He thus threw in his lot with the Scottish philosophy, and his first dissertations are, in their leading position, adaptations from Reid's Inquiry.
This is Reid's first reply to Hume.
These, with an account of Aristotle's Logic appended to Lord Kames's Sketches of the History of Man (1774), conclude the list of works published in Reid's lifetime.
Hamilton's edition of Reid also contains an account of the university of Glasgow and a selection of Reid's letters, chiefly addressed to his Aberdeen friends the Skenes, to Lord Kames, and to Dr James Gregory.
The key to Reid's philosophy is to be found in his revulsion from the sceptical conclusions of Hume.
In view of the results of this analysis, Reid's theory (and the theory of Scottish philosophy generally) has been dubbed natural realism or natural dualism, in contrast to theories like subjective idealism and materialism or to the cosmothetic idealism or hypothetical dualism of the majority of philosophers.
The real significance of Reid's doctrine lies in its attack upon Hume's fundamental principles, (1) that all our perceptions are distinct existences, and (2) that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences (cf.
But Reid's actions are better than his words; his real mode of procedure is to redargue Hume's conclusions by a refutation of the premises inherited by him from his predecessors.
And in regard to Reid's favourite proof of the principles in question by reference to "the consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned," it is only fair to observe that this argument assumes a much more scientific form in the Essays, where it is almost identified with an appeal to "the structure and grammar of all languages."
Similarly, Reid's assertion of the essential distinction between space or extension and feeling or any succession of feelings may be compared with Kant's doctrine in the Aesthetic. " Space," he says, "whether tangible or visible, is not so properly an object [Kant's" matter "1 as a necessary concomitant of the objects both of sight and touch."
And, if Kant was overridden by a love of symmetry, Reid's indifference to form and system is an even more dangerous defect.
Nevertheless, Reid's insistence on judgment as the unit of knowledge and his sharp distinction between sensation and perception must still be recognized as of the highest importance.
For Reid's ethical theory, see Ethics.
For Reid's life see D.
Stewart's Memoir prefixed to Hamilton's edition of Reid's works.
Hamilton Reid's compilation, is by J.
He vacillated a great deal about our mode of perceiving the external world; but his final view (edition of Reid's works, note D*) consisted in supposing that (1) sensation is an apprehension of secondary qualities purely as affections of the organism viewed as ego; (2) perception in general is an apprehension of primary qualities as relations of sensations in the organism viewed as non-ego; while (3) a special perception of a so-called " secundo-primary " quality consists in " the consciousness of a resisting something external to our organism."
From this time forward Reid's success was continuous and marked.
While he owed to Reid all his theory of morality, he repaid the debt by giving to Reid's views the advantage of his admirable style and academic eloquence.
He upheld Reid's psychological method and expounded the "common-sense" doctrine, which was attacked by the two Mills.
Reid's Academica (London, 1885) and Landgraf's Pro Sext.
- An excellent account of Cicero as a philosopher is given in the preface to Reid's edition of the Academica.