We cannot possibly have any cognition of how such an act is possible.
For the analysis of cognition-reactions see O.
The foundations of cognition must be discovered by observation or analysis of experience so conceived.
This consciousness is a source of self-cognition quite apart from and independent of reason.
(b) How then are the primary data of mathematical cognition to be derived from an experience containing space and time relations in Hume, in regard to this problem, distinctly separates geometry from algebra and arithmetic, i.e.
Both cognition and volition are functions of thought as well as forms of moral action.
It does not seem necessary to endeavour to follow his minute examination of the principle of real cognition with the same fulness.
He holds that it is through our moral consciousness that we know that we are free; in the cognition that I ought to do what is right because it is right and not because I like it, it is implied that this purely rational volition is possible; that my action can be determined, not " mechanically," through the necessary operation of the natural stimuli of pleasurable and painful feelings, but in accordance with the laws of my true, reasonable self.
Cognition, then, in the strict sense, occupies the middle place between sense perception, which is belief in matters of sense, and reason, which is belief in supersensuous fact.
The former fall into the two classes of feelings (subjective) and perceptions (objective); the latter, according as the receptive or the spontaneous element predominates, into cognition and volition.
In cognition being is the object and in volition it is the purpose of thought: in the first case we receive (in our fashion) the object of thought into ourselves; in the latter we plant it out into the world.
Though Locke, doubtless, drew no distinction between the problems of psychology and of theory of knowledge, yet the discussion of the various forms of cognition given in the fourth book of the Essay seems to be based on grounds quite distinct from and in many respects inconsistent with the fundamental psychological principle of his work.
If the relations involved in the fact of cognition are only those discoverable by observation of any particular portion of known experience, then such relations are quite external and contingent.
While these hints towards a completely intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition were related, could not be so reduced.
The ultimate basis for the activity of cognition is given by the will.
Neoplatonism perceived that neither sense perception nor rational cognition is a sufficient basis or justification for religious ethics; consequently it broke away from rationalistic ethics as decidedly as from utilitarian morality.
Cognition of the Spigelian and caudate lobes as parts of a single lobe, for which he proposes the name of lobus venae cavae.
For here we have to consider how the individual intelligence comes to know any fact whatsoever, and what is meant by the cognition of a fact.
The difficulty of reconciling the two views is that which gives rise to much of the obscurity in Locke's treatment of the theory of knowledge; in Hume the effort to identify them, and to explain the synthesis which is essential to cognition as merely the accidental result of external relations among the elements of conscious experience, appears with the utmost clearness, and gives the keynote of all his philosophical work.
For a complete treatment of this portion of the theory of knowledge, there require to be taken into consideration at least the following points: (a) the exact nature and significance of the space and time relations in our experience, (b) the mode in which the primary data, facts or principles, of mathematical cognition are obtained, (c) the nature, extent and certainty of such data, in themselves and with reference to the concrete material of experience, (d) the principle of inference from the data, however obtained.
Feeling in this higher sense (as distinguished from "organic" sensibility, Empfindung), which is the minimum of distinct antithetic consciousness, the cessation of the antithesis of subject and object, constitutes likewise the unity of our being, in which the opposite functions of cognition and volition have their fundamental and permanent background of personality and their transitional link.
We cannot know things-in-themselves: they exist for us only in our cognition of them, through the medium of sense-given data.
Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition, the theory of knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the principles which lie at the basis of;all reasoned cognition.
But if complete, this Wissenschaftslehre must be able to deduce the whole organism of cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and incapable of proof; only thus can we have a system of reason.
Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of possible cognition, only three are thinkable - one perfectly unconditioned both in form and matter; a second, unconditioned in form but not in matter; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form.
Iv., ad fin., 1905); Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition; G.
COGNITION (Latin cognitio, from cognoscere, to become acquainted with), in psychology, a term used in its most general sense for all modes of being conscious or aware of an object, whether material or intellectual.
On cognition generally, G.
Moreover, since the "real" is the object of the "true," and can be distinguished from the "unreal" only by developing superior value in the process of cognition which arrives at it, the notions of "reality" and "fact" also turn out to be disguised forms of value.
Cognition manifestly needs the help of Reason even in its theoretical use.
At the same time Democritus distinguished between obscure (UKOTG1j) cognition, resting on sensation alone, and genuine (yvrjoL), which is the result of inquiry by reason, and is concerned with atoms and void, the only real existences.
Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906).
While therefore we cannot, as we have seen, attain the idea of the supreme unity of thought and being by either cognition or volition, we can find it in our own personality, in immediate self-consciousness or (which is the same in Schleiermacher's terminology) feeling.
(a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental consideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under which cognition is possible.
Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian view - lying, indeed, at the foundation of it - was the doctrine that the matter of cognition is altogether given, or thrown into the form of cognition from without.
