Hallucinations, incurable pain, loss of muscular control, cognitive dysfunction.
"Loss of cognitive function is a sign, yes," he replied.
The tumor is still growing, which means there is still a chance at cognitive deterioration.
It traces the necessary acts by which the cognitive consciousness comes to be what it is, both in form and in content.
It is impossible to enter here on the steps by which the theoretical ego is shown to develop into the complete system of cognitive categories, or to trace the deduction of the processes (productive imagination, intuition, sensation, understanding, judgment, reason) by which the quite indefinite non-ego comes to assume the appearance of definite objects in the forms of time and space.
As contrasted with the first it stood for the necessity of recognizing a universal or ideal element as a constitutive factor in all experience whether cognitive or volitional; as contrasted with the latter for the ultimate unity of subject and object, knowledge and reality, and therefore for the denial of the existence of any thing-in-itself for ever outside the range of experience.
While it is evident that some such conclusion must follow from the attempt to regard the cognitive consciousness as made up of disconnected feelings, it is equally clear, not only that the result is selfcontradictory, but that it involves certain assumptions not in any way deducible from the fundamental view with which Hume starts.
The writers of the Scottish school, Reid in particular, did undoubtedly indicate some of the weaknesses in Hume's fundamental conception, and their attempts to show that the isolated feeling cannot be taken as the ultimate and primary unit of cognitive experience are efforts in the right direction.
Psychologically, pragmatism starts from the efficacy and allpervasiveness of mental activity, and points out that interest, attention, selection, purpose, bias, desire, emotion, satisfaction, &c., colour and control all our cognitive processes.
A judgment which is not prompted by motives and inspired by interest, which has not for its aim the satisfaction of a cognitive purpose, is psychologically impossible, and it is, therefore, mistaken to construct a logic which abstracts from all these facts.
But cognitive "good" and moral "good" are brought into close connexion, as species of teleological "good" and contributory to "the Good."
If the new truth seems to be such that our cognitive purposes would have been better served by it than they were by the truth we had at the time, it is antedated and said to have been "true all along."