Krauss in Jewish Encyc. s.v.
Krauss, "Zur Geschichte der Chazaren," in Revue orientale pour les etudes Ourals-altaiques (1900).
Krauss, Sagen and M¢rchen der Si dslaven, ii.
An attack from the Trentino with the object of cutting the Italian communications with the Julian front, and so bottling Cadorna's main force in what Krauss calls " the Venetian sack," was an operation which could not but commend itself to the Austrian general staff.
Conrad believed that the effect of the attack would be decisive, and Krauss, then chief of the staff to the Archduke Eugene, agreed, but was of opinion that a double attack should be made, on both the Julian and Trentino fronts.
Krauss was convinced that an offensive against Italy from the Trentino was practicable, and, if accompanied by a simultaneous attack on the Isonzo front, would lead to great results.
Conrad does not seem to have considered the idea of attacking till later on in the season, and the plan which he put before German headquarters was radically different in idea from that which Krauss favoured.
When he failed to convince Falkenhayn that the effort should be a joint one, he determined to attack independently, and, according to Krauss, he endeavoured to conceal his preparations from the Germans.
Krauss, as chief-of-staff of the Archduke Eugene, was opposed to the disposition of the two armies and to the limitation of the attack to the hill country.
Krauss blames the Austrian XX.
The line chosen by Krauss ran from south of Rovereto in front of Col Santo to the Borcola Pass; thence along the rim of the Arsiero plateau, north of the Posina and east of the Upper Astico; thence north-eastward across the Val d'Assa to Monte Mosciagh, and thence northward to the old frontier.
Farther south, repeated attempts were made to retake Monte Cimone, which the Archduke Charles had wished to abandon, but which Krauss insisted should be held.
The northern group of four divisions (three Austrian and one German Jager) was commanded by Krauss, who had been called back from the Bukovina.
Krauss records the satisfaction he felt when he observed that the additional troops given to the IV.
Krauss was still held up at Saga and on Polounik, and the Bosnians had gained no more ground.
Two Alpine groups were already on the way to this critical point, having been dispatched the day before, but it was clear that Krauss would try to push through by this route, the shortest way to the Tagliamento.
Krauss was pressing upon the Stol, and finding a weak resistance; the Potenza brigade was falling back from Creda; Monte Matajur had fallen, practically undefended.
Krauss complains that only he and Krafft von Delmensingen, Below's chief-of-staff, had been inspired by adequate ambitions for the attack.
Krauss expressed the opinion that the real objective should have been Lyons.
Krauss himself admits that if the Italians had held the Stol in strength his own move would have been frustrated.
Krauss, Stein, Berrer and Scotti were very quick in their pursuit, and Berrer paid for his haste with his life.
Krauss tells a remarkable story according to which both Below, with Scotti's group, and later, Goiginger, with the right wing of Henriquez's army, wished on reaching the Tagliamento to swing S., and cut off the Duke of Aosta's army, which, Krauss maintains, was still some distance to the east.
According to Krauss, Boroevic refused to allow Scotti to encroach upon his line of march, and forbade Gen.
Krauss also asserts that the manoeuvre would have led to the capture of the King of Italy and of Cadorna and his staff, a statement for which, though furnished by " a neutral crowned head," there are no grounds whatever.
Of Tarcento, for which Krauss and Stein were making with all speed.
The following morning Di Giorgio was strongly attacked at Pinzano and Krauss established a sufficient bridgehead.
For Stein was sending troops across to reinforce Krauss, and incidentally, according to Krauss, to claim the credit which was due to the Bosnians alone.
This move cut off the greater part of Tassoni's Carnia force, caught between Krauss and Krobatin.
Conrad and Boroevic were making no headway, but a more dangerous attack was being conducted by Krauss, between the Brenta and the Piave.
Krauss, who now had Krobatin's troops under his orders, and subsequently drew reinforcements from Stein's group, wished to organize a double drive through the Brenta and Piave gorges, and reach the plain by the tactics he had successfully employed in the Plezzo basin.
Krauss blames his divisional commanders, who, he says, were opposed to these tactics, and could not make up their minds to a resolute attempt.
When he failed in his first attempt to go through in the valleys, Krauss resigned himself to a frontal attack upon the mountain lines between the Brenta and the Piave.
Who had broken through at Plezzo, and the 94 th, from Krobatin's army, gained a little ground on the right, the Alpine troops of the 22nd capturing the summit of Monte Pertica, but the German Alpenkorps and the Austrian 50th, which had passed to Krauss from Stein's group, to replace the battered Bosnian and Jager divisions, made no headway against the salient of Solarolo and Spinoncia, or against the TombaMonfenera line.
Conrad and Krauss continued their attempts to break through on the mountain front, but Krauss confined his efforts to the positions west of Monte Grappa and the worrying Solarolo salient.
Boroevic remained quiet on the Piave front, and the rest of Below's army was now practically a reservoir for Krauss, who drew divisions both from Scotti and from Hofacher, as well as from Stein.
Krauss was finding the question of communications very difficult, especially for his artillery ammunition, and could not open his new attack till Dec. ro.
Between Conrad's two efforts Krauss had made a determined attempt to drive the Italians off the Grappa line.
Krauss, who reports that he was not allowed to have the German troops on the spot more than 48 hours before they were to attack, claims that this " excessive sparing " of the troops worked out badly, for they suffered from insufficient acquaintance with the terrain.
Krauss had better success with his right wing.
Krauss accepted failure for the moment, hoping for an early spring offensive farther west.
Krauss and I.