Conceptual logic, on the other hand, is false from the start.
The conceptual logic has made the mistake of making ideation a stage in thought prior to judgment.
Hence arose conceptual logic; according to which conception is a simple apprehension of an idea without belief in being or not being, e.g.
The conceptual logic supposes that conception always precedes judgment; but the truth is that sensory judgment begins and inferential judgment ends by preceding conception.
As the same writer puts it: " There is such a thing as numerical difference, different from conceptual difference," 2 or expressing the same thing in other words " there are relations not grounded in the nature of the related terms."
He starts, that is in logic, with conceptual units apparently self-contained and admitting of nothing but external relation, but proceeds to justify the intrinsic relation between the matter of his units by an appeal to the fact of the coherence of all contents of thought.
The great merit of conceptual logic was the demand for a mental analysis of mental reasoning, and the direct analysis of reasoning into judgments which are the sole premises and conclusions of reasoning and of all mental inferences.
It was natural enough that the originators of conceptual logic, seeing that judgments can be expressed by propositions, and conceptions by terms, should fall into the error of supposing that, as propositions consist of terms, so judgments consist of conceptions, and that there is a triple mental order - conception, judgment, reasoning - parallel to the triple linguistic order - term, proposition, discourse.
It is in this treatise that what have been called " the conceptual categories " 8 emerge, viz.
It was in the pressing to its extreme consequences of the conception of uncompromising identity which is to be found in Leibnitz, that the contradictions took their rise which Herbart aimed at solving, by the method of relations and his doctrine of the ultimate plurality of " reals," The logic of relations between conceptual units, themselves unaltered by the relation, seems a kind of reflection of his metaphysical method.
If some, and not the least essential, of these aspects are quasi-negative, it must be remembered that negations - witness the Unseen, the Unknown, the Infinite of a more advanced theology - are well adapted to supply that mystery on which the religious consciousness feeds with the slight basis of conceptual support it needs.
Their point is to stretch Hume's phenomenalism so as to embrace all science, by contending that mechanism is not at the bottom of phenomena, but is only the conceptual shorthand by aid of which men of 'science can briefly describe phenomena, and that all science is description and not explanation.
But, in opposition to Wundt and in common with Schuppe, he believes that experience is (1) experience of the individual, and (2) experience of the race, which is but an extension of individual experience, and is variously called, in the course of the discussion, universal, collective, conceptual, rational experience, consciousness in general, absolute consciousness, intelligence, and even, after Caird, " a perfect intelligence."
The former belong to the school of empirical logic, the latter to the school of conceptual and formal logic. Both have started from points which Aristotle indicated without developing them.
But we must first consider the mental analysis of inference, and this brings us to conceptual and formal logic.
At the same time his psychology, though maintaining his empiricism, contained some seeds of conceptual logic, and indirectly of formal logic. Intellectual development, which according to the logic of the Analytics consists of sense, memory, experience, induction and intellect, according to the psychology of the De Anima consists of sense, imagination and intellect, and one division of intellect is into conception of the undivided and combination of conceptions as one (De An.
But the same passage relegates conceptions and their combinations to the De Anima, and confines the De Inter pretatione to names and propositions in conformity with the linguistic analysis which pervades the logical treatises of Aristotle, who neither brought his psychological distinction between conceptions and their combinations into his logic, nor advanced the combinations of conceptions as a definition of judgment (Kcp16cs), nor employed the mental distinction between conceptions and judgments as an analysis of inference, or reasoning, or syllogism: he was no conceptual logician.
Conceptual logicians were, indeed, from the first aware that sense supplies the data, and that judgment and therefore inference contains belief that things are or are not.
It is, however, the main business of logic to direct us how out of judgments to form inferences signified by discourse; and this is the one point which conceptual logic has contributed to the science of inference.
Formal logic has arisen out of the narrowness of conceptual logic. The science of inference no doubt has to deal primarily with formal truth or the consistency of premises and conclusion.
This process is called conceptual synthesis, the possibility of which is a sine qua non for the exchange of information by speech and writing.
These are easy to spot: They rely on huge conceptual leaps without a framework to support them.
(I) He perceived the importance of the universal or conceptual element in knowledge, and thus at a single stroke broke through the hard realism of ordinary common sense, disproved all forms of naturalism that were founded on the denial of the reality of thought, and cut away the ground from a merely sensational and subjective idealism.
If what is real in things is ultimately nothing but their relations, and if relations are inconceivable apart from the relating mind, what is this but the dissolution of the solid ground of external reality which my consciousness seems to assure me underlies and eludes all the conceptual network by which I try to bring one part of my experience into connexion with another ?
Knowledge has under both forms the same object, the relative difference of the two being that when the conceptual form predominates we have speculative science and when the form of judgment prevails we have empirical or historical science.