Finally, Schopenhauer's voluntarism has had a profound effect on psychology inside and outside Germany, and to a less degree produced attempts to deduce from voluntaristic psychology new systems of voluntaristic metaphysics, such as those of Paulsen and Wundt.
The first to modify the pure voluntarism of Schopenhauer was E.
Though no noumenalist, in many details he is with noumenalists; with Fechner in psychophysics, in psychophysical parallelism, in the independence of the physical and the psychical chains of causality, in reducing physical and psychical to a difference of aspects, in substituting impulse for accident in organic evolution, and in wishing to recognize a gradation of individual spiritual beings; with Schopenhauer and Hartmann in voluntarism; and even with Schelling and Hegel in their endeavour, albeit on an artificial method, to bring experience under notions, and to unite subject and object in one concrete reality.
Wundt founds his whole philosophy on four psychological positions: his phenomenalistic theory of unitary experience, his voluntarism, his actualistic theory of soul, and his psychological theory of parallelism.
Wundt's voluntarism takes a new departure, in which, however, he was anticipated by the paradox of Descartes: that will is required to give assent to anything perceived (Principia philosophiae, i.
In short, his whole voluntarism means that, while the inorganic world is mere object, all organization is congealed will, and all thinking is apperceptive will.
To proceed, however, with voluntarism, Wundt, as we have seen, makes personality turn on will.
He does not accept the universal voluntarism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, but believes in individual wills, and a gradation of wills, in the organic world.
On the whole, his voluntarism, though like that of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, is not the same; not Schopenhauer's, because the ideating will of Wundt's philosophy is not a universal irrational will; and not Hartmann's, because, although ideating will, according to Wundt's phenomenalism, is supposed to extend through the world of organisms, the whole inorganic world remains a mere object of unitary experience.
He uses this psychical causality to carry out his voluntarism into detail, regarding it as an agency of will directed to ends, causing association and understanding, and further acting on a principle which he calls the heterogony of ends; remarking very truly that each particular will is directed to particular ends, but that beyond these ends effects follow as unexpected consequences, and that this heterogony produces social effects which we call custom.
We can only explain it by supposing that Wundt wishes to believe that, beyond the " ideal," there really is proof of a transcendent, ideating, substance-generating will of God; and that he is approaching the noumenal voluntarism of his younger contemporary Paulsen.
It is opposed to the various doctrines of FreeWill, known as voluntarism, libertarianism, indeterminism, and is from the ethical standpoint more or less akin to necessitarianism and fatalism.