Among psychologists Helmholtz, Mach, Brentano, Hering, Delboeuf, were all more or less against him.
The world was turning at Mach speed and Dean felt himself racing along with the uninformed, totally out of control.
There can be no doubt that Mach, Schuppe and Wundt drew the right phenomenalistic conclusions from such phenomenalistic data.
Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung historischkritisch dargestellt (1883; 2nd edition (1889 translation) by T.
Outside the English-writing world, identical or kindred tendencies are represented in France by Leroy, Poincare, Bergson, Milhaud, Blondel, Duhem, Wilbois, Pradines; in Germany by Mach, Ostwald, Simmel, Jerusalem, Goldscheid, Jacoby; in Italy by Papini, Prezzolini, Vailati, Troiano.
Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung (4th ed., Leipzig, 1901; Eng.
Mach has made some interesting observations on this point.
The following figures obtained by Mach afford an interesting illustration of these processes At first the sugar in the juice consists entirely of dextrose, but later fructose (laevulose) is formed.
Mach.) alcoholic fermentation, ethylic alcohol, water and carbonic acid.
ERNST MACH (1838-), Austrian physicist and psychologist, was born on the 18th of February 1838 at Turas in Moravia, and studied at Vienna.
Like Mach, he started from the principle of economy of thinking, and in the Kritik endeavoured to explain pure experience in relation to knowledge and environment.
Thus Mach found an amplitude 0 2 cm.
Mach (Optisch-akustischen Versuche, 1873).
Mach found an excursion of 0 .
The city was divided into two parts by a canal, on an island in which stood the temple, E-mach, with a ziggurat, or stage tower.
Mach and J.
Ernst Mach is a conspicuous instance of a confusion of physics and psychology ending in a scepticism like that of Hume.
It retains some relics of Fechner's influence; first, the theory of identity, according to which the difference between the physical and psychical is not a dualism, but everything is at once both; and secondly, the substitution of mathematical dependence for physical causality, except that, whereas Fechner only denied causality between physical and psychical, Mach rejects the entire distinction between causality and dependence, on the ground that " the law of causality simply asserts that the phenomena of Nature are dependent on one another."
If we ask how Mach arrived at this scepticism, which is contained in his well-known scientific work Die ill echanik in ihrer Entwickelung (1883; ed.
It is important to understand that Mach had developed this economical view of thought in 1872, more than ten years before the appearance of his work on the history of mechanics as he tells us in the preface, where he adds that at a later date similar views were expressed by Kirchhoff in his V orlesungen fiber mathematische Physik (1874).
" When I say," says Mach, " that a body A exerts a force on a body B, I mean that B, on coming into contraposition with A, is immediately affected by a certain acceleration with respect to A."
In a word, Mach and Kirchhoff agree that force is not a cause, convert Newtonian reciprocal action into mere interdependency, and, in old terminology, reduce mechanics from a natural philosophy of causes to a natural history of mere facts.
Now, Mach applies these preconceived opinions to " mechanics in its development," with the result that, though he shows much skill in mathematical mechanics, he misrepresents its development precisely at the critical point of the discovery of Newton's third law of motion.
Withdraw this foundation of bodies as inter-resisting forces causing one another in collision to form a joint mass with a common velocity but without penetration, and the evidence of the third law disappears; for in the case of attractive forces we know nothing of their modus operandi except by the analogy of the collision of inter-resisting bodies, which makes us believe that something similar, we know not what, takes place in gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. Now, Mach, though he occasionally drops hints that the discovery of the law of collision comes first, yet never explains the process of development from it to the third law of motion.
But the idealists are only too glad to get any excuse for denying bodily substances and causes; and, while Leibnitz supplied them with the fancied analysis of material into immaterial elements, and Hume with the reduction of bodies to assemblages of sensations, Mach adds the additional argument that bodily forces are not causes at all.
Nor is there any objection to this economical view of thought, as long as we remember what Avenarius and Mach forget, that the essence of thought is the least action neither more nor less than necessary to the point, which is the reality of things.
Again he agrees with the reaction both to Hume and to Kant in limiting knowledge to mental phenomena, and has affinities with Mach as well as with Lange.
As with Kant against Hume, so with Wundt against Mach and Avenarius, the world we know will contain something more than mere complexes of sensations, more than pure experience: with Wundt it will be a world of real causes and some substances, constituted partly by experience and partly by logical thinking, or active inner will.
Mach had begun to put them forward in 1872, and Kirchhoff in 1874.
These are the views of Mach and of Pearson, as we read them in the latter's Preface.
James Ward, in Naturalism and Agnosticism (1899), starts from the same phenomenalistic views of Mach and Kirchhoff about mechanics; he proceeds to the hypothesis of duality within experience, which we have traced in James Ward.