To the former he owes his appreciation of exact investigation and a complete knowledge of the aims of science, to the latter an equal admiration for the great circle of ideas which had been diffused by the teaching of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.
The true method of science which he possessed forced him to condemn as useless the entire form which Schelling's and Hegel's expositions had adopted, especially the dialectic method of the latter, whilst his love of art and beauty, and his appreciation of moral purposes, revealed to him the existence of a transphenomenal world of values into which no exact science could penetrate.
Here, too, it was that Hegel's philosophy of history made a deep impression upon him.
Up to the revolutionary year 1830 his religious views had remained strongly tinged with rationalism, Hegel remaining his guide in religion as in practical politics and the treatment of history.
In earlier life he had been a zealous student of Kant and Hegel, and to the end he never ceased to cultivate the philosophic spirit; but he had little confidence in metaphysical systems, and sought rather to translate philosophy into the wisdom of life.
Whatever may have been Hegel's own belief in regard to personal immortality, the logical issue of his absolute idealism has been well stated by W.
His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz).
The same reason that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy.
Hegel was such a system.
Hegel brushes aside all these hesitations.
Hegel offers a supposed proof that Time and Space, Matter, Nature, are ascertainable and definable 2 This is Kant's positive refutation of Hume's scepticism.
As a result, Hegel's system undertakes to show candid minds that incompatible assertions not only may but must both be true.'
Hegel wrote extensively upon religion, especially in his Philosophy of Religion.
If perfect knowledge be possible for us, it must take, the form of such a system as Hegel offers.
If the world exists purely to be known, and if every other working of reason comes into consideration qua incomplete knowledge, Hegel is right with his sweeping intellectualism.
MacTaggart (Studies in Hegelian Dialectic) contends that direct contradiction is confined to the elementary portions of Hegel's Logic: but he does not deny its existence there, though his interpretation, could one accept it, softens the paradox.
Used by Kant sceptically of the limitations of reason, dialectic in Hegel becomes constructive; and scepticism itself becomes a stage in knowledge.
Not that a posteriori is denied, or that idealism even in Hegel tries to evolve reality out of the philosopher's inner consciousness.
The element of givenness, dominant in empiricism, and partially surviving through intuitionalism even into Kant, is sublimated in Hegel's thinking.
1 Hegel will allow no dualism of fact and principles.
More peculiarly his own is Hegel's great doctrine The of contradiction, whereby opposing views of truth " rank as stages in one progressive definition.
Hegel, as interpreted by Dr MacTaggart).
The English thinkers influenced by Hegel are inclined to assert mechanism unconditionally, as the very expression of reason - the only thinkable form of order.
And, as the sympathizers with Hegel try to force mechanical necessity into the garb of absolute or ideal necessity, so they seek to show that moral necessity is only an inferior form of absolute or ideal or, we might say, mathematical necessity.
Hegel's system is, in its own way, a great evolutionary philosophy of an ideal type.
4 The idea of evolution in time (physical evolution) was laughed at by Hegel.
MacTaggart in regard to Hegel, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, chap. iii.
Malebranche gave all causation to God; and the acosmist - as Hegel called him, in repudiation of Bayle's nickname " atheist " - Spinoza, from the premises of Carte.
Kant puts together, as belonging to " Rational Theology," three arguments - he is critic of fond of triads, though they have not the significance for him which they came to have for Hegel.
The main line in pure philosophy runs on from Kant's wavering and sceptical idealism to the all-including gnosis of Hegel.'
Hegel inherits from Kant the three arguments, and takes them as stages in one developing process of argu- thought.
Trace out the clue of causation to the end, says Hegel in effect, and it introduces you, not to a single first cause beyond nature, but to the totality of natural process - a substance, as it were, in which all causes inhere.
And, in some sense not clearly explained, Hegel identifies this final religion with Christianity.
The idealisms of Fichte and Schelling made contributions to Hegel's thought; Krause and the Roman Catholic Baader represent parallel if minor phases of idealism.
Obviously this writer is harder to focus than Kant or Hegel.
When Otto Ritschl interprets values hedonistically - recoiling from Hegel's idealism the whole way to empiricism - he brings again to our minds the doubt whether hedonist ethics can serve as a foundation for any religious belief.
(3) Hegel regards them as phases.
Mackintosh's Selections from the Literature of Theism (useful texts with useful notes: nothing from Hegel).
Like Schelling, Hegel conceives the problem of existence as one of becoming.
