Cognition Sentence Examples

We cannot possibly have any cognition of how such an act is possible.

The foundations of cognition must be discovered by observation or analysis of experience so conceived.

The ultimate basis for the activity of cognition is given by the will.

We understand such data by the process of social cognition.

Tourette syndrome does not, in itself, negatively affect intelligence or cognition.

It was once believed that infants lacked the ability to think or form complex ideas and remained without cognition until they learned language.

This movement is said to go forth from God to the animated heaven, stars, visible world and man, which represent decreasing degrees of cognition.

But in this very cognition of self is involved the distinction of knower and known, from which proceeds the power to become spirit.

It is true that Leibnitz himself did not work out any complete doctrine of knowledge, but in the hands of his successors the theory took definite shape in the principle that the whole work of cognition is in essence analytical.

It follows from them that the relation of a real ground to that which is thereby posited or denied cannot be expressed by a judgment but only by means of a notion, which by analysis may certainly be reduced to yet simpler notions of real grounds, but yet in such a way that the final resort of all our cognition in this regard must be found in simple and irreducible notions of real grounds, the relation of which to their consequents cannot be made clear."

He is here at the point at which he remained for many years, accepting without any criticism certain fundamental notions as required for real cognition.

No glimmering of the further question, Whence come these notions and with what right do we apply them in cognition?

His long-continued reflection on the Wolffian doctrine of knowledge had made clear to him that synthetic connexion, the essence of real cognition, was not contained in the products of thinking as a formal activity of mind operating on material otherwise supplied.

Cognition is necessarily limited.

The result is a plethora of work on what has become known as embodied cognition.

Are all aspects of visuo-spatial cognition equally impaired in Williams Syndrome?

Here's hoping many more fruitful and funded years of research on spatial cognition can answer some of them.

What do we know about the nature of teacher cognition?

However, the implementation of agent cognition used in this model does support the explicit introduction of domain knowledge into the representation of cognition.

Peacocke himself has recently accepted that arguments from animal cognition do indeed force the acceptance of the Autonomy Thesis (Peacocke 2002 ).

Areas of Interest My key area of research in TESOL is language teacher cognition.

Self-consciousness, or the subject of the transcendental unity of apperception, was likewise impervious to cognition from the Kantian standpoint.

It is thus contrasted with metaphysics, which considers the nature of reality, and with psychology, which deals with the objective part of cognition, and, as Prof. James Ward said, "is essentially genetic in its method" (Mind, April 1883, pp. 166-167).

By it the theoretical and practical reason shall be shown to coincide; for while the categories of cognition and the whole system of pure thought can be expounded from one principle, the ground of this principle is scientifically, or to cognition, inexplicable, and is made conceivable only in the practical philosophy.

Some traces of this confused fashion of regarding sense-perceptions are left even in the Kritik, specially perhaps in the Aesthetik, and they give rise to much of the ambiguity which unfortunately attaches to the more developed theory of cognition.

The relation in which they stand to the categories or pure notions is ambiguous; and, when Kant has to consider the fashion in which category and data of sense are to be brought together, he merely places side by side as a priori elements the pure connective notions and the pure forms of perception, and finds it, apparently, only a matter of contingent convenience that they should harmonize with one another and so render cognition possible.

My main area of interest is the interaction between cortical and subcortical structures underlying human cognition, emotion and behavior.

Nevertheless, insights such as this can be integrated into contemporary scientific theorizing about cognition and the brain with surprisingly fruitful results.

A fourth change in cognition is that thinking tends to become multidimensional, rather than limited to a single issue.

Cognition can be defined as a process by which knowledge is gained from perceptions or ideas.

One of the basic aspects of an individual's ability to think and know (cognition) is how one is able to perceive certain stimuli.

Moreover, while Kant in a quite similar manner pointed out that intuition had special conditions, space and time, he did not show any link of connexion between these and the primitive conditions of pure cognition.

It does not seem necessary to endeavour to follow his minute examination of the principle of real cognition with the same fulness.

Feeling is not a mental function subordinate to cognition or volition, but of equal rank and authority; yet feeling, cognition and volition alike conduct to faith in the unknown Absolute, though by different paths and processes.

The senses, the sole source of knowledge, are supposed to yield us immediately cognition of individual things; phantasy (which Gassendi takes to be material in nature) reproduces these ideas; understanding compares these ideas, which are particular, and frames general ideas.

It is not a little remarkable that we should find in Hume, not only the sceptical dissolution of all fixity of cognition, which is the inevitable result of the individualist method, but also the clearest consciousness of the very root of the difficulty.

