modern period the prolonged discussion of natural rights and the social contract must be regarded as a contribution to such a theory.

History is thus represented by Hegel, for example, as the realization of the idea of freedom, or rather as the reconciliation of individual freedom and the play of cultured interests with the stable objectivity of law and an abiding consciousness of the greater whole in which we move.

Of these the most important is The Secret of Hegel, which is admitted, both in England and in Germany, to be among the most scholarly and valuable contributions to Hegelian doctrine and to modern philosophy in general.

In the preface to the new edition he explains that he was first drawn to the study of Hegel by seeing.

In these two works Dr Stirling endeavoured to establish an intimate connexion between Kant and Hegel, and even went so far as to maintain that Hegel's doctrine is merely the elucidation and crystallization of the Kantian system.

In this year appeared Hegel's Encyclopddie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, of which Cousin had one of the earliest copies.

He thought Hegel not particularly amiable, but the two became friends.

The historical position of the system lies in its relations to Kant, Schelling and Hegel.

Cousin Relations was opposed to Kant in asserting that the uncondi- to Kant, tioned in the form of infinite or absolute cause is but Schelling a mere unrealizable tentative or effort on the part of and Hegel.

Again the pure being of Hegel is a mere abstraction, - a hypothesis illegitimately assumed, which he has nowhere sought to vindicate.

The intellectual intuition of Schelling, as above consciousness, the pure being of Hegel, as an empty abstraction, unvindicated, illegitimately assumed, and arbitrarily developed, are equally useless as bases of metaphysics.

Kant's scheme, which in religious theory as well as in chronology may be regarded as a link between the 18th and 19th centuries, led on to the very different scheme of Hegel; and the latter system began almost at once to influence Church doctrine.

Influences from Hegel are also to be traced in Richard Rothe, I.

Reaction against the philosophy of Hegel and the criticism of Baur is common to all the school, though Ritschl went further back than the younger men towards critical tradition and further in some points towards orthodox dogma.

See C. Hegel, Stadte u.

Before the ethics of Kant had begun to be seriously studied in England, the rapid and remarkable development of metaphysical view and method of which the three chief stages are represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel respectively had already taken place; and the system of the latter was occupying the most prominent position in the philosophical thought of Germany.

In the systems of Schelling and Hegel ethics falls again into a subordinate place; indeed, the ethical view of the former is rather suggested than completely developed.

But in Kant's view the universal content of this will is only given in the formal condition of "only acting as one can desire all to act," to be subjectively applied by each rational agent to his own volition; whereas Hegel conceives the universal will as objectively presented to each man in the laws, institutions and customary morality of the community of which he is a member.

It is true that Hegel regards the conscious effort to realize one's own conception of good as a higher stage of moral development than the mere conformity to the jural rules establishing property, maintaining contract and allotting punishment to crime, in which the universal will is first expressed; since in such conformity this will is only accomplished accidentally by the outward concurrence of individual wills, and is not essentially realized in any of them.

Hegelianism appears as a distinct element in modern English ethical thought; but the direct influence of Hegel's system is perhaps less important than that indirectly exercised through the powerful stimulus which it has given to the study of the historical development of human thought and human society.

According to Hegel, the essence of the universe is a process of thought from the abstract to the concrete; and a right understanding of this process gives the key for interpreting the evolution in time of European philosophy.

The effect of the lectures (posthumously edited) in which Hegel's " Philosophy of History " and " History of Philosophy " were expounded, has extended far beyond the limits of his special school; indeed, the predominance of the historical method in all departments of the theory of practice is not a little due to their influence.

He proceeded to Germany, studied Hegel, and soon got into touch with the leaders of the young German movement in Berlin.

He went first to University College, London; at Heidelberg he worked at German; at Berlin he studied psychology, metaphysics and also physiology under du Bois-Reymond, and heard lectures on Hegel, Kant and the history of philosophy, ancient and modern.

Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education.

He brought out an edition of Hegel's works, adapted several of Shakespeare's plays for the theatre, wrote a.

Reid and Malebranche first attracted him among the philosophers, and after these he turned to Hegel, Kant and Herder.

Is this a charmingly literal rendition of Hegel's master-slave dialectic?

To escape this problem, the article turns to Hegel's dialectic in order to overcome the subject/object dualism implied in economic approaches.

Such an about-face into timelessness is not extraneous to Hegel's dialectics and philosophy of history.

