In the doctrine - no object, no subject - no subject, no object - that is, in the utter identification of things with objects of subjects, he anticipated not only Schelling and Hegel, but also Schuppe and Wundt with their congeners.
Schuppe, who, in his Erkenntnistheoretische Logik (1878), and in his shorter Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie and Logik (1894), gives the view a wider scope by the contention that the real world is the common content or object of common consciousness, which, according to him, as according to Fichte, is one and the same in all individual men.
Different individual consciousnesses plainly differ in having each its own content, in which Schuppe includes each individual's body as well as the rest of the things which come within the consciousness of each; but they also as plainly agree, e.g.
Now, the point of Schuppe is that, so far as they agree, individual consciousnesses are not merely similar, but the same in essence; and this supposed one and the same essence of consciousness in different individuals is what he calls consciousness in general (Bewusstsein iiberhaupt).
Schuppe, indeed, wrote an article in the Vierteljahrsschrift of Avenarius to prove their essential agreement.
He does not, however, think with Schuppe that there is one common consciousness, but only that there is a collective consciousness and a collective will; not perceiving that then the sun - in his view a mere object in the experience of every member of the collection - would be only a collective sun.
It follows that every psychical compound into which temporal and spatial ideas enter must itself be an idea; and, as time at any rate accompanies all our sensations, it follows that every psychical compound of sensations, containing as it does, always temporal, if not also spatial, ideas, must be a compound idea, and not, as nativists suppose, Schuppe for instance, a compound sensation.
The phenomenalisms of Schuppe, Avenarius and Wundt, and to the hypothesis of one consciousness, which appears variously in the German idealisms, not of Kant, as Ward thinks, but of Fichte, Hegel and Schuppe; and somehow he manages to end with the noumenalistic conclusion that Nature is God's Spirit.
But, in opposition to Wundt and in common with Schuppe, he believes that experience is (1) experience of the individual, and (2) experience of the race, which is but an extension of individual experience, and is variously called, in the course of the discussion, universal, collective, conceptual, rational experience, consciousness in general, absolute consciousness, intelligence, and even, after Caird, " a perfect intelligence."
He applies universal experience, as Schuppe does, to explain the unity of the object, and its independence of individual but not of universal experience, holding that the one sun, and the whole world of intersubjective intercourse, or the " trans-subjective " world, though " independent of the individual percipient as such," is " not independent of the universal experience, but the object of that experience " (ii.
He applies universal experience to explain how we come, falsely in his opinion, to believe that the object of experience is an independent thing; and he uses three arguments, which are respectively those of Schuppe, Avenarius and Wundt.
There can be no doubt that Mach, Schuppe and Wundt drew the right phenomenalistic conclusions from such phenomenalistic data.
Secondly, it does not content itself with the mere formulae of thinking, but pushes forward to theories of method, knowledge and science; and it is a hopeful sign to find this epistemological spirit, to which England was accustomed by Mill, animating German logicians such as Lotze, Daring, Schuppe, Sigwart and Wundt.
Writing his preface to his second edition in 1888, Sigwart says: " Important works have appeared by Lotze, Schuppe, Wundt and Bradley, to name only the most eminent; and all start from the conception which has guided this attempt.
It requires nothing beyond the sensation and belief in the given existence of the given pressure: not all judgment then requires categories of understanding, or notions of identity, difference and causality, or even of existence, such as Schuppe supposes.
Schuppe, however, who is a fertile creator of quasi-syllogisms, has managed to invent some examples from two negative premises of a different kind: (I) (2) (3) No MisP. NoMisP. NoPisM.
Equally fallacious are two other attempts of Schuppe to produce syllogisms from invalid moods: (1) 1st Fig.
Schuppe, Erkeuntnistheoretische Logik (Bonn, 1878); Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie and Logik (Berlin, 1894); R.