Cadorna sentence example

cadorna
  • On the 11th of September occupaGeneral Cadorna at the head of 60,000 men entered ilon of papal territory.
    0
    0
  • The secretary-general of the Italian foreign office, Baron Blanc, who had accompanied General Cadorna to Rome, was received almost daily by Cardinal Antonelli, papal secretary of state, in order to settle innumerable questions arising out of the Italian occupation.
    0
    0
  • An attack from the Trentino with the object of cutting the Italian communications with the Julian front, and so bottling Cadorna's main force in what Krauss calls " the Venetian sack," was an operation which could not but commend itself to the Austrian general staff.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna's general line of argument, when rumours of attack began to arrive, resembled that of Falkenhayn.
    0
    0
  • Like Falkenhayn, Cadorna thought the railway communications insufficient.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • Cadorna was sceptical of an offensive in strength, and thought that the reported movements in the Trentino signified a limited attack, to be undertaken with the object of hampering his offensive towards the east.
    0
    0
  • Army to the minimum in order to strengthen his attack on the Isonzo, and in reply to Brusati's expressions of anxiety regarding the adequacy of his forces during this period Cadorna pointed out that the requirements of the Isonzo front made it necessary to reduce the numbers of the I.
    0
    0
  • Army had advanced at various points beyond the limits laid down by Cadorna, and in these sectors the army was aligned for offensive action.
    0
    0
  • This would not have mattered if the necessary defensive works had been carried out, but the energies of the troops had been directed to preparing elaborate works in advance positions not well suited for defence, and the positions chosen by Cadorna for the main line of resistance were in many cases untouched.
    0
    0
  • In his answering despatch Cadorna repeated the instructions to fall back upon the principal line of resistance in case of an enemy attack.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • In reply Cadorna detached two more divisions, the 9th and loth, from the general reserve in Friuli, to be held in reserve at Schio and Bassano, and gave an additional group of Alpine battalions to the I.
    0
    0
  • Although Cadorna was still sceptical in regard to an offensive in force, he increased Brusati's artillery strength by 18 batteries of middle-calibre guns and gave special orders for the supply and transport of ammunition.
    0
    0
  • On April 2 1 at Cadorna's request Brusati sent a report upon the defensive system between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana, accompanied by a map showing the various lines, stating that the conditions were " re-assuring," and that the third line of defence upon which Cadorna had laid special emphasis could be considered as being in a satisfactory state of efficiency.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna was unwilling to break up the 9th Div., and ordered that it should be held in reserve at Schio, within easy reach of the Vallarsa sector, while to reinforce the Tonezza sector he dispatched an additional brigade from the general reserve.
    0
    0
  • At the end of April Cadorna went to visit the lines in person.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • The forward lines on Monte Armentera and Monte Salubio were poorly adapted for defence, but had been strongly fortified, while the line east of the Maso torrent, which Cadorna had indicated as the main line of defence, had undergone little preparation.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna ordered the positions to be modified.
    0
    0
  • This line was shown as existing upon the map sent to Cadorna on April 21 by the I.
    0
    0
  • A few days previously Cadorna had modified the system of commands in the threatened sector.
    0
    0
  • Many prisoners were taken, and the second line, which was withdrawn in accordance with the general instructions given by Cadorna, came back in some disorder.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • Cadorna transferred his staff from Udine to Thiene on May 16, and next day he found a critical situation on his left.
    0
    0
  • Although the wings were holding, the situation in the centre was very grave, and Cadorna considered that if the Austrians were able to concentrate on the weak spot and keep up the impetus of their attack they might succeed in breaking through to the plain.
    0
    0
  • On May 26 the situation was such that Cadorna thought it wise to make further preparations for a step which he had already considered and planned - a retreat from the Isonzo and Cadoro.
    0
    0
  • Although Cadorna believed that he could hold back the Austrian attack, he had no intention of omitting any precautions.
    0
    0
  • The Italian position looked unfavourable and worse was yet to come, but Cadorna's confidence was justified.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • Corps, which belonged to Prince Leopold's Army Group. By the end of the month Cadorna was holding his own, although both Dankl and von Koevess were still making progress.
    0
    0
  • Weakness in artillery was Cadorna's main preoccupation for many days.
    0
    0
  • The troops between Asiago and the Val Canaglia had very few guns, and even when sufficient artillery reenforcements were available Cadorna preferred first to strengthen his wings for the counter-attack that he was already preparing.
    0
    0
  • On June 13 Cadorna took counsel with his generals, who were nearly unanimous in expressing a grave view of the situation.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna had confidence in his own estimate of the situation, and confirmed the order for an attack by the XX.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • Cadorna relinquished the idea of a big counter-offensive as soon as he found a resistance which could only be overcome by long preparation and the use of artillery in mass.
    0
    0
  • It has already been said that in the initial phase of the battle the Italian leadership was at fault, and on this point much controversy has taken place, one party blaming Cadorna and another Brusati.
    0
    0
  • It was serious enough that the positions indicated by Cadorna in the early days of the war had not been prepared.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna relied upon Brusati's reports, and when, at the end of April, he inspected the positions himself, the enemy attack was daily expected, and it was too late to effect more than slight modifications.
    0
    0
  • In reply to the common criticism that Cadorna ought to have inspected the lines earlier, the answer is that he was fully occupied from Oct.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • After the initial disasters, which can scarcely be laid at his door, Cadorna showed the qualities of a great leader.
    0
    0
  • It has been suggested that Cadorna should have pursued his counter-offensive and left the Isonzo alone.
