Vico founded no school, and though during his lifetime and for a while after his death he had many admirers both in Naples and the northern cities, his fame and name were soon obscured, especially as the Kantian system dominated the world of thought.
The distinguished after writers, whom we have to regard as repeating in essence pre-Kantian theories, generally know Kant, and frequently show traces of him in detail.
Mansel tried (1858) to play Pascal's game on Kantian principles, developing the sceptical side of 'Kant's many-faceted mind.
The term mysticism is indeed often extended by popular usage and philosophical partisanship to the whole activity of the post-Kantian idealists.
To take but one example, "the distinction between sensible qualities and the substance to which they belong, and between thought and the mind that thinks, is not the invention of philosophers; it is found in the structure of all languages, and therefore must be common to all men who speak with understanding" (Hamilton's Reid, pp. 229 and The principles which Reid insists upon as everywhere present in experience evidently correspond pretty closely to the Kantian categories and the unity of apperception.
The transcendental deduction, or proof from the possibility of experience in general, which forms the vital centre of the Kantian scheme, is wanting in Reid; or, at all events, if the spirit of the proof is occasionally present, it is nowhere adequately developed.
THOMAS HILL GREEN (1836-1882), English philosopher, the most typical English representative of the school of thought called Neo-Kantian, or Neo-Hegelian, was born on the 7th of April 1836 at Birkin, a village in the West Riding of Yorkshire, of which his father was rector.
Brown wrote a criticism of Darwin's Zoonomia (1798), and was one of the first contributors to the Edinburgh Review, in the second number of which he published a criticism of the Kantian philosophy, based entirely on Villers's French account of it.
In 1789 he published his chief work, the Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermägens, in which he attempted to simplify the Kantian theory and make it more of a unity.
The development of the Kantian standpoint contained in the "New Theory of Human Understanding" (1789), and in the Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791), was called by its author Elementarphilosophie.
However crude and hasty this critical investigation, it helped to direct philosophic reflection to the unity of mind, and so to develop the post-Kantian line of speculation.
Thus his theoretic opposition to the Kantian aesthetics is but the reflection of his practical opposition to the form-idolatry of the Weimar poets.
Schubert, he published an edition of the works of Kant, to which he appended a history of the Kantian doctrine.
He felt that any philosophical advance must be based on the Kantian methods.
He has been called Kantian and Neo-Kantian, Realist and Idealist (by himself, for he held that appearance and reality are co-extensive and coincident).
It effected a revolution in his mode of thinking; so completely did the Kantian doctrine of the inherent moral worth of man harmonize with his own character, that his life becomes one effort to perfect a true philosophy, and to make its principles practical maxims. At first he seems to have thought that the best method for accomplishing his object would be to expound Kantianism in a popular, intelligible form.
He resolved to bring himself before Kant's notice by submitting to him a work in which the principles of the Kantian philosophy should be applied.
The Critique of Revelation marks the culminating point of Fichte's Kantian period.
It was not possible that having reached this point he should not press forward and leave the Kantian position.
The remainder of the year he spent at Zurich, slowly perfecting his thoughts on the fundamental problems left for solution in the Kantian philosophy.
(a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental consideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under which cognition is possible.
Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the Kantian view - lying, indeed, at the foundation of it - was the doctrine that the matter of cognition is altogether given, or thrown into the form of cognition from without.
Besides the histories of post-Kantian philosophy by Erdmann, Fortlage (whose account is remarkably good), Michelet, Biedermann and others, see Wm.
In Kantian terminology Dialektik is the name of that portion of the Kritik d.
It was by asking precisely these questions that Hegel gave the finishing strokes to the Kantian philosophy.
Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity.
At first the influence of German thought, German enlightenment and idealism was apparent, particularly in Kollar (a Slovak); the influence of Kant was seen in Palacky, that of Hegel and post-Kantian speculation in Aug.
Is obvious; and his limitation of reason to the sphere of experience suggests in itself the title of agnostic or positivist rather than that of sceptic. Yet, if we go a little deeper, there is substantial justification for the view which treats agnosticism of the Kantian type as essentially sceptical in its foundations and in its results.
2 It may be as well to add that the sceptical side of Kantianism is mainly confined to the Critique of Pure Reason, but this side of Kantian thought has been most widely influential.