With Hegel the absolute is itself a dialectic process which contains within itself a principle of progress from difference to difference and from unity to unity.
Nature to Hegel is the idea in the form of hetereity; and finding itself here it has to remove this exteriority in a progressive evolution towards an existence for itself in life and mind.
Nature (says Zeller) is to Hegel a system of gradations, of which one arises necessarily out of the other, and is the proximate truth of that out of which it results.
Only spirit has a history; in nature all forms are contemporaneous.2 Hegel's interpretation of mind and history as a process of evolution has more scientific interest than his conception of nature.
Yet while, in its application to history, Hegel's theory of evolution has points of resemblance with those doctrines which seek to explain the worldprocess as one unbroken progress occurring in time, it constitutes on the whole a theory apart and sui generis.
Hegel gives a place in his metaphysical system to the mechanical and the teleological views; yet in his treatment of the world as an evolution the idea of end or purpose is the predominant one.
Of the followers of Hegel who have worked out his peculiar idea of evolution it is hardly necessary to speak.
Rosenkranz, who in his work Hegel's Naturphilosophie seeks to develop Hegel's idea of an earthorganism in the light of modern science, recognizing in crystallization the morphological element.
His philosophical standpoint may be characterized as a reaction from the pantheistic tendency of Hegel's idealistic rationalism towards a more pronouncedly theistic position.
the Moral Self (1897); Principles of Individuality (1911); What Religion Is (1920) as well as translations of Hegel and Lotze.
Hegel) was represented in England in a fragmentary way by S.
Hegel's theological followers, of every shade and party, represent the first, and Schleiermacher's the second.
The movement of German philosophy which led from Kant to Hegel has indeed found powerful British champions (T.
To appreciate the significance of the doctrines of Heraclitus, it must be borne in mind that to Greek philosophy the sharp distinction between subject and object which pervades modern thought was foreign, a consideration which suggests the conclusion that, while it is a great mistake to reckon Heraclitus with the materialistic cosmologists of the Ionic schools, it is, on the other hand, going too far to treat his theory, with Hegel and Lassalle, as one of pure Panlogism.
Ethics here stands to sociology in a close relation, similar, in many respects, to that which we find in Hegel and in Comte.
He published also translations into French with commentaries of Hegel's works: Logique de Hegel (Paris, 1859; 2nd ed., 1874); Philosophie de la nature de Hegel (1863-65); Philosophic de l'esprit de Hegel (1867-69); Philosophie de la religion de Hegel (1876-78, incomplete).
Mariano, Augusto Vera (Naples, 1887) and Strauss e Vera (Rome, 1874); Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel's Naturphilosophie and deren Bearbeitung durch A.
Hegel therefore, to take an instance, can no more fitly be classed as a mystic than Spinoza can.
To Hegel similarly the world, though evil at any moment, progresses by conflict and suffering towards the good.
Schopenhauer emphasizes the pessimistic side of Hegel's thought.
He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.
Through the influence of Prof. Daub he was led to an interest in the then predominant philosophy of Hegel and, in spite of his father's opposition, went to Berlin to study under the master himself.
A disciple of Neander and friend of Richard Rothe, Muller bitterly opposed the philosophy of Hegel and the criticism of F.
The Unconscious appears as a combination of the metaphysic of Hegel with that of Schopenhauer.
In 1858, under the stimulus of Henry C. Brockmeyer, Harris became interested in modern German philosophy in general, and in particular in Hegel, whose works a small group, gathering about Harris and Brockmeyer, began to study in 1859.
In 1899 the university of Jena gave him the honorary degree of Doctor of Philosophy for his work on Hegel.
Besides being a contributor to the magazines and encyclopedias on educational and philosophical subjects, he wrote An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy (1889); The Spiritual Sense of Dante's Divina Commedia (1889); Hegel's Logic (1890); and Psychologic Foundations of Education (1898); and edited Appleton's International Education Series and 'Webster's International Dictionary.
In philosophy he was a follower of Victor Cousin, and through him of Hegel.
One of his best lieutenants said of him in a moment of impatience: " Lord Derby is like the God of Hegel: ` Er setzt sich, er verneint sich, er verneint seine Negation.'
Hegel's is an intellectualist monism, explaining matter, sensation, personal individuality and will as forms of thought.
In his studies he had come under the influence of Schleiermacher, Hegel and Franz Baader; but he was a man of independent mind, and developed a peculiar speculative theology which showed a disposition towards mysticism and theosophy.
