1 Hegel will allow no dualism of fact and principles.
Thus at several points Plato reveals germs of dualism and asceticism.
The threatened dualism of ideal and material becomes for Aristotle mainly a contrast of matter and form; the lower stage in development desires or aims at the higher, matter more and more tending to pass into form, till God is form without any matter.
Against Manichaean dualism he had vindicated free will; but as against Pelagianism he taught the bondage of sinful man - a position accepted in the East but never welcome there, and not more than half welcome even in the West.
In the philosophy of Descartes we meet with a dualism of mind and matter which does not easily lend itself to the conception of evolution.
The fundamental dualism of Basilides is confirmed also by one or two other passages.
It is possibly also in connexion with the dualism of his fundamental 1 =Nimrod = Zoroaster, cf.
Now, of this sharply-defined dualism there is scarcely a trace in the system described by the Fathers of the Church.
Basilides, then, represents that form of Gnosticism that is closest to Persian dualism in its final form.
So far as we can see, on the other hand, Basilides appears actually to represent a further development of Iranian dualism, which later produced the religious system of Mani.
But in Judaism monotheistic conceptions reigned supreme, and the Satan of Jewish belief as opposed to God stops short of the dualism of Persian religion.
In view of the results of this analysis, Reid's theory (and the theory of Scottish philosophy generally) has been dubbed natural realism or natural dualism, in contrast to theories like subjective idealism and materialism or to the cosmothetic idealism or hypothetical dualism of the majority of philosophers.
It was expounded by Geulincx and Malebranche to avoid the difficulty of Descartes's dualism of thought and extension, and to explain causation.
But this dualism is a temporally limited dualism - no more than an episode in the world-whole - and is destined to terminate in monotheism.
The aim of knowledge is explanation, and the dualism or pluralism which acquiesces in recognizing two or more wholly disparate forms of reality has in so far renounced explanation.
SeeABSOLUTE; Dualism; Metaphysics; Materialism; Idealism.
His destructive criticism thus tended to reintroduce the dualism between faith and reason which Scholasticism had laboured through centuries to overcome, though Scotus himself, of course, had no such sceptical intention.
Jellachich, who as a soldier was devoted to the interests of the imperial house, realized that the best way to break the revolutionary power of the Magyars and Germans would be to encourage the Slav national ideas, which were equally hostile to both; to set up against the Dualism in favour at Pest and Vienna the federal system advocated by the Sla y s, and so to restore the traditional Habsburg principle of Divide et impera.
On subjects of politics, amongst the more important works are the various monographs of Gustavus Beksics on the Dualism of AustriaHungary, on the " New Foundations of Magyar Politics " (A magyar politika uj alapjai, 1899), on the Rumanian question, &c.; the writings of Emericus Balint, Akos Beothy, Victor Concha (systematic politics), L.
Except Gregory Magistros none of the Armenian sources lays stress on the dualism of the Paulicians.
Yet this did not probably go beyond the dualism of the New Testament itself.
The dualism of the earlier Zoroastrians, which may be compared with the Christian doctrine of God and Satan, gradually tended in la.
This philosophy, called Empirio-criticism, is not, however, a realistic but an idealistic dualism, nor can it be called materialism.
In the later heresy of Manichaeism there were affinities to Gnosticism, but it was a mixture of many elements, Babylonian-Chaldaic theosophy, Persian dualism and even Buddhist ethics (p. 126).
2 His bitter foe is his uncle; the germs of dualism appear early.
Thus defined, idealism is opposed to ordinary common-sense dualism, which regards knowledge or experience as the result of the more or less accidental relation between two separate and independent entities - the mind and its ideas on one side, the thing with its attributes on the other - that serve to limit and condition each other from without.
All thought starts from the ordinary dualism or pluralism which conceives of the world as consisting of the juxtaposition of mutually independent things and persons.
In the pantheism that thus takes the place of the old dualism there seems no place left for the individual.