Thus, on the one hand, the individualist conception, when carried out to its full extent, leads to the total negation of all real cognition.

The metaphysical conception of the monads, each of which is the universe in nuce, presents insuperable difficulties when the connexion or interdependence of the monads is in question, and these difficulties obtrude themselves when the attempt is made to work out a consistent doctrine of cognition.

Up to the stage indicated by the Dissertation he had been attempting, in various ways, to unite two radically divergent modes of explaining cognition - that which would account for the content of experience by reference to affection from things without us, and that which viewed the intellect itself as somehow furnished with the means of pure, rational cognition.

An absolutely new conception of experience was necessary, if the fact of cognition was to be explained at all, and the various modes in which Kant expresses the business of his critical philosophy were merely different fashions of stating the one ultimate problem, differing according to the particular aspect of knowledge which he happened to have in view.

To inquire how synthetic a priori j udgments are possible, or how far cognition extends, or what worth attaches to metaphysical propositions, is simply to ask, in a specific form, what elements are necessarily involved in experience of which the subject is conscious.

How is it possible for the individual thinking subject to connect together the parts of his experience in the mode we call cognition?

The essence of cognition or knowledge was a synthetic act, an act of combining in thought the detached elements of experience.

Now synthesis was explicable neither by reference to pure thought, the logical or elaborative faculty, which in Kant's view remained analytic in function, nor by reference to the effects of external real things upon our faculties of cognition.

The modes under which it is possible for such given difference to become portion of the conscious experience of the ego, the modes under which the isolated data can be synthetically combined so as to form a cognizable whole, make up the form of cognition, and upon this form rests the possibility of any a priori or rational knowledge.

He treats the elements of cognition separately in connexion with the several subjective processes involved in knowledge, viz.

The consideration of the several elements which in combination make up the fact of cognition, or perception, as it may be called, contains little or nothing bearing on the origin and nature of the given data of sense, inner or outer.

For cognition there is requisite synthetic combination, and the intellectual function through which such combination takes place.

It appeared evident, then, to Kant that in the forms of judgment, as they are stated in the common logic, there must be found the analogues of the types of judgment which are involved in transcendental logic, or in the theory of real cognition.

The unity of the ego, which has been already noted as an element entering into the synthesis of cognition, is a unity of a quite distinct and peculiar kind.

That the ego to which different parts of experience are presented must be the same ego, if there is to be cognition at all, is analytically evident; but the peculiarity is that the ego must be conscious of its own unity and identity, and this unity of self-consciousness is only possible in relation to difference not contained in the ego but given to it.

The mode in which Kant endeavours to show how the several portions of cognition are subjectively realized brings into the clearest light the inconsistencies and imperfections of his doctrine.

Perception or real cognition is thus conceived as a complex fact, involving data of sense and pure perceptive forms, determined by the category and realized through productive imagination in the schema.

Throughout the positive portion of his theory of cognition, Kant has been beset by the doctrine that the categories, as finished, complete notions, have an import or significance transcending the bounds of possible experience.

But to assert that cognition is limited and its matter contingent is to form the idea of an intelligence for whom cognition would not be limited and for whom the data of intuition would not be given, contingent facts, but necessarily produced along with the pure categories.

Understanding, as has been seen, is the faculty of cognition strictly so called; and within its realm, that of space, time and matter, positive knowledge is attainable.

The specific function of reason is the effort after completed explanation of the experience presented in cognition.

These ideas, the expression of the various modes in which unity of reason may be sought, have no objects corresponding to them in the sphere of cognition.

The limits of scientific cognition become intelligible, only when the sphere of understanding is subjected to critical reflexion and compared with the possible sphere of reason, that is, the sphere of rationally complete cognition.

There still remains, over and above the realm of nature, the realm of free, self-conscious spirit; and, within this sphere, it may be anticipated that the ideas will acquire a significance richer and deeper than the merely regulative import which they possess in reference to cognition.

Not in the sphere of cognition, where objects are mechanically determined, but in that of will or of reason as practical.

Freedom, it is true, is theoretically not an object of cognition, but its impossibility is not thereby demonstrated.

Judgment is here merely reflective; that is to say, the particular element is given, so determined as to be possible material of knowledge, while the universal, not necessary for cognition, is supplied by reason itself.

The phenomena of organic production furnish data for a special kind of judgment, which, however, involves or rests upon a quite general principle, that of the contingency of the particular element in nature and its subjectively necessary adaptation to our faculty of cognition.

The idea of such an understanding is, for cognition, transcendent, for no corresponding fact of intuition is furnished, but it is realized with practical certainty in relation to reason as practical.

