Lotze publicly and formally denied that he belonged to the school of Herbart, though he admitted that historically the same doctrine which might be considered the forerunner of Herbart's teachings might lead to his own views, viz.
But he also recognizes association by similarity, or assimilation, or " apperception " in Herbart's more confined sense of the word, and association by contiguity, or complication.
(a) Of the idea we may say that whatever else it is, and apart from all puzzles as to ideas of relations such as smallness, of negative qualities such as injustice, or of human inventions such as beds, it is opposed to that of which it is the idea as its intelligible formula or law, the truth or validity - Herbart's word - of the phenomenon from the point of view of nexus or system.
Kant's Logic. Herbart's admitted allegiance, however, was Kantian with the qualification, at a relatively advanced stage of his thinking, that it was " of the year 1828 " - that is, after controversy had brought out implications of Kant's teaching not wholly contemplated by Kant himself.
That it was the formal character of Herbart's logic which was ultimately fatal to its acceptance outside the school as an independent discipline is not to be doubted.
And lastly, Herbart's logic conforms to the exigencies of his system as a whole and the principle of the bare or absolute self-identity of the ultimate " reals " in particular.
For at the basis of Herbart's speculation there lies a conception of identity foreign to the thought of Kant with his stress on synthesis, in his thoroughgoing metaphysical use of which Herbart goes back not merely to Wolff but to Leibnitz.
To those, of course, for whom the only real identity is identity in difference, while identity without difference, like difference without identity, is simply a limit or a vanishing point, Herbart's logic and metaphysic will alike lack plausibility.
The setting of Herbart's logic in his thought as a whole might of itself perhaps justify separate treatment.
Herbart's influence is surely to be found too in the evolution of what is called Gegenstandstheorie.
Reference has been made above to the effect upon the rise of the later psychological logic produced by Herbart's psychology of apperception, when disengaged from the background of his metaphysic taken in conjunction with his treatment in his practical philosophy of the judgment of value or what he calls the aesthetic judgment.
The paradox of the theory of judgment is due to the ideal of identity, and the way in which this is evaded by supplementation to produce a non-judgmental identity, followed by translation of the introduced accessories with conditions in the hypothetical judgment, is thoroughly in Herbart's manner.
His metaphysical method, however, is like Herbart's, not identifiable with his logic, and the latter has for its central characteristic its thorough restatement of the logical forms traditional in language and the text-books, in such a way as to harmonize with the doctrine of a reality whose organic unity is all-inclusive.