Hegel and Nietzsche had glimmerings of the idea, but it is described very fully and simply in the Book of Wisdom or Folly.

First there was a critical, rationalist idealism, often involving a return to Descartes, Kant, Hegel or Husserl.

The man thus gloomy about history was the german philosopher Hegel.

These doctrines of Lotze - though pronounced with the distinct and reiterated reserve that they did not contain a solution of the philosophical question regarding the nature, origin, or deeper meaning of this all-pervading mechanism, neither an explanation how the action of external things on each other takes place nor yet of the relation of mind and body, that they were merely a preliminary formula of practical scientific value, itself requiring a deeper interpretation - these doctrines were nevertheless by many considered to be the last word of the philosopher who, denouncing the reveries of Schelling or the idealistic theories of Hegel, established the science of life and mind on the same basis as that of material things.

Fichte (the younger) did not escape this misinterpretation of Lotze's true meaning, though they had his Metaphysik and Logik to refer to, though he promised in his Allgemeine Physiologie (1851) to enter in a subsequent work upon the "bounding province between aesthetics and physiology," and though in his Medizinische Psychologie he had distinctly stated that his position was neither the idealism of Hegel nor the realism of Herbart, nor materialism, but that it was the conviction that the essence of everything is the part it plays in the realization of some idea which is in itself valuable, that the sense of an all-pervading mechanism is to be sought in this that it denotes the ways and means by which the highest idea, which we may call the idea of the good, has voluntarily chosen to realize itself.

The opposition which he had made to Hegel's formalism had induced some to associate him with the materialistic school, others to count him among the followers of Herbart.

In this endeavour he forms with Herbart an opposition to the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, which aimed at objective and absolute knowledge, and also to the criticism of Kant, which aimed at determining the validity of all human knowledge.

These manifestations of the divine spirit again cannot be traced and understood by reducing (as Hegel did) the growth of the human mind in the individual, in society and in history to the monotonous rhythm of a speculative schematism; the essence and worth which is in them reveals itself only to the student of detail, for reality is larger and wider than philosophy; the problem, "how the one can be many," is only solved for us in the numberless examples in life and experience which surround us, for which we must retain a lifelong interest and which constitute the true field of all useful human work.

In religion, which was his main interest, he was much influenced by Hegel, and appears somewhat in the ambiguous position of a sceptic anxious to believe.

Or a philosopher like Hegel, armed with a metaphysical theory, may descend upon the facts of religion and interpret them in its light, till they almost lose their original significance, which we might provisionally define as consisting in this, that the believer in any religion finds himself helped or (as he claims) saved by it.

In spite of the various details of the Judgment Critique (as to beauty; and as to the " internal " or as Hegel subsequently phrased it " immanent " adaptations seen in living organisms) Kant regards as extremely precarious all these hints of a higher view of nature.

In the later intuitionalism of Hamilton, recoiling from Hegel, the many subjective necessities of the intuitionalist scheme were made to breathe the new agnostic suggestions.

Through this unexpected and obscure principle of "dialectic Hegel claimed to fulfil his programme of interpreting everything as manifest necessary truth of ideal relationship. It all must be so and you see it must.

Hegel, as often interpreted - pantheistically?) or (b) nothing exists but minds (e.g.

This may help us to appreciate the meaning of Hegel's Dialectic. His thought then is not wholly paradox, whatever the expression may be.

The theism of Hegel is ambiguous.'

There is no chance for the moral consciousness to claim a decisive vote if a metaphysical system like Hegel's demonstrates all realities in every region, and if its janissaries crush out every movement of rebellion against the tyranny of abstract thought.

Heraclitus conceives of the incessant process of flux in which all things are involved as consisting of two sides or moments - generation and decay - which are regarded as a confluence of opposite streams. In thus making transition or change, viewed as the identity of existence and non-existence, the leading idea of his system, Heraclitus anticipated in some measure Hegel's peculiar doctrine of evolution as a dialectic process.'

Attaching himself with enthusiasm to Hegel's system, Vera (who wrote fluently both in French and in English as well as in Italian) became widely influential in spreading a knowledge of the Hegelian doctrine, and became the chief representative of Italian Hegelianism.

With Thomas Hill Green he founded in England a school of orthodox neo-Hegelianism (see Hegel, ad fin.), and through his pupils he exerted a farreaching influence on English philosophy and theology.

