On the outbreak of the South African War in 1899 Grant was at first disposed to be hostile to the policy of Lord Salisbury and Mr Chamberlain; but his eyes were soon opened to the real nature of President Kruger's government, and he enthusiastically welcomed and supported the national feeling which sent men from the outlying portions of the Empire to assist in upholding British supremacy in South Africa.
A temporary peace was no sooner secured than Commandant Jan Viljoen rose in revolt and engaged Kruger's forces.
Kruger's force called itself the Staatsleger or Army of the State.
On the occasion of Kruger's second mission to endeavour to get the annexation revoked Sir T.
Kruger's design at this time was to bring the whole of the external trade of the state, which was growing yearly as the gold industry developed, through Delagoa Bay and over the Netherlands railway.
In the period which intervened between the Jameson raid and the outbreak of the war in October 1899 President Kruger's administration continued to be what it had been; that is to say, it was not merely bad, but it got progressively worse.
These recommendations made by President Kruger's own nominees were practically ignored.
In 1890 he became state secretary and in that position was regarded as Kruger's right-hand man.
The persistent attempt of the South African Republic to assert its full independence, culminating in a formal denial of British suzerainty, made it additionally incumbent on Great Britain to carry its point as to the Uitlander grievances, while, from Mr Kruger's point of view, the admission of the Uitlanders to real political rights meant the doom of his oligarchical regime, and appeared in the light of a direct menace to Boer supremacy.
Kruger's Early Chr.
In President Kruger's eyes British trade meant ruin; he desired to keep it out of the Republic at all costs, and he begged the Free State to delay the construction of their railway until the Delagoa Bay line was completed.
Again, after Mr Kruger's ultimatum in October 1899, Lord Rosebery spoke upon the necessity of the nation closing its ranks and supporting the government in the prosecution of war in South Africa.
At the same time there were incidents in Kruger's life which but ill conform to any Biblical standard he might choose to adopt or feel imposed upon him.
From this time forward Kruger's life is so intimately bound up with the history of his country, and even in later years of South Africa, that a study of that history is essential to an understanding of it (see Transvaal and South Africa).
In spite of these facts Kruger's position was insecure.
From 1877 onward Kruger's external policy was consistently anti-British, and on every side - in Bechuanaland, in Rhodesia, in Zululand - he attempted to enlarge the frontiers of the Transvaal at the expense of Great Britain.
This retort was President Kruger's rallying cry whenever he found himself in the least degree pressed, either from within or without the state.
It is recorded that when a statue to President Kruger at Pretoria was erected, it was by Mrs. Kruger's wish that the hat was left open at the top, in order that the rain-water might collect there for the birds to drink.
If Watermeyer's formula, " In all things political, purely despotic; in all things commercial, purely monopolist," was true of the government of the Dutch East India Company in the 18th century, it was equally true of Kruger's government in the latter part of the 19th.
Brand refused to be ensnared in Kruger's policy, and the negotiations led to no agreement.
Hofmeyr was among those whom Kruger's attitude drove into a loose alliance with Rhodes.
Great Britain watched the development of Kruger's plans with misgiving, but except on points of detail it was felt for some time to be impossible to bring pressure upon the Transvaal.