In the Philosophy of the Practical, but more especially in the work entitled What is living and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel Croce criticizes the erroneous treatment of the opposites, and shows that on the contrary every opposition has at bottom a distinction from which it arises, and that therefore the true unity is unity-distinction, which is development and, as such, opposition that is continuously surpassed and continually re-appearing to be again surpassed.
The philosophers from whom Croce learned most are Vico, the author of the Scienza nuova, and Hegel, but the thought of all other thinkers flows in his writings, in conformity with its historical character, and for this reason may, for instance, be found in it traces of some of Hegel's most active opponents, such as Herbart.
Much influence is ascribed to this heathen element by Lujo Brentano, Karl Hegel, W.
If, as Hegel asserted, our experience is all knowledge, and if knowledge is indefinitely transformed by the conditions of knowing, then we are tempted to regard the object as superfluous, and to treat our innate conviction that knowledge has reference to objects as a delusion which philosophical reflection is destined to dispel.
But the world will take what is available in Comte, while forgetting that in his work which is as irrational in one way as Hegel is in another.
He has, indeed, described in graphic terms the greatest of the more superficial changes he underwent; how he had " carried into logical and ethical problems the maxims and postulates of physical knowledge," and had moved within the narrow lines drawn by the philosophical instructions of the class-room " interpreting human phenomena by the analogy of external nature "; how he served in willing captivity " the ` empirical ' and ` necessarian ' mode of thought," even though " shocked " by the dogmatism and acrid humours " of certain distinguished representatives "; 1 and how in a period of " second education " at Berlin, " mainly under the admirable guidance of Professor Trendelenburg," he experienced " a new intellectual birth" which " was essentially the gift of fresh conceptions, the unsealing of hidden openings of self-consciousness, with unmeasured corridors and sacred halls behind; and, once gained, was more or less available throughout the history of philosophy, and lifted the darkness from the pages of Kant and even Hegel."
Fichte a new speculative theism, and became an opponent of Hegel's pantheistic idealism.
"The intuitive soul," says Hegel, "oversteps the conditions of time and space; it beholds things remote, things long past, and things to come."' What we need, if any progress is to be made in knowledge of the subject, is not a metaphysical hypothesis, but a large, carefully tested, and well-recorded collection of examples, made by savants of recognized standing.
Ordinary scryers of fancy pictures are common enough, but scryers capable of apparently supra-normal successes 1 "Philosophie der Geistes," Hegel's Werke, vii.
He read philosophy at Berlin, Halle and Heidelberg, devoting himself mainly to the doctrines of Hegel and Schleiermacher.
Two other of his works on Hegel are important, the Leben Hegels (1844) and the Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph (1870).
Hutchison Stirling, The Secret of Hegel, part 6.
In the system of Hegel the word resumes its original Socratic sense, as the name of that intellectual process whereby the inadequacy of popular conceptions is exposed.
It was by asking precisely these questions that Hegel gave the finishing strokes to the Kantian philosophy.
Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity.
For this Hegel was doubtless partly to blame.
Hegel undoubtedly meant to affirm that the actual was rational in the face of the philosophy which set up subjective feeling and reason against it.
Hegel carried this principle further than had yet been done.
The " Logic " of Hegel is merely the continuation of Kant's " Deduction " of the categories and ideas of the reason which has generally been recognized as the soberest of attempts to set forth the presuppositions which underlie all experience.
" What Hegel attempts to show is just that the categories by which thought must determine its object are stages in a process that, beginning with the idea of ` Being,' the simplest of all determinations is driven on by its own dialectic till it reaches the idea of self-consciousness.
Secret of Hegel (1865).
The mistake is not Hegel's but ours.
Wallace, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel (1894), and Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (1894); A.
to Hegel's Phil.
See Karl Hegel, Steidle and Gilden (Leipzig, 1891); Allan, Geschiedenis en beschrijving van Haarlem (Haarlem, 1871-1888).
Dr Smith contributed articles on Calvin, Kant, Pantheism, Miracles, Reformed Churches, Schelling and Hegel to the American Cyclopaedia, and contributed to McClintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia; and was editor of the American Theological Review (1859 sqq.), both in its original form and after it became the American Presbyterian and Theological Review and, later, the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review.
It was in some ways the herald of a new school of German historical thought, for it shows that idealization of power and success which he had learnt from the teaching of Hegel.
Originally a follower of Hegel, he turned to Fichte and Beneke (q.v.), with whose insistence on psychology as the basis of all philosophy he fully agreed.