For example, cognitive science could employ video-based methodologies for the analysis of situated cognition.

Researchers have pointed to [22] the " distributed cognition " which results from collaborative learning within a shared context.

Professor Alan Cowey, FRS University of Oxford Using TMS to explore the nature and timing of brain events underlying visual cognition.

The utility of the computer metaphor to understand human cognition will be considered.

Although the illness primarily affects cognition, it can also contribute to chronic problems with behavior or emotions.

Students can choose between a range of topics, including analysis, notation, historical subjects, ethnomusicology, performance and music cognition.

Most research over the past 25 years has shown that CES reduced anxiety and improved cognition in recovering drug addicts and alcoholics.

About 25 percent had learning problems or language delay; 20 percent had borderline cognition or attention deficits; and 66 percent had two or more of these characteristics.

Cognitive development theories view morality as an outgrowth of cognition, or reasoning, whereas personality theories are holistic in their approach, taking into account all the factors that contribute to human development.

This is evident in five distinct areas of cognition.

It remains to be seen how knowledge can be explained on such a basis; but, before proceeding to sketch Hume's answer to this question, it is necessary to draw attention, first, to the peculiar device invariably resorted to by him when any exception to his general principle that ideas are secondary copies of impressions presents itself, and, secondly, to the nature of the substitute offered by him for that perception of relations or synthesis which even in Locke's confused statements had appeared as the essence of cognition.

Cognition manifestly needs the help of Reason even in its theoretical use.

The general principle of the adaptation of nature to our faculties of cognition has two specific applications, with the second of which it is more closely connected than with the first.

But if complete, this Wissenschaftslehre must be able to deduce the whole organism of cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and incapable of proof; only thus can we have a system of reason.

The primitive fact under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis which we call cognition was this unity.

Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition, the theory of knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the principles which lie at the basis of;all reasoned cognition.

Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of possible cognition, only three are thinkable - one perfectly unconditioned both in form and matter; a second, unconditioned in form but not in matter; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form.

In the first place there are certain principles of cognition which appear to rest upon and to express relations of the universal elements in conscious experience, viz.

Both cognition and volition are functions of thought as well as forms of moral action.

Such a fashion of disguising difficulties points, not only to an inconsistency in Hume's theory as stated by himself, but to the initial error upon which it proceeds; for these perplexities are but the consequences of the doctrine that cognition is to be explained on the basis of particular perceptions.

The former fall into the two classes of feelings (subjective) and perceptions (objective); the latter, according as the receptive or the spontaneous element predominates, into cognition and volition.

The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially by Schultze (Aenesidemus) and Maimon.

Cognition is therefore distinct from emotion and conation; it has no psychological connexion with feelings of pleasure and pain, nor does it tend as such to issue in action.

Fichtean idealism therefore at once stood out negatively, as abolishing the dogmatic conception of the two real worlds, subject and object, by whose interaction cognition and practice arise, and as amending the critical idea which retained with dangerous caution too many fragments of dogmatism; positively, as insisting on the unity of philosophical interpretation and as supplying a key to the form or method by which a completed philosophic system might be constructed.

Now if this mode of treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked.

For in the problem of real cognition he is brought face to face with the characteristic feature of knowledge, distinction of self from matters known, and reference of transitory states to permanent objects or relations.

The results follow with the cognition utmost ease from his original postulate.

Moreover, since the "real" is the object of the "true," and can be distinguished from the "unreal" only by developing superior value in the process of cognition which arrives at it, the notions of "reality" and "fact" also turn out to be disguised forms of value.

If the extant authorities are to be trusted, Xenocrates recognized three grades of cognition, each appropriated to a region of its own - viz.

Cognition, then, in the strict sense, occupies the middle place between sense perception, which is belief in matters of sense, and reason, which is belief in supersensuous fact.

Through faith, which is a firm and certain cognition of the divine benevolence towards us founded on the truth of the gracious promise in Christ, men are by the operation of the Spirit united to Christ and are made partakers of His death and resurrection, so that the old man is crucified with Him and they are raised to a new life, a life of righteousness and holiness.

While therefore we cannot, as we have seen, attain the idea of the supreme unity of thought and being by either cognition or volition, we can find it in our own personality, in immediate self-consciousness or (which is the same in Schleiermacher's terminology) feeling.

Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian view - lying, indeed, at the foundation of it - was the doctrine that the matter of cognition is altogether given, or thrown into the form of cognition from without.

It was left for Hume to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final consequences of that view so far as cognition is concerned.

Hume wavers somewhat in his division of the various kinds of cognition, laying stress now upon one now upon another of the points in which mainly they differ from one another.

