An attack from the Trentino with the object of cutting the Italian communications with the Julian front, and so bottling Cadorna's main force in what Krauss calls " the Venetian sack," was an operation which could not but commend itself to the Austrian general staff.
Cadorna's general line of argument, when rumours of attack began to arrive, resembled that of Falkenhayn.
On April 2 1 at Cadorna's request Brusati sent a report upon the defensive system between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana, accompanied by a map showing the various lines, stating that the conditions were " re-assuring," and that the third line of defence upon which Cadorna had laid special emphasis could be considered as being in a satisfactory state of efficiency.
The Italian position looked unfavourable and worse was yet to come, but Cadorna's confidence was justified.
By June 2 Cadorna's V.
Weakness in artillery was Cadorna's main preoccupation for many days.
If he had obeyed in the letter Cadorna's order that the greater part of the forces belonging to the XXVII.
Cadorna's main preoccupation was now for the IV.
It was natural, perhaps, that he should not have realized fully and at once the urgent necessities of the situation, but his hesitation to act promptly in accordance with Cadorna's instructions exposed him to the danger of having the retreat of his right wing cut off.
Cadorna's communique of Oct.
But Cadorna's open condemnation of his soldiers was strongly resented in many quarters.
Whether Cadorna or Capello was right in idea is a question which will remain a subject of contention, though Cadorna's arguments seem almost unanswerable.
The point is that Capello would seem to have interpreted Cadorna's instructions as to counter-offensive action in too liberal a fashion, influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by his own wish to attempt a big counter-stroke.
Cadorna's efforts had not succeeded in making all of his subordinates grasp the principles of defence in depth, or of " elastic " defence.