Both Zeller and Hegel remark upon the difference between the calm of ancient scepticism and the perturbed state of mind evinced by many modern sceptics.
In part it may fairly be attributed to the retarding influence of the school of Ewald, but in large part also Well- to the fact that Vatke, a pupil of Hegel, had developed his theory on a priori grounds in accordance with the principles of Hegel's philosophy of history.
Among his (elder) contemporaries were Hegel and HÃ¶lderlin.
This period was marked by considerable changes in his views and by the final breach on the one hand with Fichte and on the other hand with Hegel.
Probably it was the overpowering strength and influence of the Hegelian system that constrained Schelling to so long a silence, for it was only in 1834, after the death of Hegel, that, in a preface to a translation by H.
Public attention was powerfully attracted by these vague hints of a new system which promised something more positive, as regards religion in particular, than the apparent results of Hegel's teaching.
The criticisms of Fichte, and more particularly of Hegel (in the "Vorrede" to the Pheinomenologie des Geistes), point to the fatal defect in the conception of the absolute as mere featureless identity.
An interesting little work is Klaiber, Holderlin, Hegel, u.
Among his works are: Darwinism and Politics (1889); Principles of State Interference (1891); Darwin and Hegel (1893); Natural Rights (1895); a translation with R.
In the course of his intellectual development, he came successively under the influence of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, and on account of the different phases through which he passed he was called the Talleyrand of German thought.
Educated at first at Eisenberg, he proceeded to Jena, where he studied philosophy under Hegel and Fichte and became privatdozent in 1802.
The comparatively small area of Krause's influence was due partly to the overshadowing brilliance of Hegel, and partly to two intrinsic defects.
The assertion of absolute substance by Spinoza incited Schelling and Hegel.
By changing the meaning of "noumenon " from the thing apprehended (voouµevov) to the thought (vOnya), and in the hypothesis of a common consciousness, he started the view that a thing is not yours or my thought, but a common thought of all mankind, and led to the wider view of Schelling and Hegel that the world is an absolute thought of infinite mind.
In the doctrine - no object, no subject - no subject, no object - that is, in the utter identification of things with objects of subjects, he anticipated not only Schelling and Hegel, but also Schuppe and Wundt with their congeners.
Schelling and Hegel thought it was infinite reason; Schopenhauer, unconscious will; Hartmann, unconscious intelligence and will; Lotze, the activity or life of the divine spirit; Fechner, followed by Paulsen, a world of spiritual actualities comprised in the one spiritual actuality, God, in whom we live and move and have our being.
Of these noumenal idealisms the earliest in time and the nearest to Fichte's philosophy was the panlogism, begun by Schelling (1775-18J4), completed by his disciple Hegel (1770-1831), and then modified by the master himself.
On Schelling's idealistic pantheism, or the hypothesis that there is nothing but one absolute reason identifying the opposites of subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel based his panlogism.
By the same dialectic Hegel was able to justify the gradual transformation of transcendental into noumenal idealism by Fichte and Schelling.
Hegel's assumption of identity in difference at once enabled him to deal with the whole difficulty by holding that different subjects are yet one subject, and any one object, e.g.
Schelling himself, as soon as he saw his own formulae exposed in the logic or rather dialectic of his disciple, began to reconsider his philosophy of identity, and brought some powerful objections against both the conclusions and the method of Hegel.
Schelling perceived that Hegel, in reducing everything to infinite mind, absorbed man's free but finite personality in God, and, in declaring that everything real is rational, failed to explain evil and sin: indeed, the English reader of T.
Hegel, he said, had only supplied the logic of negative philosophy; and it must be confessed that the most which could be extracted from the Hegelian dialectic would be some connexion of thoughts without proving any existence of corresponding things.
Hence he rejected the infinite intelligence supposed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel against whom he urged that blind will produces intelligence, and only becomes conscious in us by using intelligence as a means to ends.
von Hartmann, who (Die Philosophie des Unbewussten, 1869, 1st ed.), advanced the view that the world as noumenal is both unconscious intelligence and unconscious will, thus founding a panpneumatism which forms a sort of reconciliation of the panlogism of Hegel and the panthelism of Schopenhauer.
In his tract entitled Schelling's positive Philosophie als Einheit von Hegel and Schopenhauer (1869) he further showed that, in his later philosophy, Schelling had already combined reason and will in the Absolute.
Thus his pantheistic is also a teleological idealism, which in its emphasis on free activity and moral order recalls Leibnitz and Fichte, but in its emphasis on the infinity of God has more affinity to Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel.