    0
    0
  • To those who maintain that Cadorna should have sacrificed everything in order to improve his defensive position in the Trentino sector, it may be answered that the line on which he stopped (or rather the modification of it necessitated by the retreat after Caporetto), properly prepared, backed by other lines in sufficient depth, and adequately served by new roads, was maintained until the end of the war.
    0
    0
  • In refusing to waste men in attempting more than was necessary Cadorna took the right decision, and won a notable success.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna was convinced that he had to stand on the defensive, the more so as he was uncertain in which sector of the Julian front the chief blow would fall, but his instructions naturally included and recommended vigorous local counter-attacks.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • In this idea he had the support of more than one of his corps commanders, but Cadorna thought, and it is difficult to meet his reasoning, that he could not throw in the forces necessary for such an attack when he was uncertain as to the direction of the forthcoming blow.
    0
    0
  • The enemy believed that Cadorna had been deceived by demonstrations made in the Trentino, and their belief was fortified by news that he was sending guns westward.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna was still preoccupied about the moral of his troops, and he made careful inquiries on this point, which received very satisfactory replies.
    0
    0
  • Definite orders had been given both by Cadorna and by Capello that immediately upon the opening of the enemy's bombardment the Italian artillery should reply with a fire of " counter-preparation " upon the enemy's trenches and zones of concentration, and that they should lay down a violent barrage as soon as there were signs of movement.
    0
    0
  • If he had obeyed in the letter Cadorna's order that the greater part of the forces belonging to the XXVII.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • Cadorna ordered the Carnia force to occupy Monte Maggiore and block the Val d'Uccea " at all costs," and sent up a division to support the troops on the Stol.
    0
    0
  • 25 Capello, who could fight no more against an illness to which he ought perhaps to have given in sooner, and had been told by the chief medical officer of the army that he must resign his command, proposed to Cadorna an immediate retreat to the Tagliamento.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna agreed as to the probable necessity of retreat, but he was doubtful as to whether it should be immediate.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna decided to attempt the further stand, and, as the II.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna hoped to hold, for a time at least, but at midnight on Oct.
    0
    0
    Advertisement
  • 28, the day on which his advance guard entered the town, less than 20 hours after Cadorna and his staff left for Treviso.
    0
    0
  • 31 the Duke of Aosta was able to inform Cadorna that all of his rearguard, with the exception of four brigades, who were holding a defensive bridgehead covering Madrisio, had passed the Tagliamento.
    0
    0
  • Krauss also asserts that the manoeuvre would have led to the capture of the King of Italy and of Cadorna and his staff, a statement for which, though furnished by " a neutral crowned head," there are no grounds whatever.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna did not expect to stay long on the Tagliamento, but he did hope to hold up the enemy long enough to give adequate time for the retreat of the Carnia force and the IV.
    0
    0
  • 4 Cadorna ordered the retreat to the line of the Piave, and that night the troops holding the line of the Tagliamento resumed their march westward.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna's main preoccupation was now for the IV.
    0
    0
  • It was natural, perhaps, that he should not have realized fully and at once the urgent necessities of the situation, but his hesitation to act promptly in accordance with Cadorna's instructions exposed him to the danger of having the retreat of his right wing cut off.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna had intended to put the battered units of the II.
    0
    0
  • This contingency had been studied, and preparations for a new line had begun, during the Austrian offensive in 1916, and Cadorna had ordered the work to be continued during the interval.
    0
    0
  • Diaz, who took over the command from Cadorna on the morning of Nov.
    0
    0
  • Fortunately, the plans for defence had been well and truly laid by Cadorna in the limited time that was available, and, still more fortunately, his foresight had caused elaborate preparations to be made on Monte Grappa.
    0
    0
  • These works had been ordered with the double object of strengthening the defences of the Val Brenta against an attack from the N., and of providing against the possibility of a retreat to the Piave, which Cadorna had been compelled to consider once before, in May 1916.
    0
    0
  • For in the whole course of the war no such candid announcement had ever been made by any commander on either side; it was assumed, especially abroad, that if Cadorna confessed this much there was far more that he did not tell.
    0
    0
  • But Cadorna's open condemnation of his soldiers was strongly resented in many quarters.
    0
    0
  • First among these, in order of time, was the difference of opinion between Cadorna and Capello as to the right course to pursue in face of the coming attack.
    0
    0
  • Whether Cadorna or Capello was right in idea is a question which will remain a subject of contention, though Cadorna's arguments seem almost unanswerable.
    0
    0
  • The point is that Capello would seem to have interpreted Cadorna's instructions as to counter-offensive action in too liberal a fashion, influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by his own wish to attempt a big counter-stroke.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna's efforts had not succeeded in making all of his subordinates grasp the principles of defence in depth, or of " elastic " defence.
    0
    0
  • The failure of the Italian artillery to carry out the general order of counter-preparation expressly given by Cadorna, and repeated in no less categorical terms by Capello, had an undoubted effect upon the course of the battle.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna and a few others had realized the progress made in attack methods and the necessity of meeting them with new methods of defence.
    0
    0
  • Peruzzi, Lanza and Bonghi pleaded for equal friendship with all powers, and especially with France; Crispi, Minghetti, Cadorna and others, including Blanc, secretary-general to the foreign office, openly favored a pro-Austrian policy.
    0
    0
  • Cadorna wished to arouse both army and country to a sense of the situation, and to indicate clearly the results of the peace propaganda against which he had protested.
    0
    0