To the former he owes his appreciation of exact investigation and a complete knowledge of the aims of science, to the latter an equal admiration for the great circle of ideas which had been diffused by the teaching of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.
IMMANUEL HERMANN FICHTE (originally [[Hartmann) Von]] (1797-1879), German philosopher, son of J.
Fichte, was born at Jena on the 18th of July 1797.
Fichte, in short, advocates an ethical theism, and his arguments might easily be turned to account by the apologist of Christianity.
One of the tests by which Fichte discriminates the value of previous systems is the adequateness with which they interpret moral experience.
The idealisms of Fichte and Schelling made contributions to Hegel's thought; Krause and the Roman Catholic Baader represent parallel if minor phases of idealism.
Fichte, Matthew Arnold, perhaps H.
From 1847 onward Ulrici edited, jointly with the younger Fichte, the Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie u.
Feuerbach labours under the same difficulty as Fichte; both thinkers strive in vain to reconcile the religious consciousness with subjectivism.
In later life he was powerfully influenced by Fichte, and subsequently, on grounds of religious feeling, by Jacobi and Bardili.
Fichte a new speculative theism, and became an opponent of Hegel's pantheistic idealism.
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814), German philosopher, was born at Rammenau in Upper Lusatia on the 19th of May 1762.
With these qualities Fichte himself combined a certain impetuosity and impatience probably derived from his mother, a woman of a somewhat querulous and jealous disposition.
A tutorship at Zurich was, however, obtained in the spring of 1788, and Fichte spent in Switzerland two of the happiest years of his life.
Fichte accepted a post as private tutor in Warsaw, and proceeded on foot to that town.
The situation proved unsuitable; the lady, as Kuno Fischer says, "required greater submission and better French" than Fichte could yield, and after a fortnight's stay Fichte set out for Konigsberg to see Kant.
The problem which Fichte dealt with in this essay was one not yet handled by Kant himself, the relations of which to the critical philosophy furnished matter for surmise.
Fichte sent his essay to Kant, who approved it highly, extended to the author a warm reception, and exerted his influence to procure a publisher.
In this conclusion we can trace the prominence assigned by Fichte to the practical element, and the tendency to make the requirements of the ego the ground for all judgment on reality.
To direct attention to the true nature of revolution, to demonstrate how inextricably the right of liberty is interwoven with the very existence of man as an intelligent agent, to point out the inherent progressiveness of state arrangements, and the consequent necessity of reform or amendment, such are the main objects of the Beitrage; and although, as is often the case with Fichte, the arguments are too formal and the distinctions too wiredrawn, yet the general idea is nobly conceived and carried out.
Towards the close of 1793 Fichte received an invitation to succeed K.
Fichte, while accepting the call, desired to spend a year in preparation; but as this was deemed inexpedient he rapidly drew out for his students an introductory outline of his system, and began his lectures in May 1794.
Some misunderstanding caused an outburst of ignorant ill-feeling on the part of the students, who proceeded to such lengths that Fichte was compelled to reside out of Jena.
In 1798 Fichte, who, with F.
The diasters of Prussia in 1806 drove Fichte from Berlin.
During these years, however, Fichte was mainly occupied with public affairs.
Debarred from taking an active part, Fichte made his contribution by way of lectures.
On the day after she was pronounced out of danger Fichte was struck down.
The philosophy of Fichte, worked out in a series of writings, and falling chronologically into two distinct periods, that of Jena and that of Berlin, seemed in the course of its development to undergo a change so fundamental that many critics have sharply separated and opposed to one another an earlier and a later phase.
This may be so, but it can be admitted neither that Fichte's views underwent radical change, nor that the Wissenschaftslehre was ever regarded as in itself complete, nor that Fichte was unconscious of the apparent difference between his earlier and later utterances.
To the criticisms of the latter, in particular, Fichte owed much, but his own activity went far beyond what they supplied to him.
Even in the practical sphere, however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition, was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of the Wissenschaftslehre.