At the same time, while accepting the Schellingian parallelistic identity of all things in God, Fechner was restrained by his accurate knowledge of physics from the extravagant construction of Nature, which had failed in the hands of Schelling and Hegel.
It resembles the views of Hegel and Lotze in its pantheistic tendency.
By this ingenious suggestion of the membership of one spirit in another, Fechner's " day-view " also puts Nature in a different position; neither with Hegel sublimating it to the thought of God's mind, nor with Lotze degrading it to the phenomena of our human minds, but identifying it with the outer appearance of one spirit to another spirit in the highest of spirits.
The panlogism of Schelling and Hegel survives in its influence.
His third position is his actualistic theory of soul, which he shares with Fichte, Hegel, Fechner and Paulsen.
It is to be monistic ideal realism, like that of Fichte and Hegel; not, however, like theirs idealistic in method, a Phantastisches Begrifsgebaude, but realistic in method, a Wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
The Influence of Kant and Hegel.
About the same time Benjamin Jowett had been studying the philosophy of Hegel; but, being a man endowed with much love of truth but with little belief in first principles, he was too wise to take for a principle Hegel's assumption that different things are the same.
But it is not a Kantian view; and it is necessary to correct two confusions of Kant and Hegel, which have been iYnported with Hegelianism by Green and Caird.
this second barrier between Kant and Hegel.
Kant, then, as interpreted by English Hegelians, already believed, before Hegel, that there is one intelligence common to all individuals, and that a noumenon is a thought of this common intelligence, " an ideal of reason "; so that Kant was trying to be a Hegelian, holding that the world has no being beyond the thoughts of one intelligence.
What Kant never said and what his whole philosophy prevented his saying, was that a single thing is a single thought of a single consciousness; either of men, as in Fichte's philosophy, or of God and man, as in Hegel's.
The passage from Kant to Hegel attempted by Green, and the harmony of Kant and Hegel attempted by Green and Caird, are unhistorical, and have caused much confusion of thought.
Wallace, the translator of most of Hegel's Encyklopadie, who had previously learnt Hegelianism from Ferrier; W.
" There are still to be mentioned two English Hegelians, who have not confused Kant and Hegel as Green did: namely, Simon Somerville Laurie (1829-1909) and F.
His theory of "attuition," by which he supposes that we become conscious of objects outside ourselves, is his " return to dualism," and is indeed so like natural realism as to suggest that, like Ferrier, he starts from Hamilton to end in Hegel.
His theory of reason brings him into contact with the German idealists: he accepts from Kant the hypothesis of synthesis and a priori categories, from Fichte the hypothesis that will is necessary to reason, from Schelling and Hegel the hypothesis of universal reason, and of an identity between the cosmic reason and the reason of man, in which he agrees also with Green and Caird.
Not so: Laurie is a Hegelian, using Kant's categories, as Hegel did, to argue that they are true not only of thoughts but of things; and for the same reason, that things and thoughts are the same.
He agrees with Hegel that there are two fundamental identities, the identity of all reason, and the identity of all reason and all being.
Rejecting everything in the Kritik which savoured of the " metempirical," he yet sympathized so far with Hegel's noumenalism as to accept the identification of cause and effect, though he interpreted the hypothesis phenomenalistically by saying that cause and effect are two aspects of the same phenomenon.
But his metaphysics is an interesting example of a phenomenalist, sympathizing with noumenalists so different as Hegel and Fechner, and yet maintaining his phenomenalism.
the phenomenalisms of Schuppe, Avenarius and Wundt, and to the hypothesis of one consciousness, which appears variously in the German idealisms, not of Kant, as Ward thinks, but of Fichte, Hegel and Schuppe; and somehow he manages to end with the noumenalistic conclusion that Nature is God's Spirit.
What makes his vindication of conscious personality all the more interesting is that he has so much in common with the Hegelians; agreeing as he does with Hegel that self-consciousness is the highest fact, the ultimate category of thought through which alone the universe is intelligible, and an adequate account of the great fact of existence.
It is difficult to see exactly where he begins to differ from Hegel; but at any rate he believes in different self-conscious persons; he does not accept the dialectical method, but believes in beginning from the personal experience of one's own self-consciousness; and, though he is not very clear on the subject, he would have to admit that a thing, such as the sun, is a different object in each person's consciousness.
Hegel said that spirit is not substance but subject, which to Aristotle would have meant that it is not a distinct thing, yet is a distinct thing.
