The list of Wundt's works is long and comprehensive, including physiology, psychology, logic and ethics.
We must look for ethics to supply the corner-stone of metaphysics, and psychology is a necessary propaedeutic. The System der Philosophie (1899; 3rd ed., 1907) contained the results of Wundt's work up to that date, both in the domain of science and in the more strictly philosophic field.
The metaphysical or ontological part of psychology is in Wundt's view the actual part, and with this the science of nature and the science of mind are to be brought into relation, and thus constituted as far as possible philosophical sciences.
- Wundt's metaphysics will form an appropriate conclusion of this sketch of German idealism, because his patient industry and eclectic spirit have fitted him to assimilate many of the views of his predecessors.
Wundt's voluntarism takes a new departure, in which, however, he was anticipated by the paradox of Descartes: that will is required to give assent to anything perceived (Principia philosophiae, i.
Now, beneath these confusing phrases the point to be regarded is that, in Wundt's opinion, though we can receive sensations, we cannot think at all beyond sense, without some will.
On the whole, his voluntarism, though like that of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, is not the same; not Schopenhauer's, because the ideating will of Wundt's philosophy is not a universal irrational will; and not Hartmann's, because, although ideating will, according to Wundt's phenomenalism, is supposed to extend through the world of organisms, the whole inorganic world remains a mere object of unitary experience.
But while thus sharply distinguishing the physical and the psychical in appearance, he follows Fechner in identifying them in reality; except that Fechner's identification is noumenal, Wundt's phenomenal.
With these four positions in hand, Wundt's philosophy consecutively follows, beginning with his psychology.
Wundt's answer is that inner impulsive will, in the form of passive apperception, forms compound ideas by association; so that all these operations are necessary to the starting-point.
That sense only gives to experience coexistences and sequences of appearances, as Hume said and Kant allowed, is also Wundt's startingpoint.
It is Wundt's own statement of his solution of the epistemological problem " that on the one hand the whole outer world exists for us only in our ideas, and that on the other hand a consciousness without objects of idea is an empty abstraction which possesses no actuality " (System, 212 -213).
Thi is Wundt's view, but only in the sense that reason passes from ideas to `'ideals," whether in the special sciences or in metaphysics.
The conclusion that reason in transcending experience can show no more than the necessity of " ideals " is the only conclusion which could follow from Wundt's phenomenalism in psychology, logic, and epistemology.
Wundt's comprehensive view that logic looks backwards to psychology and forward to epistemology was hundreds of years ago one of the many discoveries of Aristotle.
We do not mean that in Wundt's supposed " inferences of relation by comparison and connexion" the premises are of no further use; but those of the first kind are of no syllogistic use in the second figure, and those of the second kind of no syllogistic use beyond particular conclusions in the third figure.
Wundt's Logic has the following forms: (I) 1st Fig.
Lastly, Wundt's view is an interesting piece of eclecticism, for he supposes that induction begins in the form of Aristotle's inductive syllogism, S-P, S-M, M-P, and becomes an inductive method in the form of Jevons's inverse deduction, or hypothetical deduction, or analysis, M-P, S-M, S-P. In detail, he supposes that, while an " inference by comparison," which he erroneously calls an affirmative syllogism in the second figure, is preliminary to induction, a second " inference by connexion," which he erroneously calls a syllogism in the third figure with an indeterminate conclusion, is the inductive syllogism itself.
Wundt's point is that the conclusion of the inductive syllogism is neither so much as all, nor so little as some, but rather the indeterminate "M and P are connected."
It is not syllogism in the form of Aristotle's or Wundt's inductive syllogism, because, though starting only from some particulars, it concludes with a universal; it is not syllogism in the form called inverse deduction by Jevons, reduction by Sigwart, inductive method by Wundt, because it often uses particular facts of causation to infer universal laws of causation; it is not syllogism in the form of Mill's syllogism from a belief in uniformity of nature, because few men have believed in uniformity, but all have induced from particulars to universals.