To answer this one must bear in mind what Fichte intended by designating all philosophy Wissenschaftslehre, or theory of science.
Not that it is a natural history, or even a phenomenology of consciousness; only in the later writings did Fichte adopt even the genetic method of exposition; it is the complete statement of the pure principles of the understanding in their rational or necessary order.
It is what Fichte called a Deed-act (Thathandlung); we cannot be aware of the process, - the ego is not until it has affirmed itself, - but we are aware of the result, and can see the necessity of the act by which it is brought about.
As early as 1797 Fichte had begun to see that the ultimate basis of his system was the absolute ego, in which is no difference of subject and object; in 1800 the Bestimmung des Menschen defined this absolute ego as the infinite moral will of the universe, God, in whom are all the individual egos, from whom they have sprung.
"Thus," says Fichte, "we reach a final conclusion.
Fichte, Sammtliche Werke (8 vols., Berlin, 1845-1846), with Nachgelassene Werke (3 vols., Bonn, 1834-1835); also Leben and Briefwechsel (2 vols., 1830, ed.
Among translations are those of William Smith, Popular Writings of Fichte, with Memoir (2 vols., London, 1848-1849, 4th ed.
Busse, Fichte and seine Beziehung zur Gegenwart des deutschen Volkes (Halle, 1848-1849); J.
Neueren Philosophie (1869, 1884, 1890); Ludwig Noack, Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren and Wirken (Leipzig, 1862); R.
Wotschke, Fichte and Erigena (1896); W.
Kabitz, Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichte- 'schen Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie (1902); E.
De Fichte (1902); M.
Fichte and der neuere Socialismus (1900).
Originally a follower of Hegel, he turned to Fichte and Beneke (q.v.), with whose insistence on psychology as the basis of all philosophy he fully agreed.
There was nothing original in the treatment, but it showed such power of appreciating the new ideas of the Fichtean method that it was hailed with cordial recognition by Fichte himself, and gave the author immediately a place in popular estimation as in the foremost rank of existing philosophical writers.
He had already contributed articles and reviews to the Journal of Fichte and Niethammer, and had thrown himself with all his native impetuosity into the study of physical and medical science.
This period was marked by considerable changes in his views and by the final breach on the one hand with Fichte and on the other hand with Hegel.
Thus Fichte, Spinoza, Jakob Boehme and the Mystics, and finally, the great Greek thinkers with their Neoplatonic, Gnostic, and Scholastic commentators, give respectively colouring to particular works.
From Fichte he derived the ideal of a completed whole of philosophic conception and also the formal method to which for the most part he continued true.
The criticisms of Fichte, and more particularly of Hegel (in the "Vorrede" to the Pheinomenologie des Geistes), point to the fatal defect in the conception of the absolute as mere featureless identity.
Educated at first at Eisenberg, he proceeded to Jena, where he studied philosophy under Hegel and Fichte and became privatdozent in 1802.
Fichte now set himself in the Wissenschaftslehre (1794) to make transcendental idealism into a system of metaphysical idealism without Kant's inconsistencies and relics of realism.
This construction, or self-determination, is what Fichte called positing (setzen).
Further, according to Fichte, on the one hand the Ego posits itself as determined through the non-Ego - no object, no subject; this is the principal fact about theoretical reason; on the other hand, the Ego posits itself as determining the non-Ego - no subject, no object; this is the principal fact about practical reason.
Fichte thus transformed the transcendental idealism of Kant by identifying the thing with the object, and by interpreting noumenon, not in Kant's sense of something which speculative reason conceives and practical reason postulates to exist in accordance with the idea, but in the new meaning of a thought, a product of reason.
But the universal historian Gervinus, refuting this opinion of the specialist historian, tries to prove that the campaign of 1813 and the restoration of the Bourbons were due to other things beside Alexander's will--such as the activity of Stein, Metternich, Madame de Stael, Talleyrand, Fichte, Chateaubriand, and others.