Lotze publicly and formally denied that he belonged to the school of Herbart, though he admitted that historically the same doctrine which might be considered the forerunner of Herbart's teachings might lead to his own views, viz.
Though he disclaims being a follower of Herbart, his formal definition of philosophy and his conception of the object of metaphysics are similar to those of Herbart, who defines philosophy as an attempt to remodel the notions given by experience.
His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz).
Herbart and H.
He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.
Smetana, while the philosophy of Herbart had a deep influence on educationists like Lindner, Durdik and Hostinsky.
Masaryk, who, as a counterpoise to German speculation and the intellectualism of Herbart, emphasized the critical study of English philosophy, notably Hume, Spencer and Mill, and the French Comte; at the same time he fully appreciated the value of Kant in epistemology.
Schulze's period of prominence in Berlin closely corresponded to that of Herbart at Konigsberg (1809-1833) and GÃ¶ttingen (1833-1841), who insisted that for boys of eight to twelve there was no better text-book than the Greek Odyssey, and this principle was brought into practice at Hanover by his distinguished pupil, Ahrens.
Lotze agreed with Leibnitz that the things which cause phenomena are immaterial elements, but added that they are not simple substances, self-acting, as Leibnitz thought, or preserving themselves against disturbance, as Herbart thought, but are interacting modifications of the one substance of God.
Herbart and Lotze, both deeply affected by the Leibnitzian hypothesis of indivisible monads, supposed that man's soul is seated at a central point in the brain; and Lotze supposed that this supposition is necessary to explain the unity of consciousness.
So far he reminds one of Herbart, who founded his " realistic " metaphysics on similar misunderstandings; except that, while Herbart concluded that the world consists of a number of simple " reals," each with a simple quality but unknown, Bradley concludes that reality is one absolute experience which harmonizes the supposed contradictions in an unknown manner.
If his starting-point recalls Herbart his method of arriving at the absolute recalls Spinoza.
Bradley, however, having satisfied himself, like Spinoza, by an abuse of the word " independent," that " the finite is self-discrepant," goes on to ask what the one Real, the absolute, is; and, as he passed from Herbart to Spinoza, so now he passes from Spinoza to Kant.
In Germany, since the victory of Kant over Wolff, realism has always been in difficulties, which we can appreciate when we reflect that the Germans by preference apply the term " realism " to the paradoxes of Herbart (1776-1841), who, in order to avoid supposed contradictions, supposed that bodies are not substances, but show (Schein), while " reals" are simple substances, each with a simple quality, and all preserving themselves against disturbance by one another, whether physically or psychologically, but not known to be either material or spiritual because we do not know the simple quality in which the nature of the real consists.
Herbart (q.v.) improved on Clarke's statement of the case.
Without realizing their debt to tradition, Herbart, Mill and recently Sigwart, have repeated Aristotle's separation of the copula from the verb of existence, as if it were a modern discovery that " is " is not the same as " exists."
The judgment, " not-being is thinkable," cited by Aristotle; the judgment, " A square circle is impossible," cited by Herbart; the judgment, " A centaur is a fiction of the poets," cited by Mill.
On the one hand, early in the igth century Herbart started the view that a categorical judgment is never a judgment of existence, but always hypothetical; on the other hand, in the latter part of the century Brentano started the view that all categorical judgments are existential.
The view of Herbart and his school is contradicted by our primary judgments of and from sense, in which we cannot help believing existence; and it gives an inadequate account even of our secondary judgments in which we no longer indeed believe existence, but do frequently believe that a nonexistent thing is (or is not) somehow determined unconditionally.
It is true, as Herbart says, that the judgment, " A square circle is an impossibility," does not contain the belief, " A square circle is existent "; but when he goes on to argue that it means, " If a square circle is thought, the conception of impossibility must be added in thought," he falls into a non-sequitur.
Herbart says that the judgment " A is B " does not contain the usually added thought that A is, because there is no statement of A's existence; as if the statement mattered to the thought.
Syllogism as formula for the exhibition of truth attained, and construction or what not as the instrumental process by which we reach the truth, have with writers since Hegel and Herbart tended to fall apart.
After Mill means after Kant and Hegel and Herbart, and it means after the emergence of evolutionary naturalism.
The formula of identity passed in another form to Herbart and therefore to Lotze.
This tendency is to be seen in the activity of Fries and Herbart and Beneke, and was actualized as the aftermath of their speculation.
