H 13-15) differently, with the consideration of (1) good fortune (thTvxta), and (2) gentlemanliness (KaXoKayaBia).
Gentlemanliness it regards as perfect virtue, containing all particular virtues, and all goods for the sake of the honourable.
Finally, the treatise concludes with saying that the limit of gentlemanliness has thus been stated, meaning that its limit is the service and contemplation of God and the control of desire by reason.
8-10) on these points is unlike the Nicomachean, and like the Eudemian Ethics in discussing good fortune and gentlemanliness, but it discusses them in a more worldly way.
They also become less like one another than before: for the treatment of good fortune, gentlemanliness, and their limit is more theological in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Magna Moralia.
Thirdly, the emphasis of the Eudemian Ethics on the perfect virtue of gentlemanliness (KaXoKaya©ia) is a decidedly old-fashioned trait, which descended to Aristotle from the Greek notion of a gentleman who does his duty to his state (cf.
505 B) to identify the form of good, without which nothing is good, with the gentlemanly thing (KaXov Kai ayaObv), without which any possession is worthless, he inspired into the author of the Eudemian Ethics the very limit (ipos) of good fortune and gentlemanliness with which it concludes, only without Plato's elevation of the good into the form of the good.
But gentlemanliness is no longer called perfect virtue, as in the Eudemian Ethics: its place has been taken by justice, which is perfect virtue to one's neighbour, by prudence which unites all the moral virtues, and by wisdom which is the highest virtue.
Accordingly, in the end the old ideal of gentlemanliness is displaced by the new ideal of the speculative and practical life.
The determination of the limit of good fortune and of gentlemanliness by looking to the ruler, God, who governs as the end for which prudence gives its orders, and the conclusion that the best limit is the most conducive to the service and contemplation of God, presents the Deity and man's relation to him as a final and objective standard more definitely in the Eudemian than in the Nicomachean Ethics, which only goes so far as to say that man's highest end is the speculative wisdom which is divine, like God, dearest to God.
8), and in emphasizing the perfect virtue of gentlemanliness (ii.
In the second book, it runs parallel to the Eudemian Ethics in placing good fortune and gentlemanliness (ii.
8-9), where the Nicomachean Ethics places the speculative and the practical life; but it omits the theological element by denying that good fortune is divine grace, and by submitting gentlemanliness to no standard but that of right reason, when the irrational part of the soul does not hinder the rational part, or intellect (vows), from doing its work.