The principle therefore of these investigations is opposed to two attempts frequently repeated in the history of philosophy, viz.: (1) the attempt to establish general laws or forms, which the development of things must have obeyed, or which a Creator must have followed in the creation of a world (Hegel); and (2) the attempt to trace the genesis of our notions and decide as to their meaning and value (modern theories of knowledge).
In this endeavour he forms with Herbart an opposition to the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, which aimed at objective and absolute knowledge, and also to the criticism of Kant, which aimed at determining the validity of all human knowledge.
These manifestations of the divine spirit again cannot be traced and understood by reducing (as Hegel did) the growth of the human mind in the individual, in society and in history to the monotonous rhythm of a speculative schematism; the essence and worth which is in them reveals itself only to the student of detail, for reality is larger and wider than philosophy; the problem, "how the one can be many," is only solved for us in the numberless examples in life and experience which surround us, for which we must retain a lifelong interest and which constitute the true field of all useful human work.
Up to the revolutionary year 1830 his religious views had remained strongly tinged with rationalism, Hegel remaining his guide in religion as in practical politics and the treatment of history.
In religion, which was his main interest, he was much influenced by Hegel, and appears somewhat in the ambiguous position of a sceptic anxious to believe.
(see C. Hegel, Steidle and Gilden, ii.
In earlier life he had been a zealous student of Kant and Hegel, and to the end he never ceased to cultivate the philosophic spirit; but he had little confidence in metaphysical systems, and sought rather to translate philosophy into the wisdom of life.
His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz).
The same reason that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy.
Hegel was such a system.
Hegel brushes aside all these hesitations.
Hegel offers a supposed proof that Time and Space, Matter, Nature, are ascertainable and definable 2 This is Kant's positive refutation of Hume's scepticism.
Through this unexpected and obscure principle of "dialectic Hegel claimed to fulfil his programme of interpreting everything as manifest necessary truth of ideal relationship. It all must be so and you see it must.
Hegel wrote extensively upon religion, especially in his Philosophy of Religion.
If perfect knowledge be possible for us, it must take, the form of such a system as Hegel offers.
If the world exists purely to be known, and if every other working of reason comes into consideration qua incomplete knowledge, Hegel is right with his sweeping intellectualism.
Used by Kant sceptically of the limitations of reason, dialectic in Hegel becomes constructive; and scepticism itself becomes a stage in knowledge.
Not that a posteriori is denied, or that idealism even in Hegel tries to evolve reality out of the philosopher's inner consciousness.
1 Hegel will allow no dualism of fact and principles.
Hegel, as often interpreted - pantheistically?) or (b) nothing exists but minds (e.g.
Hegel, as interpreted by Dr MacTaggart).
The English thinkers influenced by Hegel are inclined to assert mechanism unconditionally, as the very expression of reason - the only thinkable form of order.
And, as the sympathizers with Hegel try to force mechanical necessity into the garb of absolute or ideal necessity, so they seek to show that moral necessity is only an inferior form of absolute or ideal or, we might say, mathematical necessity.
MacTaggart in regard to Hegel, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, chap. iii.
Malebranche gave all causation to God; and the acosmist - as Hegel called him, in repudiation of Bayle's nickname " atheist " - Spinoza, from the premises of Carte.
The main line in pure philosophy runs on from Kant's wavering and sceptical idealism to the all-including gnosis of Hegel.'
Hegel inherits from Kant the three arguments, and takes them as stages in one developing process of argu- thought.
Trace out the clue of causation to the end, says Hegel in effect, and it introduces you, not to a single first cause beyond nature, but to the totality of natural process - a substance, as it were, in which all causes inhere.
And, in some sense not clearly explained, Hegel identifies this final religion with Christianity.
The theism of Hegel is ambiguous.'
(3) Hegel regards them as phases.
- Two sets of writers have been considered: - first, the greater philosophers, who have incidentally furthered theism (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Mill, Lotze), or opposed it (Epicurus, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Mill, Spencer); and, secondly, the deliberate champions of theism - Cicero (especially in the De Natura Deorum), Philo, Raymond of Sabunde (in a sense), Wolff, Butler (in a sense), Paley, and a host of English and German 18th-century authors, who chiefly handle the Design argument; then recent writers like R.
Like Schelling, Hegel conceives the problem of existence as one of becoming.
With Hegel the absolute is itself a dialectic process which contains within itself a principle of progress from difference to difference and from unity to unity.
Nature to Hegel is the idea in the form of hetereity; and finding itself here it has to remove this exteriority in a progressive evolution towards an existence for itself in life and mind.
Nature (says Zeller) is to Hegel a system of gradations, of which one arises necessarily out of the other, and is the proximate truth of that out of which it results.
It does not conceive of the organic as succeeding on the inorganic, or of conscious life 2 Hegel somewhere says that the question of the eternal duration of the world is unanswerable: time as well as space can be predicated of finitudes only.
Hegel gives a place in his metaphysical system to the mechanical and the teleological views; yet in his treatment of the world as an evolution the idea of end or purpose is the predominant one.
Of the followers of Hegel who have worked out his peculiar idea of evolution it is hardly necessary to speak.
Funck-Brentano (Paris, 1895); Vuylsteke, Oorkondenboek der stad Gent (Ghent,' 1900, &c.); Karl Hegel, Steidle and Gilden (Leipzig, 1891), vol.
The Moral Self (1897); Principles of Individuality (1911); What Religion Is (1920) as well as translations of Hegel and Lotze.
Hegel) was represented in England in a fragmentary way by S.
The movement of German philosophy which led from Kant to Hegel has indeed found powerful British champions (T.
To appreciate the significance of the doctrines of Heraclitus, it must be borne in mind that to Greek philosophy the sharp distinction between subject and object which pervades modern thought was foreign, a consideration which suggests the conclusion that, while it is a great mistake to reckon Heraclitus with the materialistic cosmologists of the Ionic schools, it is, on the other hand, going too far to treat his theory, with Hegel and Lassalle, as one of pure Panlogism.
Ethics here stands to sociology in a close relation, similar, in many respects, to that which we find in Hegel and in Comte.
He published also translations into French with commentaries of Hegel's works: Logique de Hegel (Paris, 1859; 2nd ed., 1874); Philosophie de la nature de Hegel (1863-65); Philosophic de l'esprit de Hegel (1867-69); Philosophie de la religion de Hegel (1876-78, incomplete).
Hegel therefore, to take an instance, can no more fitly be classed as a mystic than Spinoza can.
To Hegel similarly the world, though evil at any moment, progresses by conflict and suffering towards the good.
He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.
Through the influence of Prof. Daub he was led to an interest in the then predominant philosophy of Hegel and, in spite of his father's opposition, went to Berlin to study under the master himself.