Cousin, whose views varied considerably at different periods of his life, 'not only adopted freely what pleased him in the doctrines of Pierre Laromiguiere, RoyerCollard and Maine de Biran, of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, and of the ancient philosophies, but expressly maintained that the eclectic is the only method now open to the philosopher, whose function thus resolves itself into critical selection and nothing more.

With these may be mentioned certain volumes of essays, among which are to be noted those upon Historical Materialism and Marxist Economy (1896-1900); upon Hegel (1905); upon Vico (1910); and the New Essays upon Aesthetic (1920), which complete and carry further the first Aesthetic. Croce only took part in the administrative work of Naples upon rare occasions and in moments of crisis.

A vivid new light is shed by him upon certain problems, such for instance as those of the imagination or intuition, the source of Art and the theme of the Aesthetic, upon pure will, the source of Economic of Rights and of Politics, treated by Economic. The more precise determination and configuration of the categories and their mode of acting, by means of which is negated and solved the concept of an external reality and of nature placed outside the spirit and opposed to it, led Croce to an absolute spiritualism, widely different from the pan-logicism of Hegel and his school, which only seemed to solve the dualism of spirit and nature and really opened the door to the notion of a transcendental God, as became clear in the development of Hegel's theory at the hands of the right wing of his school.

Meredith, the What is living and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel (Macmillan), and the Breviary of Aesthetic (Rice Institute, Texas), the volume Shakespeare, Ariosto and Corneille (Henry Holt & Co., New York), and the Poetry of Dante by Douglas Ainslie.

At first the influence of German thought, German enlightenment and idealism was apparent, particularly in Kollar (a Slovak); the influence of Kant was seen in Palacky, that of Hegel and post-Kantian speculation in Aug.

He also prepared two theses for his doctorate in philosophy, De primis socialismi germanici lineamentis apud Lutherum, Kant, Fichte et Hegel (1891), and De la realite du monde sensible.

Hegelianism had made itself unpopular, and its confusion of God, nature and man had led to differences within the school itself (see Hegel).

In expanding Kant's act of synthesis till it absorbed the inner sense and the innermost soul, he started the modern paradox that soul is not substance, but subject or activity, a paradox which has been gradually handed down from Schelling and Hegel to Fechner, and from Fechner to Paulsen and Wundt.

He also rejected the optimism of Leibnitz and Hegel, and placed the most irrational of wills at the base of the worst possible of worlds (see further Schopenhauer).

The truth of Nature is force; the truth of will is rational desire; the truth of life is neither the optimism of Leibnitz and Hegel, nor the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, but the moderatism of Aristotle.

The three most vital idealisms of this kind at the moment are the panpneumatism of Hartmann, combining Hegel with Schopenhauer; the panteleologism of Lotze, reviving Leibnitz; and the panpsychism of Paulsen, continuing Fechner, but with the addition of an epistemology combining Kant with Schopenhauer.

Though no noumenalist, in many details he is with noumenalists; with Fechner in psychophysics, in psychophysical parallelism, in the independence of the physical and the psychical chains of causality, in reducing physical and psychical to a difference of aspects, in substituting impulse for accident in organic evolution, and in wishing to recognize a gradation of individual spiritual beings; with Schopenhauer and Hartmann in voluntarism; and even with Schelling and Hegel in their endeavour, albeit on an artificial method, to bring experience under notions, and to unite subject and object in one concrete reality.

In the first Hegel showed how the supineness of the committee of estates in Wurttemberg had favoured the usurpations of the superior officials in whom the court had found compliant servants.

Both Schelling and Hegel stand in a relation to art, but while the aesthetic model of Schelling was found in the contemporary world, where art was a special sphere and the artist a separate profession in no intimate connexion with the age and nation, the model of Hegel was found rather in those works of national xui.

Hegel, like Goethe, felt no patriotic shudder at the national disaster, and in Prussia he saw only a corrupt and conceited bureaucracy.

From all periods of the world - from medieval piety and stoical pride, Kant and Sophocles, science and art, religion and philosophy - with disdain of mere chronology, Hegel gathers in the vineyards of the human spirit the grapes from which he crushes the wine of thought.

Thesis, antithesis and synthesis, a Fichtean formula, is generalized by Hegel into the perpetual law of thought.

The value of these works is impaired somewhat by Baur's habit of making the history of dogma conform to the formulae of Hegel's philosophy, a procedure "which only served to obscure the truth and profundity of his conception of history as a true development of the human mind" (Pfleiderer).