His limitation of theological knowledge to the bounds of human need might, if logically pressed, run perilously near phenomenalism; and his epistemology ("we only know things in their activities") does not cover this weakness.
Epistemology is concerned rather with the possibility of knowledge in the abstract (sub specie aeternitatis, Ward, ibid.).
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to draw a hard and fast line between epistemology and other branches of philosophy.
If, for example, philosophy is divided into the theory of knowing and the theory of being, it is impossible entirely to separate the latter (Ontology) from the analysis of knowledge (Epistemology), so close is the connexion between the two.
Some thinkers have identified the two, while others regard Epistemology as a subdivision of logic; others demarcate their relative spheres by confining logic to the science of the laws of thought, i.e.
Yvcnacs) for "Epistemology" as a special term for that part of Epistemology which is confined to "systematic analysis of the conceptions employed by ordinary and scientific thought in interpreting the world, and including an investigation of the art of knowledge, or the nature of knowledge as such."
"Epistemology" would thus be reserved for the broad questions of "the origin, nature and limits of knowledge" (Baldwin's Diet.
We, on the contrary, mainly through the influence of Descartes, rather ask what are the things we know, and therefore, some more and some less, come to connect ontology with epistemology, and in consequence come to treat metaphysics in relation to psychology and logic, from which epistemology is an offshoot.
The conclusion of his epistemology is that we start with ourselves positing subjective sensations - e.g.
The metaphysics resulting from this epistemology is that the socalled thing in itself is not a cause of our sensations, but a product of one's own thinking, a determination of the Ego, a thing known to the Ego which constructs it.
He calls this epistemology " transcendent realism "; it is really " transcendent idealism."
He saw that the theories of the origin of knowledge in idealistic epistemology are unsound.
Kant, however, had no epistemology for such a contention, because according to him both outer and inner senses give mere appearance, from which we could not know either body in itself, or soul in itself.
The three most vital idealisms of this kind at the moment are the panpneumatism of Hartmann, combining Hegel with Schopenhauer; the panteleologism of Lotze, reviving Leibnitz; and the panpsychism of Paulsen, continuing Fechner, but with the addition of an epistemology combining Kant with Schopenhauer.
Like all true followers of Kant, Riehl prefers epistemology to metaphysics; yet in reality he founds a metaphysics on epistemology, which he calls " critical realism," so far as it asserts a knowledge of things beyond phenomena, and " critical monism," so far as it holds that these things are unlike both physical and psychical phenomena, but are nevertheless the common basis of both.
From this epistemology he derives the metaphysical conclusion that the things we know are indeed independent of my consciousness and of yours, taken individually, or, to use a new phrase, are " transsubjective "; but, so far from being independent of the common consciousness, one and the same in all of us, they are simply its contents in the inseparable relation of subject and object.
In his logic, and especially in his epistemology, Wundt appears as a mediator between Hume and Kant, but with more leaning to the latter.
But to make such a conversion from phenomenalism plausible, it is necessary to be silent about his whole psychology, logic, and epistemology, and the consequent limitation of knowledge to experience, and of reason to ideas and " ideals," without any power of inferring corresponding things.
Spencer widens the empirical theory of the origin of knowledge by his brilliant hypothesis of inherited organized tendencies, which has influenced all later psychology and epistemology, and tends to a kind of compromise between Hume and Kant.
Tried to effect a harmony of Kant and Hegel by proceeding from the epistemology of the former to the metaphysics of the latter.
Wundt's comprehensive view that logic looks backwards to psychology and forward to epistemology was hundreds of years ago one of the many discoveries of Aristotle.
And the light that later writers bring to bear on Kant's logic and epistemology from other sides of his speculation varies in kind and in degree.
He created their formal logic and contributed much that was of value to their psychology and epistemology; but in the main his work was to new-label and new-arrange in every department, and to lavish most care and attention on the least important parts - the logical terminology and the refutation of fallacies, or, as his opponents declared, the excogitation of fallacies which even he could not refute.
The order in which, for clearness of exposition, it will be most convenient to consider these disciplines will be psychology, epistemology or theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, then logic, aesthetics and ethics.
This leads to the consideration of the main divisions of philosophy - PsYcxoLoGY (q.v.), epistemology (theory of knowledge, Erkenntnisstheorie), and metaphysics (ontology; see Metaphysic).
We return to the distinction between epistemology and psychology, by way of illustrating the nature of the former, we may take the following summing up by Professor James Ward in a valuable article on "Psychological Principles" in Mind (April 1883, pp. 166, 567): "Comparing psychology and epistemology, then, we may say that the former is essentially genetic in its method, and might, if we had the power to revise our existing terminology, be called biology; the latter, on the other hand, is essentially devoid of everything historical, and treats, sub specie aeternitatis, as Spinoza might have said, of human knowledge, conceived as the possession of mind in general."
But appearing with these thinkers as the problem of perception, epistemology widens its scope and becomes, in Kant's hands, the question of the possibility of experience in general.
This introduces us to the second part of the question we are seeking to determine, namely the relation of epistemology to metaphysics.
If self-consciousness be treated in this objective fashion, then we pass naturally from epistemology to metaphysics or ontology.
Without prejudice, then, to the claim of epistemology to constitute the central philosophic discipline, we may simply note its liability to be pressed too far.
The result of the foregoing, however, is to show that, as soon as epistemology draws its conclusion, it becomes metaphysics; the theory of knowledge passes into a theory of being.
The metaphysic is the epistemology from another point of view - regarded as completing itself, and explaining in the course of its exposition that relative or practical separation of the individual knower from the knowable world, which it is a sheer assumption to take as absolute.
Logic, therefore, agrees with epistemology (and differs from psychology) in treating thought not as mental fact but as knowledge, as idea, as having meaning in relation to an objective world.
Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, chap. ii.) has been directed, though it is chiefly expressed in the language of epistemology, has its roots nevertheless in the direct testimony of moral experience.