It is almost superfluous to remark, first, that Hume here deliberately gives up his fundamental principle that ideas are but the fainter copies of impressions, for it can never be maintained that order of disposition is an impression, and, secondly, that he fails to offer any explanation of the mode in which coexistence and succession are possible elements, of cognition in a conscious experience made up of isolated presentations and representations.

The final problem of Hume's theory of knowledge, the discussion of the real significance of the two factors of cognition, self and external things, is handled in the Treatise with great fulness and dialectical subtlety.

In transcendental analytic on the other hand we concern ourselves only with the transcendental " deduction " or vindication of the conditions of experience, and we have a logic of cognition in which we may establish our epistemological categories with complete validity.

At the same time Democritus distinguished between obscure (UKOTG1j) cognition, resting on sensation alone, and genuine (yvrjoL), which is the result of inquiry by reason, and is concerned with atoms and void, the only real existences.

In Kantian terminology apperception is (1) transcendental - the perception of an object as involving the consciousness of the pure self as subject, and (2) empirical, - the cognition of the self in its concrete existence.

It is a mere prejudice of philosophic thinkers, a prejudice which has descended from Aristotle, that mediate or demonstrated cognition is superior in cogency and value to the immediate perception of truths or facts.

He holds that it is through our moral consciousness that we know that we are free; in the cognition that I ought to do what is right because it is right and not because I like it, it is implied that this purely rational volition is possible; that my action can be determined, not " mechanically," through the necessary operation of the natural stimuli of pleasurable and painful feelings, but in accordance with the laws of my true, reasonable self.

Even in the practical sphere, however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition, was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of the Wissenschaftslehre.

The psychological theory of cognition takes for granted the dualism of the mind that knows and the object known; it takes no account of the metaphysical problem as to the possibility of a relation between the ego and the non-ego, but assumes that such a relation does exist.

Neoplatonism perceived that neither sense perception nor rational cognition is a sufficient basis or justification for religious ethics; consequently it broke away from rationalistic ethics as decidedly as from utilitarian morality.

For here we have to consider how the individual intelligence comes to know any fact whatsoever, and what is meant by the cognition of a fact.

In all cognition, strictly so-called, there is involved a certain synthesis or relation of parts of a characteristic nature, and if we attempt to discuss this synthesis as though it were in itself but one of the facts forming the matter of knowledge, we are driven to regard this relation as being of the quite external kind discovered by observation among matters of knowledge.

If the relations involved in the fact of cognition are only those discoverable by observation of any particular portion of known experience, then such relations are quite external and contingent.

Hume's well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact corresponds fairly to this separation of the formal and real problems in the theory of cognition, although that distinction is in itself inadequate and not fully representative of Hume's own conclusions.

Jacobi's next important work, David Hume fiber den Glauben, oder Idealismus and Realismus (1787), was an attempt to show not only that the term Glaube had been used by the most eminent writers to denote what he had employed it for in the Letters on Spinoza, but that the nature of the cognition of facts as opposed to the construction of inferences could not be otherwise expressed.

Feeling in this higher sense (as distinguished from "organic" sensibility, Empfindung), which is the minimum of distinct antithetic consciousness, the cessation of the antithesis of subject and object, constitutes likewise the unity of our being, in which the opposite functions of cognition and volition have their fundamental and permanent background of personality and their transitional link.

While these hints towards a completely intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition were related, could not be so reduced.

The perception of relations, which, according to him, is the essence of cognition, the demonstrative character which he thinks attaches to our inference of God's existence, the intuitive knowledge of self, are doctrines incapable of being brought into harmony with the view of mind and its development which is the keynote of his general theory.

Real cognition, as Hume points out, implies transition from the present impression or feeling to something connected with it.

Hume sees distinctly that if conscious experience be taken as containing only isolated states, no progress in explanation of cognition is possible, and that the only hope of further development is to be looked for in a radical change in our mode of conceiving experience.

Only by separating the two sources of cognition, related to one another as form to content, do we get the mutually exclusive and separately incomprehensible conceptions of freedom and inevitability.

The difficulty of reconciling the two views is that which gives rise to much of the obscurity in Locke's treatment of the theory of knowledge; in Hume the effort to identify them, and to explain the synthesis which is essential to cognition as merely the accidental result of external relations among the elements of conscious experience, appears with the utmost clearness, and gives the keynote of all his philosophical work.

While denying all knowledge of the supersensuous, Mansel deviated from Kant in contending that cognition of the ego as it really is is itself a fact of experience.

He confesses result that, in confining all cognition to single perceptions and.