Trendelenburg (1802-1872), a formidable opponent of Hegel, tried to surmount Kant's transcendental idealism by supposing that motion, and therefore time, space and the categories, though a priori, are common to thought and being.
Etienne Vacherot deserted Descartes for Hegel.
He accepted from Hegel " the real is rational " without the Hegelian method, for which he substituted conscious experience as a revelation of the divine.
Hegel only extended a priori forms to things by resolving things into thoughts.
One cannot but feel regret at seeing the Reformed Churches blown about by every wind of doctrine, and catching at straws now from Kant, now from Hegel, and now from Lotze, or at home from Green, Caird, Martineau, Balfour and Ward in succession, without ever having considered the basis of their faith; while the Roman Catholics are making every effort to ground a Universal Church on a sane system of metaphysics.
Clarke, include General Metaphysics (1890), by John Rickaby, who effectively criticizes Hegel by precise distinctions, which, though scholastic, did not deserve to be forgotten.
Schelling (in his Identity-philosophy) and Hegel both carried on the pantheistic tradition, which after Hegel broke up into two lines of thought, the one pantheistic the other atheistic.
Yet in some respects his ideas opened the way for the later speculations of Schelling and Hegel.
He concluded his years of preparation by a European tour, in the course of which he received kind attention from almost every distinguished man in the world of letters, science and art; among others, from Goethe, Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Byron, Niebuhr, Bunsen, Savigny, Cousin, Constant and Manzoni.
He studied theology in the universities of Heidelberg and Berlin (1817-20) under Karl Daub (1765-1836), Schleiermacher and Neander, the philosophers and historians Georg Hegel, Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1858) and F.
Like Schleiermacher he combined with the keenest logical faculty an intensely religious spirit, while his philosophical tendencies were in sympathy rather with Hegel than with Schleiermacher, and theosophic mysticism was more congenial to him than the abstractions of Spinoza, to whom Schleiermacher owed so much.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel >>
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-183r), German philosopher, was born at Stuttgart on the 27th of August 1770.
At the grammar school of Stuttgart, where Hegel was educated between the ages of seven and eighteen, he was not remarkable.
With Holderlin Hegel learned to feel for the old Greeks a love which grew stronger as the semi-Kantianized theology of his teachers more and more failed to interest him.
In Jesus Hegel finds the expression for something higher than mere morality: he finds a noble spirit which rises above the contrasts of virtue and vice into the concrete life, seeing the infinite always embracing our finitude, and proclaiming the divine which is in man and cannot be overcome by error and evil, unless the man close his eyes and ears to the godlike presence within him.
During these years Hegel kept up a slack correspondence with Schelling and Holderlin.
Schelling, already on the way to fame, kept Hegel abreast with German speculation.
Meanwhile, Holderlin in Jena had been following Fichte's career with an enthusiasm with which he infected Hegel.
It is pleasing to turn from these vehement struggles of thought to a tour which Hegel in company with three other tutors made through the Bernese Oberland in July and August 1796.
" Towards the close of his engagement at Bern, Hegel had received hopes from Schelling of a post at Jena.
Fortunately his friend Holderlin, now tutor in Frankfort, secured a similar situation there for Hegel in the family of Herr Gogol, a merchant (January 1797).
Here, as in contemporaneous criticisms of Kant's ethical writings, Hegel aims at correcting the abstract discussion of a topic by treating it in its systematic interconnexions.
But the best evidence of Hegel's attention to contemporary politics is two unpublished essays - one of them written in 1798, " On the Internal Condition of Wurttemberg in Recent Times, particularly on the Defects in the Magistracy," the other a criticism on the constitution of Germany, written, probably, not long after the peace of Luneville (1801).
Referring the collapse of the empire to the retention of feudal forms and to the action of religious animosities, Hegel looked forward to reorganization by a central power (Austria) wielding the imperial army, and by a representative body elected by the geographical districts of the empire.
Even philosophy with Hegel at this epoch was subordinate to religion; for philosophy must never abandon the finite in the search for the infinite.
Soon, however, Hegel adopted a view according to which philosophy is a higher mode of apprehending the infinite than even religion.
At Frankfort, meanwhile, the philosophic ideas of Hegel first assumed the proper philosophic form.
Circumstances soon put Hegel in the way to complete these outlines.
His father died in January 1799; and the slender sum which Hegel received as his inheritance, 3154 gulden (about 260), enabled him to think once more of a studious life.
The upshot was that Hegel arrived at Jena in January 1801.
