Plurality of Reals is not possible."
But, in thus adapting to his own purposes the Leibnitzian analysis of material into immaterial, he drew his own conclusions according to his own metaphysics, which required that the supposed centres of force are not Leibnitzian " monads," nor Herbartian " reals," nor divine modifications such as Lotze afterwards supposed, but are elements of a system which in outer aspect is bodily and in inner aspect is spiritual, and obeying laws of spirit.
So far he reminds one of Herbart, who founded his " realistic " metaphysics on similar misunderstandings; except that, while Herbart concluded that the world consists of a number of simple " reals," each with a simple quality but unknown, Bradley concludes that reality is one absolute experience which harmonizes the supposed contradictions in an unknown manner.
In the text he explains that, if there were a plurality of reals, they would have to be beings independent of each other, and yet, as a plurality related to each other - and this again seems to him to be a contradiction.
In Germany, since the victory of Kant over Wolff, realism has always been in difficulties, which we can appreciate when we reflect that the Germans by preference apply the term " realism " to the paradoxes of Herbart (1776-1841), who, in order to avoid supposed contradictions, supposed that bodies are not substances, but show (Schein), while " reals" are simple substances, each with a simple quality, and all preserving themselves against disturbance by one another, whether physically or psychologically, but not known to be either material or spiritual because we do not know the simple quality in which the nature of the real consists.
And lastly, Herbart's logic conforms to the exigencies of his system as a whole and the principle of the bare or absolute self-identity of the ultimate " reals " in particular.
It is no mere coincidence that his treatment of all forms of continuance and even his positive metaphysic of " reals " show affinity to Leibnitz.
It was in the pressing to its extreme consequences of the conception of uncompromising identity which is to be found in Leibnitz, that the contradictions took their rise which Herbart aimed at solving, by the method of relations and his doctrine of the ultimate plurality of " reals," The logic of relations between conceptual units, themselves unaltered by the relation, seems a kind of reflection of his metaphysical method.
The result then is briefly thus: In place of the one absolute position, which in some unthinkable way the common understanding substitutes for the absolute positions of the n attributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same (as it were, central) real (hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes), but each being continued by different reals (hence the plurality and difference of attributes in unity of substance).
Where there is the appearance of inherence, therefore, there is always a plurality of reals; no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident can be admitted at all.
Since c depended on a series of reals A3+A3+A3 ...
But to think a number of reals "in connexion" (Zusammensein) will not suffice as an explanation of phenomena; something or other must happen when they are in connexion; what is it?
What "actually happens" as distinct from all that seems to happen, when two reals A and B are together is that, assuming them to differ in quality, they tend to disturb each other to the extent of that difference, at the same time that each preserves itself intact by resisting, as it were, the other's disturbance.
And so by coming into connexion with different reals the "self-preservations" of A will vary accordingly, A remaining the same through all; just as, by way of illustration, hydrogen remains the same in water and in ammonia, or as the same line may be now a normal and now a tangent.
But to indicate this opposition in the qualities of the reals A+B, we must substitute for these symbols others, which, though only "contingent aspects" of A and B, i.e.
This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connexion and the opposite.
By its help we are enabled to comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of matter.
When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will (in general) be imperfect, i.e.
Of less intensity than when only two reals are together.
But "objective semblance" corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states.
Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals been simply contiguous, i.e.
For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connexions.
The changes in this motion, however, for which we should require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-preservations that actually occur when reals meet.
But to explain this modification is the business of psychology; it is enough now to see that the subject like all reals is necessarily unknown, and that, therefore, the idealist's theory of knowledge is unsound.
But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know what actually happens when it is in connexion with other's reals, for its self-preservations then are what we call sensations.
And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely.