From the Trentino he returned to Caprera to mature his designs against Rome, which had been evacuated by the French in pursuance of the Franco-Italian convention of the 15th of September 1864.
)n the 22nd Prussia, without consulting Italy, made an armisI with Austria, while Italy ob~a~ned an eight days truce on fdition of evacuating the Trentino, which had almost entirely fallen into the hands of Garibaldi and his volunteers.
Austria had persistently adopted a policy of pin-pricks and aggravating police provocation towards the Italians of the Adriatic Littoral and of the Trentino, while encouraging the Slavonic element in the former and the Germans in the latter.
The facts regarding the Yugoslav legions and the services rendered by Yugoslav deserters at Gorizia and in the Trentino were simply suppressed.
The Archivio trentino (1882) was the organ of " Italia Irredenta."
The Venetian attacks were finally repulsed in 1487, and the bishop retained his temporal powers till 1803 when they passed to Austria, to which (save 1805-1814, when first the Bavarians and then Napoleon held the region) they have ever since belonged, the Trentino being annexed formally to Tirol in 1814.
He continued the policy of improving relations with Austria, which did not contribute to his popularity; after the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina his imprudently worded speech at Carate created the illusion that Italy was to be compensated, perhaps by the cession of the Trentino, and the disappointment when nothing of the kind materialized greatly weakened his prestige.
He joined Garibaldi in 1866 as a volunteer and fought under him in the Trentino, in 1867 at Mentana and in 1870 in France.
But, as is well known, in 1859 they lost to the house of Savoy both the Milanese and the Bergamasca, and in 1866 Venetia proper also, so that the Trentino is now their chief possession on the southern slope of the Alps.
The evidences of this travel (which are really incontestable, though a small minority of critics still decline to admit them) consist of (1) some fine drawings, three of them dated 1494 and others undated, but plainly of the same time, in which Diirer has copied, or rather boldly translated into his own Gothic and German style, two famous engravings by Mantegna, a number of the "Tarocchi" prints of single figures which pass erroneously under that master's name, and one by yet another minor master of the North-Italian school; with another drawing dated 1495 and plainly copied from a lost original by Antonio Pollaiuolo, and yet another of an infant Christ copied in 1495 from Lorenzo di Credi, from whom also Diirer took a motive for the composition of one of his earliest Madonnas; (2) several landscape drawings done in the passes of Tirol and the Trentino, which technically will not fit in with any other period of his work, and furnish a clear record of his having crossed the Alps about this date; (3) two or three drawings of the costumes of Venetian courtesans, which he could not have made anywhere but in Venice itself, and one of which is used in his great woodcut Apocalypse series of 1498 (4) a general preoccupation which he shows for some years from this date with the problems of the female nude, treated in a manner for which Italy only could have set him the example; and (5) the clear implication contained in a letter written from Venice in 1506 that he had been there already eleven years before; when things, he says, pleased him much which at the time of writing please him no more.
An attack from the Trentino with the object of cutting the Italian communications with the Julian front, and so bottling Cadorna's main force in what Krauss calls " the Venetian sack," was an operation which could not but commend itself to the Austrian general staff.
Conrad believed that the effect of the attack would be decisive, and Krauss, then chief of the staff to the Archduke Eugene, agreed, but was of opinion that a double attack should be made, on both the Julian and Trentino fronts.
Troops required for the Trentino attack alone at 25 divisions; he doubted the possibility of collecting such a force, and he questioned whether, if it were available, supply could be assured by the limited railway communications leading to the scene of action.
Krauss was convinced that an offensive against Italy from the Trentino was practicable, and, if accompanied by a simultaneous attack on the Isonzo front, would lead to great results.
He believed that the Trentino operation could be conducted in Jan.
It is difficult for anyone who knows the Trentino in winter to admit his contention that this hard snow would resist the passage of troops in mass, not to speak of guns, even if one were to accept his idea of basing the operation on drives through the valleys, on the west of Lake Garda as well as on the east.
Cadorna was sceptical of an offensive in strength, and thought that the reported movements in the Trentino signified a limited attack, to be undertaken with the object of hampering his offensive towards the east.
Army, and that in the event of a threat developing from the Trentino there would be sufficient warning to allow the reenforcement of the front in good time.
Brusati had carried out successfully the initial part of his work, the reduction in length of the Trentino front.
On April 2 Brusati sent a further report upon the concentration of enemy troops in the Trentino, and stated that he had taken the steps which he considered to be most opportune in relation to the means at his disposal.
There will always be adherents of the fallacy that Italy should have attacked through the Trentino, though they are in the main confined to those who do not know the country, or those who have no experience of modern war.
To those who maintain that Cadorna should have sacrificed everything in order to improve his defensive position in the Trentino sector, it may be answered that the line on which he stopped (or rather the modification of it necessitated by the retreat after Caporetto), properly prepared, backed by other lines in sufficient depth, and adequately served by new roads, was maintained until the end of the war.
The enemy believed that Cadorna had been deceived by demonstrations made in the Trentino, and their belief was fortified by news that he was sending guns westward.
But these were the French and British heavy guns (nearly 200 in number), which had been withdrawn when he stated that he could not renew his offensive, and a number of batteries now restored to the Trentino front, which had been stripped for the earlier fighting.