Schelling was the main philosophical lion of the time; and in some quarters Hegel was spoken of as a new champion summoned to help him in his struggle with the more prosaic continuators of Kant.
Hegel's first performance seemed to justify the rumour.
Still more striking was the agreement shown in the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which Schelling and Hegel wrote conjointly during the years 1802-1803.
Even at a later period foreign critics like Cousin saw much that was alike in the two doctrines, and did not hesitate to regard Hegel as a disciple of Schelling.
The dissertation by which Hegel qualified for the position of Privatdozent (De orbitis planetarum) was probably chosen under the influence of Schelling's philosophy of nature.
For while Hegel, depending on a numerical proportion suggested by Plato, hinted in a single sentence that it might be a mistake to look for a planet between Mars and Jupiter, Giuseppe Piazzi (q.v.) had already discovered the first of the asteroids (Ceres) on the ist of January 1801.
Apparently in August, when Hegel qualified, the news of the discovery had not yet reached him, but critics have made this luckless suggestion the ground of attack on a priori philosophy.
Hegel's lectures, in the winter of 1801-1802, on logic and metaphysics were attended by about eleven students.
Meanwhile, after the departure of Schelling from Jena in the middle of 1803, Hegel was left to work out his own views.
At Jena, though some of his hearers became attached to him, Hegel was not a popular lecturer any more than K.
" Such art," says Hegel, " is the common good and the work of all.
Hegel, as we have already seen, was fully aware of the change that was coming over the world.
Hegel's fortunes were now at the lowest ebb.
The school system was reorganized by new regulations, in accordance with which Hegel wrote a series of lessons in the outlines of philosophy - ethical, logical and psychological.
They were published in 1840 by Rosenkranz from Hegel's papers.
As a teacher and master Hegel inspired confidence in his pupils, and maintained discipline without pedantic interference in their associations and sports.
On the 16th of September 1811 Hegel married Marie von Tucher (twenty-two years his junior) of Nuremberg.
Hegel's letters to his wife, written during his solitary holiday tours to Vienna, the Netherlands and Paris, breathe of kindly and happy affection.
Hegel the tourist - recalling happy days spent together; confessing that, were it not because of his sense of duty as a traveller, he would rather be at home, dividing his time between his books and his wife; commenting on the shop windows at Vienna; describing the straw hats of the Parisian ladies - is a contrast to the professor of a profound philosophical system.
Hinrichs (q.v.), to whose Religion in its Inward Relation to Science (1822) Hegel contributed an important preface.
The strangest of his hearers was an Esthonian baron, Boris d'Yrkull, who after serving in the Russian army came to Heidelberg to hear the wisdom of Hegel.
But his books and his lectures were alike obscure to the baron, who betook himself by Hegel's advice to simpler studies before he returned to the Hegelian system.
At Heidelberg Hegel was active in a literary way also.
It is the only exposition of the Hegelian system as a whole which we have direct from Hegel's own hand.
Hegel in his essay, which was republished at Stuttgart, supported the royal proposals, and animadverted on the backwardness of the bureaucracy and the landed interests.
In 1818 Hegel accepted the renewed offer of the chair of philosophy at Berlin, vacant since the death of Fichte.
The hopes which this offer raised of a position less precarious than that of a university teacher of philosophy were in one sense disappointed; for more than a professor Hegel never became.
In 1821 Hegel published the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (2nd ed., 1840; ed.
With the principle that whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real, Hegel fancied that he had stopped the mouths of political critics and constitution-mongers.
In his disgust at the crude conceptions of the enthusiasts, who had hoped that the war of liberation might end in a realm of internal liberty, Hegel had forgotten his own youthful vows recorded in verse to HBlderlin, " never, never to live in peace with the ordinance which regulates feeling and opinion."
During his thirteen years at Berlin Hegel's whole soul seems to have been in his lectures.
At these Hegel became a frequent and appreciative visitor and made extracts from the art-notes in the newspapers.
Hegel himself grew more and more into a belief in his own doctrine as the one truth for the world.
The journal was not solely in the Hegelian interest; and more than once, when Hegel attempted to domineer over the other editors, he was met by vehement and vigorous opposition.
Hegel and his family retired for the summer to the suburbs, and there he finished the revision of the first part of his Science of Logic. On the beginning of the winter session, however, he returned to his house in the Kupfergraben.
On this occasion an altercation occurred between him and his friend Gans, who in his notice of lectures on jurisprudence had recommended Hegel's Philosophy of Right.