Dualism, but on another, and this the deeper side, he represents the attempt to restore the theory in a more satisfactory form.
This is as far removed as possible either from dualism or from empiricism.
But with these advances came the danger of falling into error from which common-sense dualism and naturalistic monism were free.
Whatever the shortcomings of individual writers may be, modern idealism differs, as we have seen, from the arrested idealism of Berkeley precisely in the point on which dualism insists.
To this dualism opposes the doctrine that truth and falsehood are a matter of mere immediate intuition: " There is no problem at all in truth and falsehood, some propositions are true and some false just as some roses are red and some white."
3 The issue between the two theories under this head may here be left with the remark that it is a curious comment on the logic of dualism that setting out to vindicate the reality of an objective standard of truth it should end in the most subjective of all the way a thing appears to the individual.
Dualism meets the assertion of absolute unity by the counter assertion of mere difference.
So far from establishing the truth for which dualism is itself concerned - the reality of all differences - such a theory can end only in a scepticism as to the reality of any difference.
The psychological theory of cognition takes for granted the dualism of the mind that knows and the object known; it takes no account of the metaphysical problem as to the possibility of a relation between the ego and the non-ego, but assumes that such a relation does exist.
It might seem, indeed, that Stoicism indicates a falling off from Plato and Aristotle towards materialism, but the ethical dualism, which was the ruling tendency of the Stoa, could not long endure its materialistic physics, and took refuge in the metaphysical dualism of the Platonists.
The Apotheosis and Hamartigenia are polemic, the first against the disclaimers of the divinity of Christ, the latter against the gnostic dualism of Marcion and his followers.
And even when there is an attempt at reconciliation, it is still quite clear how strong was the original dualism which has to be overcome.
A further weakening of the dualism is indicated when, in the systems of the Valentinian school, the fall of Sophia takes place within the godhead, and Sophia, inflamed with love, plunges into the Bythos, the highest divinity, and when the attempt is thus made genetically to derive the lower world from the sufferings and passions of fallen divinity.
All these efforts at reconciliation show how clearly the problem of evil was realized in these Gnostic and half-Gnostic sects, and how deeply they meditated on the subject; it was not altogether without reason that in the ranks of its opponents Gnosticism was judged to have arisen out of the question, 7r60ev TO KaK6P; This dualism had not its origin in Hellenic soil, neither is it related to that dualism which to a certain extent existed also in late Greek religion.
It is an Oriental (Iranian) dualism which here finds expression, though in one point, it is true, the mark of Greek influence is quite clear.
When Gnosticism recognizes in this corporeal and material world the true seat of evil, consistently treating the bodily existence of mankind as essentially evil and the separation of the spiritual from the corporeal being as the object of salvation, this is an outcome of the contrast in Greek dualism between spirit and matter, soul and body.
For in Oriental (Persian) dualism it is within this material world that the good and evil powers are at war, and this world beneath the stars is by no means conceived as entirely subject to the influence of evil.
Gnosticism has combined the two, the Greek opposition between spirit and matter, and the sharp Zoroastrian dualism, which, where the Greek mind conceived of a higher and a lower world, saw instead two hostile worlds, standing in contrast to each other like light and darkness.
Even the characteristic dualism of Gnosticism has already proved to be in part of Iranian origin; and now it becomes clear how from that mingling of late Greek and Persian dualism the idea could arise that these seven halfdaemonic powers are the creators or rulers of this material world, which is separated infinitely from the light-world of the good God.
The attitude of Gnosticism to the Old Testament and to the creator-god proclaimed in it had its deeper roots, as we have already seen, in the dualism by which it was dominated.
With this dualism and the recognition of the worthlessness and absolutely vicious nature of the material world is combined a decided spiritualism.
And it is interesting to observe how, e.g., St Augustine, though desperately combating the dualism of the Manichaeans, yet afterwards introduced a number of dualistic ideas into Christianity, which are distinguishable from those of Manichaeism only by a very keen eye, and even then with difficulty.