Lichtenstein, Lotze and Wundt (Bern, 1900).
Still, the idea of the exact measurement of sensation has been a fruitful one, and mainly through his influence on Wundt, Fechner was the father of that "new" psychology of laboratories which investigates human faculties with the aid of exact scientific apparatus.
Wundt, Outlines of Psychology (trans.
Realism, more particularly of the Wundt type, is represented by Emericus Pauer, Az ethikai determinismus (" Ethical Determinism "), and Eugen Posch (Az idorb'l, " On Time ").
See Wundt, Philos.
WILHELM MAX WUNDT (1832-), German physiologist and philosopher, was born on the 16th of August 1832 at Neckarau, in Baden.
According to Wundt, the.
In 1892 Wundt published Hypnotismus and Suggestion.
So Avenarius (q.v.) was no materialist, but only an empiricist anxious to reclaim man's natural view of the world from philosophic incrustations; yet when his Empiriokriticismus ends in nothing but environment, nervous system, and statements dependent on them, without soul, though within experience, he comes near to materialism, as Wundt has remarked.
In the doctrine - no object, no subject - no subject, no object - that is, in the utter identification of things with objects of subjects, he anticipated not only Schelling and Hegel, but also Schuppe and Wundt with their congeners.
This hypothesis of an acquired perception of a space mentally constructed by " local signs " supplied Lotze and many succeeding idealists, including Wundt, with a new argument for metaphysical idealism.
By thus supposing a psychical basis to evolution, Fechner, anticipating Wundt, substituted a psychical development of organs for Darwinian accidental variation.
Fechner saw psychology deriving advantage from the methods, as well as the results, of his experiments, and in 1879 the first psychological laboratory was erected by Wundt at Leipzig.
Nevertheless, largely under the influence of the exaggeration of the conservation of energy, many psychologists - Wundt, Paulsen, Riehl, Jodl, Ebbinghaus, Miinsterberg, and in England Lewes, Clifford, Romanes, Stout - have accepted Fechner's psychophysical parallelism, as far at least as men and animals are concerned.
He agrees with Fechner and Wundt that there is no substantial soul, and that soul is nothing but the mental states, or rather their unity--thus identifying it with Kant's synthetic unity.
Wundt proves that all idealisms are in a way one.
Wundt founds his whole philosophy on four psychological positions: his phenomenalistic theory of unitary experience, his voluntarism, his actualistic theory of soul, and his psychological theory of parallelism.
Wundt, however, having gone so far, there stops.
Wundt supposes not only that all organisms have outer will, the will to act, but also that all thinking is inner will - the will to think.
Wundt, however, having supposed that all thinking consists of ideas, next supposes that all thinking is willing.
Wundt, in consequence, thinking with Kant that apperception is a spontaneous activity, and with Fichte that this activity requires will, and indeed that all activity is will, infers that apperception is inner will.
Wundt, however, goes still farther.
To proceed, however, with voluntarism, Wundt, as we have seen, makes personality turn on will.
Wundt accepts Fichte's theory of the actuality, and Fechner's synechological view, of the soul.
Wundt, however, has satisfied himself, like Fechner, that there is no real opposition of body and soul, and concludes, in accordance with his own phenomenalism, that his body is only an object abstracted from his unitary experience, which is all that really is of him.
Wundt does not allow that we know beyond experience any souls of earth, or any other inorganic being.
Wundt is confined by his starting-point to his deduction that what we know is mental phenomena, ideas regarded as objects and subjects of experience.
Further, Wundt declares that the psychical compound of sensations, with which, according to him, we actually start, is not a complex sensation, but a compound idea; so that I am expected to believe that, when I hear the chord of D, I am not conscious of single sensations of D, F, A, and have only a compound idea of the chord - as if the hearing of music were merely a series of ideas!
Wundt, however, has a reason for substituting compound idea for sensation: he accepts Lotze's hypothesis of local signs, and adds a hypothesis of temporal signs.
Wundt, indeed, is aware of the consequences.
In his logic, and especially in his epistemology, Wundt appears as a mediator between Hume and Kant, but with more leaning to the latter.
Not, says Wundt, by association, as Hume said, but by thinking; not, however, by a priori thinking, as Kant said, but by logical thinking, by applying the logical principle of ground and consequent (which Leibnitz had called the principle of sufficient reason) as a causal law to empirical appearances.