Hegel, indignant at what he deemed patronage, demanded that the note should be withdrawn.
Hegel in his class-room was neither imposing nor fascinating.
Every one has heard the legend which makes Hegel say, " One man has understood me, and even he has not."
Even to the last Hegel had not so externalized his system as to treat it as something to be led up to by gradual steps.
For this reason the book is at once the most brilliant and the most difficult of Hegel's works - the most brilliant because it is to some degree an autobiography of Hegel's mind - not the abstract record of a logical evolution, but the real history of an intellectual growth; the most difficult because, instead of treating the rise of intelligence (from its first appearance in contrast with the real world to its final recognition of its presence in, and rule over, all things) as a purely subjective process, it exhibits this rise as wrought out in historical epochs, national characteristics, forms of culture and faith, and philosophical systems. The theme is identical with the introduction to the Encyklopddie; but it is treated in a very different style.
The mind coming through a thousand phases of mistake and disappointment to a sense and realization of its true position in the universe - such is the drama which is consciously Hegel's own history, but is represented objectively as the process of spiritual history which the philosopher reproduces in himself.
Here, according to Hegel, is the field of philosophy.
The philosophy of Hegel is idealism, but it is an idealism in which every idealistic unification has its other face in the multiplicity of existence.
Compared with Fichte and Schelling, Hegel has a sober, hard, realistic character.
The claims of the individual, the real, material and historical fact, it was said, had been sacrificed by Hegel to the universal, the ideal, the spiritual and the logical.
Thought in this primary form, when in all its parts completed, is what Hegel calls the " idea."
So far as this Hegel seems on the side of revolution.
Thought became only the result of organic conditions - subjective and human; and the system of Hegel was no longer an idealization of religion, but a naturalistic theory with a prominent and peculiar logic.
The logic of Hegel is the only rival to the logic of Aristotle.
What Aristotle did for the theory of demonstrative reasoning, Hegel attempted to do for the whole of human knowledge.
According to Hegel the terms in which thought exhibits itself are a system of their own, with laws and relations which reappear in a less obvious shape in the theories of nature and mind.
It is part of Hegel's plan to remedy this one-sided character of thought, by laying bare the gradations of ideas.
The merit of Hegel is to have indicated and to a large extent displayed the filiation and mutual limitation of our forms of thought; to have arranged them in the order of their comparative capacity to give a satisfactory expression to truth in the totality of its relations; and to have broken down the partition which in Kant separated the formal logic from the transcendental analytic, as well as the general disruption between logic and metaphysic. It must at the same time be admitted that much of the work of weaving the terms of thought, the categories, into a system has a hypothetical and tentative character, and that Hegel has rather pointed out the path which logic must follow, viz.
The charges of superficial analogies, so freely urged against the " Natur-philosophie " by critics who forget the impulse it gave to physical research by the identification of forces then believed to be radically distinct, do not particularly affect,Hegel.
Hegel with great detail.
In this account of the development of an independent, active and intelligent being from the stage where man like the Dryad is a portion of the natural life around him, Hegel has combined what may be termed a physiology and pathology of the mind - a subject far wider than that of ordinary psychologies, and one of vast intrinsic importance.
Beginning with the antithesis of a legal system and 2 Law morality, Hegel, carrying out the work of Kant, presents and the synthesis of these elements in the ethical life (Sittlichhistory.
The Lectures on the Philosophy of History, edited by Gans and subsequently by Karl Hegel, is the most popular of Hegel's works.
A graver mistake, according to some critics, is that Hegel, far from giving a law of progress, seems to suggest that the history of the world is nearing an end, and has merely reduced the past to a logical formula.
And at any rate the method is greater than Hegel's employment of it.
But as with Aristotle so with Hegel - beyond the ethical and political sphere rises the world of absolute spirit in art, religion and philosophy.
The so-called beauty of nature is for Hegel an adventitious beauty.
Hegel after expounding the nature of religion passes on to discuss its historical phases, but in the immature state of religious science falls into several mistakes.
The lectures on the History of Philosophy deal disproportionately with the various epochs, and in some parts date from the beginning of Hegel's career.
As time went on it became obvious that without de p arture from the spirit of idealism Hegel's principle was susceptible of a different interpretation.
In reply to Bradley's argument for the unreality of the self, Hegel is interpreted as meaning that the opposition between self and not-self on which it is founded is one that is self-made and in being made is transcended.
- Shortly after Hegel's death his collected works were published by a number of his friends, who combined for the purpose.
Haym, Hegel and seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857); K.
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