It is no accident that it was the psychology of apperception and the voluntaryist theory or practice of Herbart, whose logical theory was so closely allied to that of the formal logicians proper, that contributed most spring from a common stock, though to us unknown - namely sense and understanding."
The brief logic of Herbart 4 is altogether formal too.
It is in the logic of judgment that Herbart inaugurates a new era.
In indicating specifically, too, the case of conclusion from a copulative major premise with a disjunctive minor, Herbart seems to have suggested the cue for Sigwart's exposition of Bacon's method of exclusions.
In the first place, Herbart is quite aware of the nature of abstraction.
In the second, there is no claim that thought at one and the same time imposes form on " the given " and is susceptible of treatment in isolation by logic. With Herbart the forms of common experience, and indeed all that we can regard as his categories, are products of the psychological mechanism and destitute of logical import.
For at the basis of Herbart's speculation there lies a conception of identity foreign to the thought of Kant with his stress on synthesis, in his thoroughgoing metaphysical use of which Herbart goes back not merely to Wolff but to Leibnitz.
It was in the pressing to its extreme consequences of the conception of uncompromising identity which is to be found in Leibnitz, that the contradictions took their rise which Herbart aimed at solving, by the method of relations and his doctrine of the ultimate plurality of " reals," The logic of relations between conceptual units, themselves unaltered by the relation, seems a kind of reflection of his metaphysical method.
Emerson's verdict upon a greater thinker - that his was " not a mind to nestle in " - may be true of Herbart, but there can be no doubt as to the stimulating force of this master.
Beneke's philosophy is a striking instance of this, with application to Fries and affinity to Herbart conjoined with obligations to Schelling both directly and through Schleiermacher.
He opposed both the extreme realism of Herbart and what he regarded as the one-sided idealism of Hegel, and endeavoured to find a mean between them, to discover the ideal or formal principle which unfolds itself in the real or material world presented to it.
Herbart apperception is that process by which an aggregate or "mass" of presentations becomes systematized (apperceptionssystem) by the accretion of new elements, either sense-given or product of the inner workings of the mind.
JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART (1776-1841), German philosopher and educationist, was born at Oldenburg on the 4th of May 17 76.
Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these - its three primary divisions being determined by as many distinct forms of elaboration.
Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real.
By way of concrete illustration Herbart instances "the common observation that the properties of things exist only under external conditions.
The elementary spatial relation Herbart conceives to be "the contiguity (Aneinander) of two points," so that every "pure and independent line" is discrete.
Without connexion, then, as nothing ' Hence Herbart gave the name Synechology to this branch of metaphysics, instead of the usual one, Cosmology.
But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidolology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology.
In his Psychology Herbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics, and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen).
= p (I -E 'R) So that if there are several connected with p by smaller and smaller parts, there will be a definite "serial" order in which they will be revived by p; and on this fact Herbart rests all the phenomena of the so-called faculty of memory, the development of spatial and temporal forms and much besides.
What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves concerning the future.
These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do not admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas (Musterbegriffe), viz.: (I) Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual's will to his judgment of it; (2) Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions to each other in respect of intensity, variety and concentration; (3) Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another's; (4) Right, in case of actual conflict with another; and (5) Retribution or Equity, for intended good or evil done.
In Theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable.
Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education.
There is a life of Herbart in Hartenstein's introduction to his Kleinere philosophische Schriften and Abhandlungen (1842-1843) and by F.
Allihn in Zeitschrift far exacte Philosophie (Leipzig, 1861), the organ of Herbart and his school, which ceased to appear in 1873.
Drobisch, Ober die Fortbildung der Philosophie durch Herbart (Leipzig, 1876); K.
Just, Die Fortbildung der Kant'schen Ethik durch Herbart (Eisenach, 1876); C. Ufer, Vorschule der Padagogik Herbarts (1883; Eng.
Felkin, Introduction to Herbart's Science and Practice of Education (1895); C. de Garmo, Herbart and the Herbartians (New York, 1895); E.
Hayward, The Student's Herbart (1902), The Critics of Herbartianism (1903), Three Historical Educators: Pestalozzi, Frobel, Herbart (1905), The Secret of Herbart (1907), The Meaning of Education as interpreted by Herbart (1907); W.
Herbart: sein Leben and seine Philosophie (1903); A.
Darroch, Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education (1903); C. J.