Now, Wundt is aware that this is not always possible, for he holds that the logical principle of ground belongs generally to the connexion of thoughts, the causal law to the combination of empirical appearances.
Wundt does not realize that, though we can often use a cause or real ground (principium essendi) as a logical ground (principium cognoscendi) for deducing effects, we can do so only when we have previously inferred from experience that that kind of cause does produce that kind of effect (see LoGrc).
Wundt, however, having satisfied himself of the power of mere logical thought beyond experience, goes on to further apply his hypothesis, and supposes that, in dealing with the physical world, logical thinking having added to experience the " supplementary notion " of causality as the connexion of appearances which vary together, adds also the " supplementary notion " of substance as substratum of the connected appearances.
Secondly, when Wundt comes to the psychical, he naturally infers from his narrow Kantian definition of substance that there is no proof of a substrate over and above all mental operations, and falsely thinks that he has proved that there is no substance mentally operating in the Aristotelian sense.
As with Kant against Hume, so with Wundt against Mach and Avenarius, the world we know will contain something more than mere complexes of sensations, more than pure experience: with Wundt it will be a world of real causes and some substances, constituted partly by experience and partly by logical thinking, or active inner will.
But as with Kant, so with Wundt, this world will be only the richer, not the wider, for these notions of understanding; because they are only contributed to the original experience, and, being mentally contributed, only the more surely confine knowledge to experience of mental phenomena.
Hence, according to Wundt, the world we know is still unitary experience, distinguished, not separated, into subject and object, aggregates of ideas analysed by judgment and combined by inference, an object of idea elaborated into causes and substances by logical thinking, at most a world of our ideas composed out of our sensations, and arranged under our categories of our understanding by our inner wills, or a world of our ideating wills; but nothing else.
1907) that Wundt in his System derives the right of metaphysics to transcend experience from similar procedure within the limits of the special sciences.
Reason, as in most modern psychologies and idealisms, is introduced by Wundt, after all sorts of operations, too late; and, when at length introduced, it is described as going beyond ideas and notions to " ideals " (Ideen), as an ideall continuation of series of thoughts beyond given experience - nothing more.
Reason, according to Wundt, is like pure reason according to Kant; except that Wundt, receiving Kantism through NeoKantism, thinks that reason arrives at " ideals " not a priori, but by the logical process of ground and consequent, and, having abolished the thing in itself, will not follow Kant in his inconsequent passage from pure to practical reason in order to postulate a reality corresponding to " ideals " beyond experience.
Wundt, in fact, agrees with Lange: that reason transcends experience of phenomena only to conceive " ideals."
" Herein," says Wundt, " consists the imperishable truth of the Kantian proposition that the moral order of the world is the single real proof of the existence of God " (System, 405; cf.
If knowledge is experience of ideas distinguished by inner will of apperception into subject and object in inseparable connexion, if the starting-point is ideas, if judgment is analysis of an aggregate idea, if inference is a mediate reference of the members of an aggregate of ideas to one another, then, as Wundt says, all we can know, and all reason can logically infer from such data, is in our ideas, and consciousness without an object of idea is an abstraction; so that reason, in transcending experience, can show the necessity of ideas and " ideals," but infer no corresponding reality beyond, whether in nature, or in Man, or in God.
Wundt, starting from a psychology of unitary experience, deduces a consistent metaphysics of no inference of things transcending experience throughout - or rather until he came to the very last sentence of his System der Philosophie (1889), where he suddenly passes from a necessity of " ideals " (Ideen), to a necessity of " faith " (Glauben), without " knowledge " (Wissen).
But when we look for the evidence of any such will beyond ourselves and our experience, we find Wundt offering nothing but an ontological " ideal " of reason, and a moral " ideal " requiring a religious " ideal," but without any power of inferring a corresponding reality.
Wundt, however, afterwards wrote an Einleitung in die Philosophic (1901; 4th ed., 1906), in which he speaks of realism in the form of ideal realism as the philosophy of the future.
We can only explain it by supposing that Wundt wishes to believe that, beyond the " ideal," there really is proof of a transcendent, ideating, substance-generating will of God; and that he is approaching the noumenal voluntarism of his younger contemporary Paulsen.