Even in the practical sphere, however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition, was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of the Wissenschaftslehre.
Cognition is therefore distinct from emotion and conation; it has no psychological connexion with feelings of pleasure and pain, nor does it tend as such to issue in action.
Fichtean idealism therefore at once stood out negatively, as abolishing the dogmatic conception of the two real worlds, subject and object, by whose interaction cognition and practice arise, and as amending the critical idea which retained with dangerous caution too many fragments of dogmatism; positively, as insisting on the unity of philosophical interpretation and as supplying a key to the form or method by which a completed philosophic system might be constructed.
The perception of relations, which, according to him, is the essence of cognition, the demonstrative character which he thinks attaches to our inference of God's existence, the intuitive knowledge of self, are doctrines incapable of being brought into harmony with the view of mind and its development which is the keynote of his general theory.
Now if this mode of treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked.
It is almost superfluous to remark, first, that Hume here deliberately gives up his fundamental principle that ideas are but the fainter copies of impressions, for it can never be maintained that order of disposition is an impression, and, secondly, that he fails to offer any explanation of the mode in which coexistence and succession are possible elements, of cognition in a conscious experience made up of isolated presentations and representations.
For in the problem of real cognition he is brought face to face with the characteristic feature of knowledge, distinction of self from matters known, and reference of transitory states to permanent objects or relations.
The final problem of Hume's theory of knowledge, the discussion of the real significance of the two factors of cognition, self and external things, is handled in the Treatise with great fulness and dialectical subtlety.
The results follow with the cognition utmost ease from his original postulate.
In transcendental analytic on the other hand we concern ourselves only with the transcendental " deduction " or vindication of the conditions of experience, and we have a logic of cognition in which we may establish our epistemological categories with complete validity.
The primitive fact under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis which we call cognition was this unity.
It was left for Hume to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final consequences of that view so far as cognition is concerned.
Such a fashion of disguising difficulties points, not only to an inconsistency in Hume's theory as stated by himself, but to the initial error upon which it proceeds; for these perplexities are but the consequences of the doctrine that cognition is to be explained on the basis of particular perceptions.
In the first place there are certain principles of cognition which appear to rest upon and to express relations of the universal elements in conscious experience, viz.
In the second place, cognition, in any real sense of that term, implies connexion for the individual mind between the present fact of experience and other facts, whether past or future.
If the extant authorities are to be trusted, Xenocrates recognized three grades of cognition, each appropriated to a region of its own - viz.
It is a mere prejudice of philosophic thinkers, a prejudice which has descended from Aristotle, that mediate or demonstrated cognition is superior in cogency and value to the immediate perception of truths or facts.
Only by separating the two sources of cognition, related to one another as form to content, do we get the mutually exclusive and separately incomprehensible conceptions of freedom and inevitability.
The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially by Schultze (Aenesidemus) and Maimon.
The psychological theory of cognition takes for granted the dualism of the mind that knows and the object known; it takes no account of the metaphysical problem as to the possibility of a relation between the ego and the non-ego, but assumes that such a relation does exist.
Hume wavers somewhat in his division of the various kinds of cognition, laying stress now upon one now upon another of the points in which mainly they differ from one another.
Hume's well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact corresponds fairly to this separation of the formal and real problems in the theory of cognition, although that distinction is in itself inadequate and not fully representative of Hume's own conclusions.
Real cognition, as Hume points out, implies transition from the present impression or feeling to something connected with it.
In Kantian terminology apperception is (1) transcendental - the perception of an object as involving the consciousness of the pure self as subject, and (2) empirical, - the cognition of the self in its concrete existence.
Jacobi's next important work, David Hume fiber den Glauben, oder Idealismus and Realismus (1787), was an attempt to show not only that the term Glaube had been used by the most eminent writers to denote what he had employed it for in the Letters on Spinoza, but that the nature of the cognition of facts as opposed to the construction of inferences could not be otherwise expressed.
Through faith, which is a firm and certain cognition of the divine benevolence towards us founded on the truth of the gracious promise in Christ, men are by the operation of the Spirit united to Christ and are made partakers of His death and resurrection, so that the old man is crucified with Him and they are raised to a new life, a life of righteousness and holiness.
In all cognition, strictly so-called, there is involved a certain synthesis or relation of parts of a characteristic nature, and if we attempt to discuss this synthesis as though it were in itself but one of the facts forming the matter of knowledge, we are driven to regard this relation as being of the quite external kind discovered by observation among matters of knowledge.
He confesses result that, in confining all cognition to single perceptions and.
Hume sees distinctly that if conscious experience be taken as containing only isolated states, no progress in explanation of cognition is possible, and that the only hope of further development is to be looked for in a radical change in our mode of conceiving experience.
While denying all knowledge of the supersensuous, Mansel deviated from Kant in contending that cognition of the ego as it really is is itself a fact of experience.