It occurs frequently in poetry, owing to the alteration for metrical reasons of the natural order of words; Jevons quotes as an example Shakespeare, Henry VI.: "The duke yet lives that Henry shall depose."
In regard to the fetishism of the Gold Coast NoII' of Africa, Jevons (Introduction to the History of J (y f Religion, pp. 165-166) maintains that" public opinion does not approve of the worship by an individual of a suhman, or private tutelary deity, and that his dealings with it are regarded in the nature of ` black art ' as it is not a god of the community."In China there is a" classical or canonical, primitive and therefore alone orthodox (tsching) and true XIII.
Its use in the Eucharist of the undivided Church has been continued since the great schism, although the Eastern Church protests against the interpolation 1 Jevons, Introd.
Jevons in the chair of logic and philosophy, at Owens College, Manchester.
The calculations of the last Coal Commission as to the future exports and of Mr Jevons as to the future annual consumption make us hesitate to prophesy how long our coal resources are likely to last.
Jevons, Introduction to the History of Religion (London, 1896); Sir A.
Jevons, Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan People, p. 161, &c. (London, 1890); L.
Jevons, An Introduction to the History of Religion, chs.
Jevons, 2nd ed.
In quantitative judgments we may think x = y, or, as Boolero oses x = v ° p p y = - ° y, or, as Jevons proposes, x = xy, or, as Venn proposes, x which is not y=o; and equational symbolic logic is useful whenever we think in this quantitative way.
An old error that we may have a valid syllogism from merely negative premises (ex omnibus negativis), long ago answered by Alexander and Boethius, is now revived by Lotze, Jevons and Bradley, who do not perceive that the supposed second negative is really an affirmative containing a " not " which can only be carried through the syllogism by separating it from the copula and attaching it to one of the extremes, thus: The just are not unhappy (negative).
Worse still, Jevons proceeded to confuse analytic deduction from consequence to ground with hypothetical deduction from ground to conseguence under the common term "inverse deduction."
Jevons supposed induction to be inverse deduction, distinguished from direct deduction as analysis from synthesis, e.g.
Sigwart declares himself in agreement with Jevons; except that, being aware of the difference between hypothetical deduction and mathematical analysis, and seeing that, whereas analysis (e.g.
The views of Jevons and Sigwart are in agreement in two main points.
According to both, again, the hypothesis of a law with which the process starts contains more than is present in the particular data: according to Jevons, it is the hypothesis of a law of a cause from which induction deduces particular effects; and according to Sigwart, it is a hypothesis of the ground from which the particular data necessarily follow according to universal laws.
The question therefore arises, how we are to discover "All M is P," and this question Wundt answers by adding an inductive method, which involves inverting the inductive syllogism in the style of Aristotle into a deductive syllogism from a hypothesis in the style of Jevons, thus: - (I) (2) S is P. Every M is P.
He agrees with Jevons in calling this second syllogism analytical deduction, and with Jevons and Sigwart in calling it hypothetical deduction.
It is, in fact, a common point of Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt that the universal is not really a conclusion inferred from given particulars, but a hypothetical major premise from which given particulars are inferred, and that this major contains presuppositions of causation not contained in the particulars.
Mill confused Newton's analytical deduction with hypothetical deduction; and thereupon Jevons confused induction with both.
Hence it is that Jevons, followed by Sigwart and Wundt, reduces it to deduction from a hypothesis in the form "Let every M be P, S is M,.
Jevons, in his Principles of Science, constantly makes the same sort of mistake.
In the same way, to infer a machine from hearing the regular tick of a clock, to infer a player from finding a pack of cards arranged in suits, to infer a human origin of stone implements, and all such inferences from patent effects to latent causes, though they appear to Jevons to be typical inductions, are really deductions which, besides the minor premise stating the particular effects, require a major premise discovered by a previous induction and stating the general kind of effects of a general kind of cause.
As we have seen, Jevons, Sigwart and Wundt all think that induction contains a belief in causation, in a cause, or ground, which is not present in the particular facts of experience, but is contributed by a hypothesis added as a major premise to the particulars in order to explain them by the cause or ground.
It is not syllogism in the form of Aristotle's or Wundt's inductive syllogism, because, though starting only from some particulars, it concludes with a universal; it is not syllogism in the form called inverse deduction by Jevons, reduction by Sigwart, inductive method by Wundt, because it often uses particular facts of causation to infer universal laws of causation; it is not syllogism in the form of Mill's syllogism from a belief in uniformity of nature, because few men have believed in uniformity, but all have induced from particulars to universals.
Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science (3rd ed., London, 1879); Studies in Deductive Logic (London, 1880); H.
Liard, Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains (5th ed., 1907), deals only with the 19th-century inductive and formal-symbolic logicians down to Jevons, to whom the book was originally dedicated.
404; Jevons, Princ. of Science ii.
3 Dr Jevons finds the primitive form in totemism (Introd.
Jevons (in An Introduction to the History of Religion, vii.) distinguishes between " things taboo," which have the mystic contagion inherent in them, and " things tabooed," to which the taboo-infection has been transmitted.
Jevons, An Introduction to the History of Religion (2nd ed., 1902); E.
WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS (1835-1882), English economist and logician, was born at Liverpool on the 1st of September 1835.
His father, Thomas Jevons, a man of strong scientific tastes and a writer on legal and economic subjects, was an iron merchant.
Degree Jevons obtained a post as tutor at Owens College, Manchester.
Jevons suffered a good deal from ill health and sleeplessness, and found the delivery of lectures covering so wide a range of subjects very burdensome.
Jevons arrived quite early in his career at the doctrines that constituted his most characteristic and original contributions to economics and logic. The theory of utility, which became the keynote of his general theory of political economy, was practically formulated in a letter written in 1860; and the germ of his logical principles of the substitution of similars may be found in the view which he propounded in another letter written in 1861, that "philosophy would be found to consist solely in pointing out the likeness of things."
This paper does not appear to have attracted much attention either in 1862 or on its publication four years later in the Journal of the Statistical Society; and it was not till 1871, when the Theory of Political Economy appeared, that Jevons set forth his doctrines in a fully developed form.
It was not till after the publication of this work that Jevons became acquainted with the applications of mathematics to political economy made by earlier writers, notably Antoine Augustin Cournot and H.
As regards the discovery of the connexion between value in exchange and final (or marginal) utility, the priority belongs to Gossen, but this in no way detracts from the great importance of the service which Jevons rendered to English economics by his fresh discovery of the principle, and by the way in which he ultimately forced it into notice.
But a certain exaggeration of emphasis may be pardoned in a writer seeking to attract the attention of an indifferent public. It was not, however, as a theorist dealing with the fundamental data of economic science, but as a brilliant writer on practical economic questions, that Jevons first received general recognition.
In this work Jevons embodied the substance of his earlier works on pure logic and the substitution of similars; he also enunciated xv.
In 1877 and the following years Jevons contributed to the Contemporary Review some articles on J.
Stanley Jevons, edited by his wife (1886).