Up to the revolutionary year 1830 his religious views had remained strongly tinged with rationalism, Hegel remaining his guide in religion as in practical politics and the treatment of history.
In earlier life he had been a zealous student of Kant and Hegel, and to the end he never ceased to cultivate the philosophic spirit; but he had little confidence in metaphysical systems, and sought rather to translate philosophy into the wisdom of life.
His philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism (Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz).
The same reason that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy.
Hegel was such a system.
Hegel brushes aside all these hesitations.
Hegel offers a supposed proof that Time and Space, Matter, Nature, are ascertainable and definable 2 This is Kant's positive refutation of Hume's scepticism.
Hegel wrote extensively upon religion, especially in his Philosophy of Religion.
If perfect knowledge be possible for us, it must take, the form of such a system as Hegel offers.
If the world exists purely to be known, and if every other working of reason comes into consideration qua incomplete knowledge, Hegel is right with his sweeping intellectualism.
Used by Kant sceptically of the limitations of reason, dialectic in Hegel becomes constructive; and scepticism itself becomes a stage in knowledge.
Not that a posteriori is denied, or that idealism even in Hegel tries to evolve reality out of the philosopher's inner consciousness.
1 Hegel will allow no dualism of fact and principles.
Hegel, as often interpreted - pantheistically?) or (b) nothing exists but minds (e.g.
Hegel, as interpreted by Dr MacTaggart).
The English thinkers influenced by Hegel are inclined to assert mechanism unconditionally, as the very expression of reason - the only thinkable form of order.
And, as the sympathizers with Hegel try to force mechanical necessity into the garb of absolute or ideal necessity, so they seek to show that moral necessity is only an inferior form of absolute or ideal or, we might say, mathematical necessity.
MacTaggart in regard to Hegel, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, chap. iii.
Malebranche gave all causation to God; and the acosmist - as Hegel called him, in repudiation of Bayle's nickname " atheist " - Spinoza, from the premises of Carte.
The main line in pure philosophy runs on from Kant's wavering and sceptical idealism to the all-including gnosis of Hegel.'
Hegel inherits from Kant the three arguments, and takes them as stages in one developing process of argu- thought.
Trace out the clue of causation to the end, says Hegel in effect, and it introduces you, not to a single first cause beyond nature, but to the totality of natural process - a substance, as it were, in which all causes inhere.
And, in some sense not clearly explained, Hegel identifies this final religion with Christianity.
(3) Hegel regards them as phases.
Like Schelling, Hegel conceives the problem of existence as one of becoming.
With Hegel the absolute is itself a dialectic process which contains within itself a principle of progress from difference to difference and from unity to unity.
Nature to Hegel is the idea in the form of hetereity; and finding itself here it has to remove this exteriority in a progressive evolution towards an existence for itself in life and mind.
Nature (says Zeller) is to Hegel a system of gradations, of which one arises necessarily out of the other, and is the proximate truth of that out of which it results.
Hegel gives a place in his metaphysical system to the mechanical and the teleological views; yet in his treatment of the world as an evolution the idea of end or purpose is the predominant one.
Of the followers of Hegel who have worked out his peculiar idea of evolution it is hardly necessary to speak.
The Moral Self (1897); Principles of Individuality (1911); What Religion Is (1920) as well as translations of Hegel and Lotze.
In the Philosophy of the Practical, but more especially in the work entitled What is living and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel Croce criticizes the erroneous treatment of the opposites, and shows that on the contrary every opposition has at bottom a distinction from which it arises, and that therefore the true unity is unity-distinction, which is development and, as such, opposition that is continuously surpassed and continually re-appearing to be again surpassed.
The philosophers from whom Croce learned most are Vico, the author of the Scienza nuova, and Hegel, but the thought of all other thinkers flows in his writings, in conformity with its historical character, and for this reason may, for instance, be found in it traces of some of Hegel's most active opponents, such as Herbart.
In his studies he had come under the influence of Schleiermacher, Hegel and Franz Baader; but he was a man of independent mind, and developed a peculiar speculative theology which showed a disposition towards mysticism and theosophy.
One of his best lieutenants said of him in a moment of impatience: " Lord Derby is like the God of Hegel: ` Er setzt sich, er verneint sich, er verneint seine Negation.'
In 1858, under the stimulus of Henry C. Brockmeyer, Harris became interested in modern German philosophy in general, and in particular in Hegel, whose works a small group, gathering about Harris and Brockmeyer, began to study in 1859.
With Thomas Hill Green he founded in England a school of orthodox neo-Hegelianism, and through his pupils he exerted a farreaching influence on English philosophy and theology.
The Unconscious appears as a combination of the metaphysic of Hegel with that of Schopenhauer.
A disciple of Neander and friend of Richard Rothe, Muller bitterly opposed the philosophy of Hegel and the criticism of F.
Through the influence of Prof. Daub he was led to an interest in the then predominant philosophy of Hegel and, in spite of his father's opposition, went to Berlin to study under the master himself.
He was remotely a disciple of Schelling, learnt much from Herbart and Weisse, and decidedly rejected Hegel and the monadism of Lotze.
To Hegel similarly the world, though evil at any moment, progresses by conflict and suffering towards the good.