From 1796 date the Briefe Ã¼ber Dogmatismus and Kriticismus, an admirably written critique of the ultimate issues of the Kantian system; from 1797 the essay entitled Neue Deduction des Naturrechts, which to some extent anticipated Fichte's treatment in the Grundlage des Naturrechts, published in 1796, but not before Schelling's essay had been received by the editors of the Journal.'
Philosophic (1796), containing an interpretation of the Kantian Kritik in the manner of Salomon Maimon.
In neither, however, are they a grammatical classification of words by their structure; and in neither are they a psychological classification of notions or general conceptions (voi uara), such as they afterwards became in Kant's Critique and the post-Kantian idealism.
In order to prove this novel conclusion he started afresh from the Cartesian " I think " in the Kantian form of the synthetic unity of apperception acting by a priori categories; but instead of allowing, with all previous metaphysicians, that the Ego passively receives sensations from something different, and not contenting himself with Kant's view that the Ego, by synthetically combining the matter of sensations with a priori forms, partially constructs objects, and therefore Nature as we know it, he boldly asserted that the Ego, in its synthetic unity, entirely constructs things; that its act of spontaneity is not mere synthesis of passive sensations, but construction of sensations into an object within itself; and that therefore understanding makes as well as shapes Nature.
As long as even the meagre realism of the Kantian thing in itself is maintained, the account of there being one sun is simply that one thing causes different phenomena in different minds.
- Noumenal Idealism In Germany Noumenal idealism is the metaphysics of those who suppose that all known things are indeed mental, but not all are phenomenal in the Kantian sense, because a noumenon is knowable so long as by a noumenon we mean some mental being or other which we somehow can discover beyond phenomena.
If things different but similar have the same attributes, and are thereby the same, then in the first place the Kantian categories, though thoughts of mental origin and therefore confined to mind, are nevertheless applicable to things, because things, though different from, are the same as, thoughts, and have the categories of thoughts; in the second place, the Fichtian Ego of mankind is not the Absolute Reason of God, and yet is the same Absolute Reason; in the third place, the Schellingian Nature is the "other " of Spirit, and yet, being a mere reflex of the Idea of Nature, is identical with Spirit; and as this Spirit is everywhere the same in God and men, Nature is also identical with our Spirit, or rather with the Infinite Spirit, or Absolute Reason, which alone exists.
He really accepted, like Kant, the hypothesis of a sense of sensations which led to the Kantian conclusion that the Nature we know in time and space is mere sensible appearances in us.
But he has a different theory of human nature and soul, and so does not accept the Kantian conclusion that things in themselves, in the sense of things beyond phenomena, are all unknowable.
Phenomenal idealism is the Kantian contention that Nature, as known to science, is phenomena of experience.
Lange (q.v.) by his History of Materialism has exercised a profound influence, which is due partly to its apparent success in answering materialism by Kantian arguments, and partly to its ingenious attempt to give.
But this modification made no difference to the Kantian and Neo-Kantian deduction from the epistemological to the metaphysical.
Having, however, made a deduction, which is at all events consistent, that on Kantian assumptions all we know is mental phenomena, Lange proceeded to reduce the rest of Kantism to consistency.
Vaihinger, himself a profound Kantian of the new school, says: " Critical scepticism is the proper result of the Kantian theory of knowledge."
There is only one Neo-Kantian way out of this dilemma, but it is to alter the original assumptions of Kant's psychological idealism.
Riehl, who in Der philosophische Kriti .cis- mus (1876, &c.) proposes the non-Kantian hypothesis that, though things in themselves are unknowable through reason alone, they are knowable by empirical intuition, and therefore also by empirical thought starting from intuition.
He accepts the Kantian positions that unity of consciousness combines sensations by a priori synthesis, and that therefore all that natural science knows about matter moving in space is merely phenomena of outer sense; and he agrees with Kant that from these data we could not infer things in themselves by reason.
Further, holding that, " like every other perception, the perception of a human body immediately involves the existence of that body," and, like Fichte, believing in a " common consciousness," he concludes that the evidence of sense is verined by " common consciousness " of the external world as objective in the Kantian sense of universally valid.
Atoms, which are never given to any consciousness, he returns the familiar Kantian answer that, though unperceived, they are perceptible.
He has a special relation to Fichte in developing the Kantian activity of consciousness into will and substituting activity for substantiality as the essence of soul, as well as in breaking down the antithesis between phenomena and things in themselves.
He constructs his system on the Kantian order - sense, understanding, reason - and exhibits most clearly the necessary consequence from psychological to metaphysical idealism.