Sigwart, in the preface to the first edition of his Logic, makes "special mention" of the assistance he obtained from this book.
CHRISTOPH WILHELM VON SIGWART (1789-1844), German philosopher, was born at Remmingsheim in Wurttemberg, and died in Stuttgart.
His SOn, Christoph Von Sigwart (1830-1894), after a course of philosophy and theology, became professor at Blaubeuren (1859), and eventually at Tubingen, in 1865.
In the preface to the first edition, Sigwart explains that he makes no attempt to appreciate the logical theories of his predecessors; his intention was to construct a theory of logic, complete in itself.
Sigwart, in Kleine Schriften, 1st series, pp. 4912 4, 2 93-3 0 4; A.
Sigwart in his Logic has also opposed the parallelistic view itself; and James has criticized it from the point of view that the soul selects out of the possibilities of the brain means to its own ends.
On this false abstraction Sigwart has made an excellent criticism in an appendix at the end of his Logic, where he remarks that we cannot isolate events from the substances of which they are attributes.
Secondly, it does not content itself with the mere formulae of thinking, but pushes forward to theories of method, knowledge and science; and it is a hopeful sign to find this epistemological spirit, to which England was accustomed by Mill, animating German logicians such as Lotze, Daring, Schuppe, Sigwart and Wundt.
Writing his preface to his second edition in 1888, Sigwart says: " Important works have appeared by Lotze, Schuppe, Wundt and Bradley, to name only the most eminent; and all start from the conception which has guided this attempt.
Without realizing their debt to tradition, Herbart, Mill and recently Sigwart, have repeated Aristotle's separation of the copula from the verb of existence, as if it were a modern discovery that " is " is not the same as " exists."
Nevertheless these obvious applications of Aristotelian traditions have been recently challenged, especially by Sigwart, who holds in his Logic (secs.
Sigwart, indeed, is deceived both about particulars and universals.
Hence Sigwart is right in saying that " All bodies are extended " means " Whatever is a body is extended," but wrong in identifying this form with " If anything is a body it is extended."
This makes them omit sensory judgments, and count only those which require ideas, and even general ideas expressed in general terms. Sigwart, for example, gives as instances of our most elementary judgments, " This is Socrates," " This is snow "- beliefs in things existing beyond ourselves which require considerable inferences from many previous judgments of sense and memory.
So Sigwart, in order to reduce universals to hypotheticals, while admitting that existence is usually thought, argues that it is not stated in the universal judgment; so also Bosanquet.
On the other hand, if on the plan of Sigwart categorical universals were reducible to hypotheticals, the same inference would be a pure hypothetical syllogism, thus: If anything is a man it is mortal.
Sigwart does not indeed shrink from this and greater absurdities; he reduces the first figure to the modus ponens and the second to the modus tollens of the hypothetical syllogism, and then, finding no place for the third figure, denies that it can infer necessity; whereas it really infers the necessary consequence of particular conclusions.
Sigwart, indeed, has missed the essential difference between the categorical and the hypothetical construction of syllogisms. In a categorical syllogism of the first figure, the major premise, " Every M whatever is P," is a universal, which we believe on account of previous evidence without any condition about the thing signified by the subject M, which we simply believe sometimes to be existent (e.g.
Hence Sigwart is undoubtedly right in distinguishing analysis from hypothetical deduction, for which he proposes the name " reduction.
Sigwart declares himself in agreement with Jevons; except that, being aware of the difference between hypothetical deduction and mathematical analysis, and seeing that, whereas analysis (e.g.
The views of Jevons and Sigwart are in agreement in two main points.
According to both, again, the hypothesis of a law with which the process starts contains more than is present in the particular data: according to Jevons, it is the hypothesis of a law of a cause from which induction deduces particular effects; and according to Sigwart, it is a hypothesis of the ground from which the particular data necessarily follow according to universal laws.
He agrees with Jevons in calling this second syllogism analytical deduction, and with Jevons and Sigwart in calling it hypothetical deduction.
It is, in fact, a common point of Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt that the universal is not really a conclusion inferred from given particulars, but a hypothetical major premise from which given particulars are inferred, and that this major contains presuppositions of causation not contained in the particulars.
The result is that both Sigwart and Wundt transform the inductive process of adducing particular examples to induce a universal law into a deductive process of presupposing a universal law as a ground to deduce particular consequences.
Hence it is that Jevons, followed by Sigwart and Wundt, reduces it to deduction from a hypothesis in the form "Let every M be P, S is M,.
As we have seen, Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt all think that induction contains a belief in causation, in a cause, or ground, which is not present in the particular facts of experience, but is contributed by a hypothesis added as a major premise to the particulars in order to explain them by the cause or ground.
How then can this universal be called, as Sigwart, for example, calls it, the ground from which these particulars follow?
Sigwart simply inverts the order of our knowledge.
It is not syllogism in the form of Aristotle's or Wundt's inductive syllogism, because, though starting only from some particulars, it concludes with a universal; it is not syllogism in the form called inverse deduction by Jevons, reduction by Sigwart, inductive method by Wundt, because it often uses particular facts of causation to infer universal laws of causation; it is not syllogism in the form of Mill's syllogism from a belief in uniformity of nature, because few men have believed in uniformity, but all have induced from particulars to universals.
Sigwart, indeed, adopting Kant's argument, concludes that we must be satisfied with consistency among the thoughts which presuppose an existent; this, too, is the reason why he thinks that induction is reduction, on the theory that we can show the necessary consequence of the given particular, but that truth of fact is unattainable.
Shute, A Discourse on Truth (London, 1877); Alfred Sidgwick, Fallacies (London, 1883); The Use of Words in Reasoning (London, 1901); C. Sigwart, Logik (2nd ed., Freiburg-i.-Br.
Sigwart, Logik, Eng.
It is deservedly, nevertheless, that Mill's applied logic has retained its pride of place amid what has been handed on, if in modified shape, by writers, e.g., Sigwart, and Professor Bosanquet, whose theory of knowledge is quite alien from his.
Sigwart (q.v.) may be named as representative.
The comparison of Sigwart with Lotze is instructive, in regard both to their agreement and their divergence as showing the range of the epistemological formula.
In a very offensive and quite unjustifiable tone, which is severely commented on by Sigwart and Fischer, he attacks the Baconian methods and its results.
Another German version with introduction and notes has been published by Sigwart based on a comparison of the two Dutch MSS.
Accordingly, full weight must be allowed to the internal evidence brought forward by Sigwart, Avernarius and others to prove Spinoza's acquaintance with Bruno's writings.
Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, i.