During the 'seventies Austro-Hungarian policy was increasingly successful in checking intercourse between the Yugosla y s of the monarchy and those outside its bounds.
Disunion had reduced the Yugosla y s to an almost negligible quantity in Balkan politics.
The Serbian court, instead of being a centre of perpetual scandal and misrule, resumed its true position as a focus of national aspirations, and this change was not lost upon the Yugosla y s of " the other side."
The Serbian and Bulgarian anthems were sung on the streets, collections were made in every village for the Balkan Red Cross funds, and when Austria-Hungary mobilized, protests were heard on every side against the bare possibility of war with Serbia, which to the Yugosla y s would be a veritable civil war.
Among the Yugosla y s the students had always dabbled unduly in politics, and this tend-.
The entry of Italy into the war was a serious set-back to the Yugoslav cause, for under the Treaty of London (April 27 1915) she was to obtain, in the event of an Entente victory, wide districts in Gorizia, Carniola, Istria and Dalmatia, peopled by not less than 700,000 Yugosla y s.
The conquest of Serbia, however, once more closed the ranks of the Yugosla y s, who saw in unity their sole hope for the future: and the desertions to the Entente which were so marked a feature of the first winter, became so rife as to render necessary a drastic revision of the Austro-Hungarian regimental system.
The Yugosla y s greatly distinguished themselves during the Dobruja campaign (Nov.
By this time it was sufficiently obvious that the Yugosla y s were tacitly if not explicitly agreed upon a triple parallel policy, framed for all contingencies.
The Czechs and Yugosla y s, finding the door thus shut in the face of their national aspirations, even in the modified Habsburg form, naturally stiffened in their opposition.
- During 1916-7 Italian public opinion, encouraged by Sonnino and his press organs, had been definitely hostile to the Yugosla y s, whom it denounced as mere Austrian agents.
The Yugosla y s were represented by Trumbic and his Committee and by 12 deputies of the Serbian Skupstina, the Czechoslovaks by Benes and Stefanik, the Poles by Zamorski, Skirmunt and Seyda, the Rumanians by Draghicescu, Lupu and Mironescu.
The effect of the congress and of this propaganda was to hasten the disintegration in the Austro-Hungarian army, and the High Command (in a communiqué of July 27) admitted that wholesale defections of the Czechoslovaks and the Yugosla y s had.
During 1918, the initiative among the Yugosla y s of the Monarchy fell more and more into the hands of the Slovenes, led by Father Korosec since the premature death of Monsignor Krek.
Henceforth the Yugosla y s acted independently of both Vienna and Budapest: and when on Oct.
The action of the Supreme Council in Paris in prescribing the frontier line of the secret treaty of London as the line of occupation under the Austro-Hungarian armistice was keenly resented by the Yugosla y s as a breach with Wilsonian principles.
That this recognition had not already been accorded before the collapse of the Central Powers began was due to disunion among the Yugosla y s themselves.
Trumbic on his part could not enter a purely Serbian Cabinet without prejudicing that freedom of choice of his compatriots in the Dual Monarchy, upon which the moral case of the Yugosla y s depended.
Italy's claims upon Istria and Dalmatia rallied the Yugosla y s to the cause of national unity, and intense indignation was aroused by the action of the Entente in drawing an armistice line against Austria-Hungary almost identical with that prescribed by the secret treaty of London, and in sanctioning Italy's prompt occupation of the disputed territory.
Friction was increased by a whole series of incidents along the coast, by the deportation of prominent Yugosla y s to Italy and by the entry of Italian troops into Fiume, despite the protests of the Yugoslav civil and military authorities (Nov.
Meanwhile the whole Nationalist press of Italy, actively, encouraged by Sonnino and his entourage, opened a fierce campaign against the Yugosla y s and their western supporters, which rapidly developed into agitation against the Allies.
It was on these grounds that the Yugosla y s, from whom the treaty had always been carefully concealed and who had of course never recognized its validity, offered to submit the whole dispute to the arbitration of President Wilson (Feb.
On March 3, however, Italy, who had steadily refused to recognize the accomplished fact of Yugoslav unity and insisted on the Conference only admitting the Yugosla y s as a " Serbian " delegation, declined American arbitration and threatened to withdraw altogether from Paris unless their territorial demands were conceded.
This in turn strengthened the hands of the extreme section among the Yugosla y s, who now advanced the full ethnographic claim, involving Trieste and Gorizia as well as Dalmatia and Istria, and at the same time increased their demands against Bulgaria, Austria and Albania.
Tardieu suggested a compromise by which the port and district of Fiume with most of eastern Istria and a total population of over 200,000 (mainly Yugosla y s) would form a small buffer state between Italy and Yugoslavia, under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
President Wilson adhered to his own scheme, but made it clear that he would not oppose any direct agreement, whatever might be its terms: while the Yugosla y s, though accepting the idea of a buffer state, insisted upon their enjoying at Fiume a status analogous to that of Poland at Danzig, and added the impossible condition of a plebiscite after three years.
The sole justification for such a claim lay in the terms of the Treaty of London, which the Yugosla y s could not adopt as a basis without stultifying their whole position against Italy.
13 Clemenceau and Lloyd George addressed new proposals to the Yugosla y s, in the form of a scarcely veiled ultimatum.